State v. Burton, 504

• Decision Date: 02 February 1968
• Docket Number: No. 504,504
• Citation: 272 N.C. 687,158 S.E.2d 883
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Lawrence Redman BURTON and Joseph Samuel Miller.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 883

158 S.E.2d 883

272 N.C. 687

STATE of North Carolina v. Lawrence Redman BURTON and Joseph Samuel Miller.

No. 504.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Feb. 2, 1968.

Atty. Gen. T. W. Bruton and Staff Atty. A. A. Vanore, Raleigh, for the state.

L. Bruce McDaniel and Garland B. Daniel, Raleigh, for defendants.

BRANCH, Justice.

The principal question presented for decision is whether the possession by defendants, under the conditions stated, of the identical instrument used in the safecracking was sufficient to repel their motions for nonsuit.

Our research does not reveal a case in this jurisdiction where possession of tools used to effect a burglary or a safecracking was the sole evidence relied upon by the State.

There is ample evidence that someone 'did, by the use of a crowbar and other tools force open a safe of General Electric Supply Company, 18 Seaboard Ave., Raleigh, N.C.' on 17 January 1967, and that three days later defendants were found in possession of burglary tools, one being identified as that which was used to pry open the safe. All of the elements of the crime were clearly proven except the identity of the person or persons who committed the crime.

The State relies on circumstantial evidence to carry the case to the jury. The rule in respect to the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to carry the case to the jury has been clearly stated by this Court in the case of State v. Stephens, 244 N.C. 380, 93 S.E.2d 431, where Higgins, J., speaking for the Court, stated:

"'* * * If there be any evidence tending to prove the fact in issue or which reasonably conduces to its conclusion as a fairly logical and legitimate deduction, and not merely such as raises a suspicion or conjecture in regard to it, the case should be submitted to the jury." The above is another way of saying there must be substantial evidence of all material elements of the offense to withstand the motion to dismiss. It is immaterial whether the substantial evidence is circumstantial or direct, or both. To hold that the court must grant a motion to dismiss unless, in the opinion of the court, the evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence would in effect constitute the presiding judge the trier of the facts. Substantial evidence of guilt is required before the court can send the case to the jury. Proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is required before the jury can convict. What is substantial evidence is a question of law for the court. What that evidence proves or fails to prove is a question of fact for the jury. State v. Simpson (244 N.C. 325, 93 S.E.2d 425); State v. Duncan (244 N.C. 374) 93 S.E.2d 421; State v. Simmons, supra (240 N.C. 780, 83 S.E.2d 904); State v. Grainger, 238 N.C. 739, 78 S.E.2d 769; State v. Fulk, 232 N.C. 118, 59 S.E.2d 617; State v. Frye, 229 N.C. 581, 50 S.E.2d 895; State v. Strickland, 229 N.C. 201, 49 S.E.2d 469; State v. Minton, 228 N.C. 518, 46 S.E.2d 296; State v. Coffey, 228 N.C. 119, 44 S.E.2d 886; State v. Harvey, 228 N.C. 62, 44 S.E.2d 472; State v. Ewing, 227 N.C. 535, 42 S.E.2d 676; State v. Stiwinter, 211 N.C. 278, 189 S.E. 868; State v. Johnson, supra (199 N.C. 429, 154 S.E. 730).'

Although the rule is clearly stated and fully recognized, it is often, as here, difficult in its application.

In the case of State v. Wooten, 239 N.C. 117, 79 S.E.2d 254, there was evidence tending to show that defendant's house and a church faced each other across a paved street, and non-taxpaid liquor was found in a field between the rear of the church and the paved highway. The Court held that the trial judge should have allowed defendants's motion for nonsuit, and stated:

'The testimony for the State is ample to show that some person violated the statutes relating to the possession of intoxicating liquor. It leaves to mere conjecture, however, the all-important question whether the culprit was the defendant or somebody else.'

The Court considered whether the State's evidence was of sufficient probative force to warrant its submission to the jury in the case of State v. Shu, 218 N.C. 387, 11 S.E.2d 155, where the State's evidence tended to show that at about 2:30 on the night of 24 April 1940 a cafe in Mooresville was broken and entered, goods stolen therefrom and a small safe thrown out nearby, unopened. Entrance was effected by breaking the glass of the front door. Blood was on the safe and on the cafe floor, apparently from someone cut by the broken glass. A witness testified that he saw an automobile in front of the cafe at 2:30 A.M. The automobile was registered in the name of defendant's father and was customarily driven by defendant. The witness saw two unidentified men leave the cafe, get in the automobile and drive away rapidly. The defendant lived with his father, two and a half miles from the cafe and had a service station about a mile and a half away, where the automobile was seen at 2:00 the same night. The next morning the automobile was found in the yard at the home of defendant's father. 'There was blood in the automobile, And also a piece of automobile spring, usable as a tire tool, which corresponded to marks on the door of the cafe where it had apparently been used in effecting entrance. (Emphasis ours.) There was no evidence that the defendant was seen at all on the night in question.' When arrested the next day, defendant was thoroughly examined and no cut or scratch was found on him. The Court, holding that the ...