State v. Burns

Decision Date08 February 1910
Citation124 N.W. 600,145 Iowa 588
PartiesSTATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. LIZZIE BURNS, Appellant
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Appeal from Wapello District Court.--HON. D. M. ANDERSON, Judge.

DEFENDANT was indicted, tried, and convicted of the crime of prostitution, and appeals to this court.

Affirmed.

Jaques & Jaques, for appellant.

H. W Byers, Attorney-General, and Charles W. Lyon, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.

OPINION

DEEMER, C. J.

Defendant was accused of prostitution for that on the 12th day of March, 1909, and at various other days and times during the year just preceding the finding of the indictment, she "did unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously, for the purpose of prostitution and lewdness, resort to, occupy, and inhabit a house of ill-fame kept for such purpose, and did then and therein willfully and feloniously lead a life of prostitution and lewdness, contrary to and in violation of law." This charge is virtually in the language of the statute. Code, section 4943. There was ample testimony to support the verdict; and, unless some error was committed by the trial court, the judgment should stand.

Complaint is made of some of the instructions; but, as no exception was taken to the charge when given, these complaints can not be considered, unless proper exceptions were filed, as provided in section 3709 of the Code. In State v. Williams, 115 Iowa 97, 88 N.W. 194, it is said: "It is true the giving of this instruction together with fifteen others, was made one of the grounds of a motion for a new trial, but this was too general in its terms, for none of the claimed defects in any of the instructions were pointed out therein." And in State v. Kirkpatrick (Iowa), 105 N.W. 121 the rule is thus stated: "No exception was taken to the instructions given. A general complaint as to the correctness of the instructions, made in a motion for a new trial, is not sufficient as the basis of an argument in this court as to their correctness."

II. Over defendant's objections the state was permitted to prove the character and reputation of the house where the defendant stayed. The indictment charged that she (defendant) did resort to, occupy, and inhabit a house of ill-fame, etc. In order to establish the character of the house the testimony offered by the state was clearly admissible. State v. Main, 31 Conn. 572; Betts v State, 93 Ind. 375; Com. v. Kimbell, 73 Mass. 328, 7 Gray 328; O'Brien v. People, 28 Mich. 213, and cases cited in 4 Ency. of Evidence, 726, 727. There seems to be a conflict in the authorities, however, regarding the admissibility of testimony showing the character and reputation of the house as distinguished from the character and reputation of its inmates in the absence of a statute permitting such evidence. See State v. Lyon, 39 Iowa 379. Our statutes (Code, section 4944) now permit the introduction of testimony as to the general reputation of the house. See, also, State v. Haberle, 72 Iowa 138, 33 N.W. 461; State v. Lee, 80 Iowa 75, 45 N.W. 545. It is true that this statute has reference to prosecutions for the keeping of a house of ill-fame; but, as...

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