State v. Burns
Decision Date | 14 July 1933 |
Docket Number | 6014 |
Citation | 23 P.2d 731,53 Idaho 418 |
Parties | STATE, Respondent, v. OTTO D. BURNS, Appellant |
Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
CRIMINAL LAW-STATUTORY OFFENSE-STATUTES-UNCERTAINTY-INVALIDITY.
1. Act creating statutory offense must define acts necessary to constitute such offense with such certainty that person may determine whether he has violated law at time he acts.
2. Accused has right to be informed in all criminal prosecutions not only by law but also by information what acts and conduct are prohibited and made punishable.
3. Statute making attorney or collector refusing to pay over money within twenty days after demand guilty of larceny held void for uncertainty (I. C. A., sec. 17-1014).
APPEAL from the District Court of the Tenth Judicial District, for Nez Perce County. Hon. Chas. F. Koelsch, Judge.
Appeal from a judgment of conviction of the crime of grand larceny. Reversed and remanded, with instructions to enter judgment exoneretur, discharge the appellant and dismiss the action.
Reversed and remanded, with instructions.
Ben F Tweedy, P. E. Stookey and A. L. Morgan, for Appellant.
A law declaring an otherwise innocent act malum prohibitum, which act has no real or substantial relation to such health morals, safety or other public necessity, is unconstitutional. (Ex parte Dees, 46 Cal.App. 656, 189 P 1050; Ex parte Bales, 42 Okla. Cr. 28, 274 P. 485.)
Bert H. Miller, Attorney General, Ariel L. Crowley, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
The legislative right to declare any act, in the interest of the public welfare, unlawful, regardless of intent, is well established. (Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. (U. S.) 386, 1 L.Ed. 648; Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 30 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed. 930; People v. West, 106 N.Y. 293, 12 N.E. 610, 60 Am. Rep. 452.)
Section 17-1014, I. C. A., is constitutional and not in conflict with section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. (16 C. J. 78; Shevlin-Carpenter v. Minnesota, supra; State v. Keller, 8 Idaho 699, 70 P. 1051.)
Budge, C. J., took no part in the decision.
Appellant is a practicing attorney at law at Lewiston, Idaho. In January, 1932, he was employed by one Herman Wolff to prosecute a malpractice claim against a Dr. Carssow. It is claimed by the state that appellant Burns, under the contract of employment, agreed to collect the claim for ten per cent of the recovery, and it is the contention of appellant that the said contract of employment was modified to provide that he should have reasonable compensation for his services in lieu of the ten per cent. The sum of $ 5,000 was collected, without suit, by Burns and a Washington attorney. The promissory notes given in the settlement of the Wolff claim, amounting to $ 2,000, were delivered by Burns to Wolff, Burns retaining the sum of $ 1,500 in cash out of the sum of $ 3,000 paid in the settlement of the claim, for and as a reasonable attorney fee for services rendered Wolff in making the collection, tendering the balance of the cash received in the settlement to Wolff, who accepted it.
September 2, 1932 (after Wolff had accepted the balance of the cash tendered by Burns), a demand was made upon Burns by Wolff in the following words and figures:
September 27, 1932, a criminal complaint was filed in the probate court of Nez Perce county, a warrant of arrest was issued for Burns, he was arrested, given a preliminary hearing in that court and held to answer in the district court for that county on a charge of grand larceny.
December 6, 1932, an information was filed against appellant in the district court for Nez Perce county, the charging part of which is in the following words and figures:
The information was based upon and Burns was prosecuted under sec. 17-1014, I. C. A., reading as follows:
"Refusal of attorney or collector to pay over money.--Every attorney-at-law, agent, collector or other person who collects or receives any money or property...
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