State v. Bundy

• Decision Date: 20 August 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11CA818.,11CA818.
• Parties: STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Eric Lapaul BUNDY, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

974 N.E.2d 139

2012 -Ohio- 3934

STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Eric Lapaul BUNDY, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 11CA818.

Court of Appeals of Ohio,

Fourth District, Pike County.

Aug. 20, 2012.

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Sarah G. LoPresti, Ohio Assistant Public Defender, Columbus, OH, for appellant.

Robert Junk, Pike County Prosecuting Attorney, Waverly, OH, for appellee.

ABELE, P.J.

{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a Pike County Common Pleas Court judgment of conviction and sentence. The jury found Eric L. Bundy, defendant below and appellee herein, guilty of (1) reckless homicide, in violation of R.C. 2905.041, along with an R.C. 2941.141 firearm specification and an R.C. 2941.145 specification that appellant used a firearm to facilitate the offense; ¹ (2) improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle, in violation of R.C. 2923.16(B); and (3) receiving stolen property, in violation of R.C. 2913.51(A).

{¶ 2} Appellant assigns the following errors for review:

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

“THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED MR. BUNDY'S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL BY ENTERING JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION FOR RECKLESS HOMICIDE, WHEN THE JURY'S DETERMINATION THAT MR. BUNDY HAD NOT ACTED IN SELF–DEFENSE WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

“THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND DEPRIVED ERIC BUNDY OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 16, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION WHEN IT INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT THE STATE MAY REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF SELF–DEFENSE BY DEMONSTRATING THAT THE DEFENDANT DID NOT MEET THE THREE ELEMENTS OF THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF SELF–DEFENSE.”

{¶ 3} Appellant's conviction stems from an unfortunate sequence of events that culminated in the fatal shooting of Richard “Pig” Harris. In April 2010, appellant had been living with Pig's brother, Brandon Harris, a reputed drug dealer. Appellant claimed to be Brandon's “bodyguard.” On April 19, 2010, appellant became angry with Brandon for leaving him home without money. Appellant then decided to steal Brandon's gun, along with some cocaine and Percocet. Appellant intended to sell the items in order to obtain money.

{¶ 4} When Brandon returned home, he and Pig discovered the missing gun and drugs. They suspected appellant had stolen them and decided to find appellant to retrieve the items.

{¶ 5} In the meantime, appellant contacted Shawn Fyffe, another reputed drug dealer, to ask for assistance to sell the items. The Harris brothers also had contacted Fyffe to ask about appellant's whereabouts. After Fyffe advised the Harris brothers that he had just spoken with appellant, the Harris brothers requested Fyffe to arrange a meeting with appellant without letting appellant know about the Harris brothers involvement. Fyffe agreed. Fyffe and appellant decided to rendezvous at an abandoned parking lot.

{¶ 6} Appellant and his brother, Charles “Chucky” Bundy, arrived at the designated location and remained in their vehicle. When Fyffe and the Harris brothers (along with Brandon's girlfriend, Lauren Smith) arrived, the Harris brothers immediately exited the vehicle and ran to the Bundy vehicle. At that point, the sequence of the events is disputed. It is undisputed, however, that appellant shot a gun that resulted in Pig's death.

{¶ 7} Each of the five witnesses to the shooting had a different account. Appellant claimed that Brandon punched out the passenger side window with the butt of a gun and that Brandon and Pig were dragging him out of the vehicle. He stated that he told Chucky to “go go go,” as he fired the gun in the air. He claimed that the shooting was an accident.

{¶ 8} Chucky stated that two or three guys jumped out of the Harris vehicle. He claimed that one of them jumped on the top of the car, pointed a gun at appellant, and stated, “your [sic] fucken [sic] dead.” Chucky stated that “they” busted the window and then starting hitting appellant and trying to pull him out of the vehicle. Chucky claimed that he put the car in reverse and “took off.” He stated that he was unaware appellant had discharged the gun.

{¶ 9} Brandon admitted that he punched out the window, but disputed appellant's claim that he did so with a gun. Brandon stated that he used his hand to punch through the window. Brandon claimed that appellant fired the gun and shot Pig at the same time that he started to punch out the window. Brandon further disputed appellant's claim that he and Pig were trying to pull him out of the vehicle. Brandon stated that he and Pig were standing next to each other on the passenger side, where appellant was seated.

{¶ 10} Lauren Smith, Brandon's girlfriend, stated that Brandon and Pig exited the car and went to the passenger side of the Bundy vehicle. She explained that “as Brandon hit the window, I seen [sic] a gunshot go off in the passenger side.”

{¶ 11} Shawn Fyffe stated that Pig and Brandon jumped out of the vehicle. He saw Brandon proceed to the driver's side and Pig to passenger side. He stated that both Brandon and Pig were punching the window. He saw a window shatter and then heard the gunshot.

{¶ 12} A Pike County Grand Jury returned an indictment that charged appellant with: (1) murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A), along with an R.C. 2941.141 firearm specification and an R.C. 2941.146 specification that appellant committed a felony that includes, as an essential element, purposely or knowingly causing or attempting to cause the death of or physical harm to another and that was committed by discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle other than a manufactured home; (2) improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle, in violation of R.C. 2923.16(B)²; and (3) receiving stolen property, in violation of R.C. 2913.51(A).

{¶ 13} At trial, appellant asserted that pursuant to R.C. 2901.05(B) (the “castle doctrine”), he presumptively acted in self-defense. Appellant claimed that he was entitled to the self-defense presumption because Brandon and Pig were in the process of unlawfully entering the vehicle that he occupied at the time he shot Pig. Appellant asserted that Brandon's action of breaking the window and Brandon's and Pig's actions of attempting to drag him from the vehicle demonstrated that they were in the process of unlawfully entering the vehicle.

{¶ 14} The state, however, disputed appellant's argument that he was entitled to the R.C. 2901.05(B) self-defense presumption. To support its theory that appellant was not entitled to the self-defense presumption, the state noted that the coroner, Dr. Gretel C. Stephens,³ testified that the bullet that killed Pig entered his body in the left pectoral region and traveled through his body from right to left. She stated that the bullet perforated his lungs, heart and pulmonary artery and that the wound was “fairly quickly fatal.” The state suggested that her testimony shows that appellant knew how to shoot to kill, that he intended to do so when he shot Pig, and that the shooting was not an “accident,” as appellant claimed.

{¶ 15} On cross-examination, appellant's counsel asked Dr. Stephens whether the bullet trajectory was “consistent with [the victim] leaning towards the muzzle of the gun at the time that it fired.” Dr. Stephens stated that it was consistent with that scenario. Counsel additionally questioned whether she found any glass fragments on the bullet. She stated that she did not. Appellant suggested that this testimony indicated that Pig was leaning toward the vehicle at the time appellant discharged the weapon and that appellant fired the gun after Brandon had punched out the window.

{¶ 16} The state further relied upon the eyewitness accounts that appellant discharged the gun at approximately the same time that Brandon was striking the window. The state argued that this evidence showed that appellant fired the weapon before anyone attempted to enter the vehicle that he occupied, and thus, this evidence defeated his claim of presumptive self-defense under R.C. 2901.05(B). The state additionally asserted that even if the evidence showed that Brandon's fist had entered, or was in the process of entering, the vehicle, the evidence did not support appellant's claim that Pig had entered, or was in the process of entering, the vehicle. The state contended that because the victim, Pig, was not in the process of entering the vehicle, the self-defense presumption did not apply.

{¶ 17} At the close of all the evidence, appellant moved for a judgment of acquittalregarding the murder count. He argued that the evidence demonstrated that he presumptively acted in self-defense under R.C. 2901.05(B). Appellant asserted that the presumption applied because (1) he was lawfully in the vehicle, (2) he was not at fault, and (3) Brandon tried to unlawfully enter the vehicle. The court denied appellant's motion.

{¶ 18} During closing argument, the state did not dispute that Brandon punched the window. The state did, however, observe that the evidence conflicted as to whether appellant discharged the gun before, during, or after the time that Brandon punched out the window. Moreover, the state asserted that appellant was not entitled to the self-defense presumption because the evidence failed to show that the victim, Pig, was in the process of unlawfully entering the vehicle when appellant shot him. The state observed that Brandon punched the window, “[b]ut [appellant] didn't shoot Brandon.” The state argued that according to Brandon and Lauren, Pig was not reaching into the vehicle when appellant shot him.

{¶ 19} Appellant's counsel asserted that the evidence demonstrated that Brandon and Pig jointly attacked the vehicle in which appellant was a lawful passenger, broke the window and then tried to drag appellant out of the vehicle.⁴ He contended that these facts show that appellant presumptively acted in self-defense under...