State v. Bunyon
| Decision Date | 26 October 1926 |
| Docket Number | 12087. |
| Citation | 135 S.E. 361,137 S.C. 391 |
| Parties | STATE v. BUNYON. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from General Sessions Circuit Court of Barnwell County; H. F Rice, Judge.
John Allen Bunyon was convicted of manufacturing spirituous liquors, and he appeals. Affirmed.
Harley & Blatt, of Barnwell, for appellant.
B. D Carter, Sol., of Bamberg, for the State.
The appellant, John Allen Bunyon, with his wife, Olivia Bunyon and his brother, Lloyd Bunyon, were tried in the court of general sessions for Barnwell county on a charge of violation of the prohibition law. The indictment set up two counts first, the unlawful possession of alcoholic liquors; and, second, manufacturing spirituous liquors.
At the conclusion of all the testimony, there was a motion for direction of a verdict on behalf of each of the defendants. With the consent of the solicitor, the trial judge, Hon. H. F. Rice, directed verdicts of not guilty as to the defendants, Olivia and Lloyd Bunyon, but refused the motion as to the appellant, John Allen Bunyon.
The verdict of the jury in the case against John Allen Bunyon was "not guilty" of possession, and "guilty" on the count charging manufacturing. A motion for a new trial was made upon the ground that there was no evidence upon which to base the conviction; this motion was refused; and the appellant was thereupon sentenced to serve six months upon the public works of Barnwell county or for a like period in the state penitentiary.
The exceptions which charge error in the refusal to direct a verdict of acquittal and the refusal to grant a new trial will be considered together.
The testimony on behalf of the state, as given by Sheriff Dyches, Magistrate Sanders, and Constable Scott, was to the effect that they searched the premises owned by Lloyd Bunyon where John Allen Bunyon and his wife, Olivia, lived; that in a kitchen adjoining the dwelling house were found a complete copper still and a barrel of mash, which were covered up with fodder; that the still pipe was full of liquor; that the still was what is termed a "kerosene outfit," and that a kerosene stove was found in another part of the house; that water had been run off the mash; that the appellant admitted to the officers that the still was his property; that the still had been lately run.
The testimony for the defendants came from the appellant and his wife. The wife denied any knowledge as to the still and mash being in the house. She stated that the night previous to the raid by the officers that she and her husband "went to commencement, and came back home about 12 o'clock"; and that her husband did not bring the still back with them.
The appellant testified that he brought the still to his home about 12 o'clock the night previous to the raid with the intention of making whisky, but that he had not made any; that he placed the mash in the kitchen, but that he did not know anything about any whisky being in the still pipe. On cross-examination, the appellant evaded answering directly questions of the solicitor. He could not tell, according to his testimony, whether the still was hot or cold when he secured it, or from whom he got it, and the court and jury must have been satisfied from his answers that he was seeking to keep from disclosing the whole truth.
We think the circuit judge was right in submitting the case to the jury, and we are unable to find any error in his refusal to grant the motion for a new trial.
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State v. Baker
...governing circumstantial evidence where the State depends solely upon this class of evidence to support a conviction. State v. Bunyon, 137 S.C. 391, 135 S.E. 361; State v. Rickenbaker et al., 187 S.C. 448, 198 43. We think in this case the State depended entirely upon circumstantial evidenc......
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State v. Gatlin
... ... overlooks the fact that the crime in this case and the ... identity of appellant were established by direct evidence and ... the circumstances introduced were merely corroborative. In ... such a case it is not requisite that the law of ... circumstantial evidence be charged. State v. Bunyon, ... 137 S.C. 391, 135 S.E. 361; State v. Rickenbaker, ... 187 S.C. 448, 198 S.E. 43 ... ... Moreover, our statutes do not require, and we know of no ... decision of this court requiring, corroboration of the ... testimony of the prosecutrix to establish the guilt of the ... ...
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State v. White
... ... 'hot.' In that the State did not rely solely upon ... circumstantial evidence, and no request having been made for ... a charge thereabout, failure to charge the law of ... circumstantial evidence is not reversible error. State v ... Bunyon, 137 S.C. 391, 135 S.E. 361; State v ... Rickenbaker, 187 S.C. 448, 198 [211 S.C. 281] S.E. 43; ... State v. Duck, 210 S.C. 94, 41 S.E.2d 628, and the ... cases therein cited on this issue ... There ... was no objection to the testimony of the witnesses, Rawlinson ... and ... ...
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State v. Rickenbaker
... ... counsel. The appellants contend, however, that although there ... was no request for such instructions it was yet the duty of ... the trial Judge to charge upon the law as to circumstantial ... evidence, and cite the case of State v. Bunyon, 137 ... S.C. 391, 135 S.E. 361, wherein Mr. Justice Blease, later ... Chief Justice, stated (page 362): "There is no doubt as ... to the proposition that when the state depends entirely upon ... circumstantial evidence for the conviction of an accused ... person, it is the duty of the circuit ... ...