State v. Burns

• Decision Date: 31 December 1896
• Citation: 21 So. 290,38 Fla. 367
• Parties: STATE ex rel. ATTORNEY GENERAL v. BURNS.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

21 So. 290

38 Fla. 367

STATE ex rel. ATTORNEY GENERAL v. BURNS.

Florida Supreme Court

December 31, 1896

Error to circuit court, Escambia county; W. D. Barnes, Judge.

Quo warranto by the state on the relation of the attorney general against Dennis Burns. The information was dismissed, and relator brings error. Affirmed.

Taylor J., dissenting.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

1. A leading purpose of section 16, art. 3, of the constitution is to prevent the incorporation into one act of legislation of more than one subject and matter properly connected therewith. A further object of the requirement is to avoid surprise or fraud in legislation by means of provisions in bills of which the titles give no sufficient notice, and to this end a title of an act should fairly apprise not only the members of the legislature, but the people to be affected, of the subject of legislation being enacted.

2. When the title of an act clearly expresses the whole object of the legislature, and the provisions in the body of the act are germane to the subject expressed in the title, an essential requirement of the constitution has been met, but a general subject may become restricted in details in the body of the act by the title; and where one is so framed as to indicate that matters connected with the subject, generally considered, are not to be treated of in the bill, it is misleading as to any legislation on such matters.

3. Titles to bills must not be misleading, or tend to avert inquiry as to provisions in acts.

4. Section 16, art. 3, of the constitution is mandatory, and the correct rule is to enforce its restrictions in all cases coming within the mischiefs intended by it to be arrested while in cases not falling within such mischiefs a liberal construction should obtain in favor of the lawmaking power.

5. The title of Act 1895, c. 4513, as it passed the legislature, is 'An act to provide for the creation of the city of Pensacola, now known as the provisional municipality of Pensacola, and for the government of said city of Pensacola and to provide for the support and maintenance of said government and improvement of said city.' Under the general provisions in the last part of the act, provision is made for the appointment by the mayor and confirmation by the council of a harbor master, who shall perform all the duties now performed by harbor masters, as set forth in section 956 of the Revised Statutes. The harbor master of the port of Pensacola has never been legally associated with the municipal governments of Pensacola, but has, from the creation of the office in 1866, been appointed by the governor, and the defendant in error is the governor's appointee to said office. Held, that the said provision in the act in reference to the appointment of harbor master by the mayor of the city of Pensacola was not constitutionally enacted.

COUNSEL

John Eagan, C. B. Parkhill, and Blount & Blount, for plaintiff in error.

Mallory & Maxwell, for defendant in error.

The relator, on June 24, 1895, filed in the circuit court of Escambia county an information in which he alleged the passage of the act of the legislature of the state of Florida entitled 'An act to provide for the creation of the city of Pensacola, now known as the provisional municipality of Pensacola, and for the government of said city of Pensacola, and to provide for its officers and their terms of office, and to provide for the support and maintenance of said government and improvement of said city,' and its approval by the governor on May 27, 1895 that such act designated certain named persons as commissioners of election to conduct an election for mayor and aldermen and other officers of said city, and to declare the result of the election; that under said act an election was held on June 4, 1895, and at it were elected, as mayor and aldermen, certain persons named in the information, who were duly thereafter declared elected by the said commissioners, and that such persons were duly qualified and eligible, and on June 7, 1895, took the oath of office, and were, respectively, inducted into the offices of mayor and aldermen; that said act provided for the appointment by the mayor and confirmation by the said board of aldermen of a harbor master, with the powers, duties, and emoluments mentioned in the act; that such board of aldermen duly and lawfully elected the relator as such harbor master; that he was qualified and eligible therefor, and, before the filing of the information, took the oath of office prescribed by law and the ordinances of said city, and gave the bond prescribed by said ordinances, and became qualified to hold the said office; that, before the said election and qualification of relator, the respondent, Dennis Burns, was the incumbent of said office, under appointment by the governor and confirmation by the senate of the state of Florida, and that the relator has made demand upon the respondent to surrender the said office, its property, insignia, franchises, etc., but that the respondent has refused, and still enjoys and uses such property, insignia, franchises, etc. The prayer is the usual one in quo warranto proceedings.

Respondent, by attorneys, filed a demurrer to the information upon the grounds: (1) That said alleged act of the legislature of the state of Florida, entitled 'An act to provide for the creation of the city of Pensacola, now known as the provisional municipality of Pensacola, and to provide for its officers and their terms of office, and to provide for the support and maintenance of said government and improvement of said city,' is unconstitutional and void, because the title of the same was materially altered and changed after it had passed both houses of the legislature and been signed by the officers thereof, and before its signature by the governor, by the insertion therein of the said words, 'and to provide for its officers and their terms of office,' immediately after the word 'Pensacola,' as last occurring in said title. (2) The said alleged act is in violation of section 27, art. 3, of the constitution of the state of Florida. (3) The said alleged act is in violation of section 16, art. 3, of the constitution of the state of Florida, in that it embraces more than one subject and matter properly connected therewith, i. e. the creation of a city and its government and the amendment of the laws relating to the state office of harbor master. (4) The section of said alleged act relating to the said office of harbor master is in violation of section 16, art. 3, of the constitution of the state of Florida (a) because it seeks to amend the laws of the state relating to the state office of harbor master, without expressing same in the title of the act; (b) because it seeks to give to the said harbor master appointed by the mayor of the city of Pensacola jurisdiction and authority outside of the territorial limits of the city, without expressing such subject in the title of the act. After argument the circuit court sustained the demurrer and (the relator not desiring to amend) dismissed the information.

The relator had sued out a writ of error to this court, and assigns as error (1) that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer of the respondent, Dennins Burns, to the information in this cause; (2) that the court erred in rendering judgment against the informant and dismissing the said cause.

OPINION

MABRY, C.J. (after stating the facts).

The title of the act (chapter 4513, Laws 1895), as we must consider it, is 'An act to provide for the creation of the city of Pensacola, now known as the provisional municipality of Pensacola, and for the government of said city of Pensacola, and to provide for the support and maintenance of said government and improvement of said city.' In the title of the enrolled bill signed by the governor, and as published in the acts of the legislature the additional words, 'and to provide for its officers and their terms of office,' are found, but we have held in the case of State v. Green, 36 Fla. 154, 18 So. 334, that, as shown by the journals of the legislature, the additional words were not in the title when the act passed the two houses of the legislative branch of the government, and could not be considered as a part of the title of the act. The body of the act contains 155 sections, with general provisions, and by the first section the inhabitants of the city of Pensacola are created corporate by the name and style of the 'City of Pensacola.' the secOND section divides the powers of government into legislative, executive, and judicial; the legislative consisting of a board of aldermen, the executive of a mayor, with executive boards, and the judicial of a police court. Certain officers and servants of the corporation are provided for, such as comptroller, treasurer, tax collector, assessor, city attorney, physician, judge of the police court, clerk, and marshal. Provisions in the act clearly show that the newly-created city was constructed upon the foundation of an existing municipality. The first section, already referred to, provides that the inhabitants of the city of Pensacola are hereby created corporate, and section 124 enacts that the boundaries of the city shall, until changed as provided by statute, remain as now established by ordinance. There is nothing in the 155 sections of the act, excluding the general provisions, extending the powers of government beyone the scope and already defined limits of the municipal grants to the existing provisional municipality. The title of the act pointedly directs attention to the existing municipality, its terms, in part, being 'An act to provide for the creation of the city of Pensacola, now known as the provisional municipality of...