State v. Bustamante

Decision Date29 March 2012
Docket NumberNo. 1 CA–CR 10–0555.,1 CA–CR 10–0555.
Citation631 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 8,274 P.3d 526,229 Ariz. 256
PartiesSTATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Martin Abel BUSTAMANTE, Appellant.
CourtArizona Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Thomas C. Horne, Attorney General By Kent E. Cattani, Chief Counsel, Criminal Appeals/Capital Litigation Division and Liza–Jane Capatos, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Attorneys for Appellee.

Robert Arentz & Associates, P.C. By Robert Arentz, Phoenix, Attorney for Appellant.

THOMPSON, Judge.

¶ 1 Martin Abel Bustamante (defendant) appeals his convictions and sentences for kidnapping and theft by extortion, both class two dangerous felonies; aggravated assault, a class three dangerous felony; and misconduct involving weapons, a class four felony. He argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and the trial court erred in rejecting his Batson1 challenge. We find no reversible error and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 The evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to upholding the jury's verdicts,2 was as follows. Adalberto Cano (Cano) and another man 3 kidnapped victim at gunpoint from a retail store parking lot. A witness identified the driver of the kidnappers' vehicle as a heavyset or pregnant female, and the vehicle as a four-door sedan. Victim subsequently called his girlfriend and relayed the kidnappers' demand for her Mercedes–Benz and $30,000 as ransom. The kidnappers threatened to kill victim if she did not comply with their demands. She cooperated with police, who arranged to drop the Mercedes off at the designated shopping mall with the keys in the gas-cap area as instructed by the kidnappers, and to monitor it.

¶ 3 Cano and defendant arrived at the ransom drop-off point in a small, four-door sedan driven by Brittney Lewis, who was pregnant; police intervened after Cano retrieved the Mercedes key from the gas-cap area and opened the driver's side door. Police found the beaten and bruised victim in the backseat of the kidnappers' vehicle, wearing a t-shirt, boxer shorts, and socks. Defendant was in the front passenger seat. A loaded handgun was visible on the floorboard of the driver's side of the small sedan, within reach of defendant, a convicted felon. Police searched defendant and found the cell phone used to make the ransom calls the night before.

¶ 4 The jury convicted defendant of kidnapping and theft by extortion, class two dangerous felonies; aggravated assault, a class three dangerous felony; and misconduct involving weapons, a class four felony. On the convictions for kidnapping, aggravated assault, and misconduct involving weapons, the court sentenced defendant to concurrent sentences, the longest of which was eleven years. The court also imposed an eleven-year sentence for the conviction of theft by extortion, and ordered it to be served consecutively to the other sentences. Defendant timely appealed.

DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 5 Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to show his “involvement” in the kidnapping, extortion, and aggravated assault, or that he knowingly possessed the handgun on the driver's side floorboard, as necessary for his conviction of misconduct involving weapons. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we resolve all conflicts in the evidence against defendant. Girdler, 138 Ariz. at 488, 675 P.2d at 1307. The credibility of witnesses and the weight given to their testimony are issues for the jury, not the court. See State v. Just, 138 Ariz. 534, 545, 675 P.2d 1353, 1364 (App.1983). No distinction exists between circumstantial and direct evidence. State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 603, 863 P.2d 881, 895 (1993). “To set aside a jury verdict for insufficient evidence it must clearly appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient evidence to support the conclusion reached by the jury.” State v. Arredondo, 155 Ariz. 314, 316, 746 P.2d 484, 486 (1987).

¶ 6 We find that the evidence, although circumstantial, was sufficient to support the convictions. The indictment charged defendant, Cano, and Brittney Lewis as both principals and accomplices in kidnapping by “knowingly restraining another person with the intent to ... [h]old the victim for ransom, as a shield or hostage”; theft by extortion for “knowingly ... seeking to obtain property ... by means of a threat ... to cause physical injury to anyone by means of a deadly weapon”; and aggravated assault, for [i]ntentionally placing another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury” using a deadly weapon. See A.R.S. §§ 13–1304(A)(1) (2010), –1804(A)(1) (2010), –1203(A)(2) (2010), and –1204(A)(2) (2010).

¶ 7 The witness to the initial kidnapping in the parking lot testified that two men, one of whom was identified as Cano, forced the victim at gunpoint into a four-door sedan driven by a heavyset or pregnant woman. The victim's girlfriend testified that she received ransom calls that night, relaying threats to kill the victim and demanding her Mercedes–Benz in exchange for his safe return. Police rescued the victim the following day at the ransom drop-off point after Cano, using keys retrieved from the gas-cap area, opened the driver's side door of the Mercedes–Benz. The victim was in the back seat of the kidnappers' vehicle, battered and bruised, wearing only a t-shirt, boxer shorts, and socks. Lewis was the driver of the kidnappers' vehicle, a four-door sedan; defendant was in the front passenger seat. A gun was visible on the front driver's side floorboard of the kidnappers' vehicle near the center console. Police found the cell phone used to make the ransom calls on defendant.

¶ 8 The jury could reasonably conclude from this circumstantial evidence that defendant was the man observed with Cano forcing the victim at gunpoint into the kidnappers' vehicle at the store parking lot, and accordingly convict him of kidnapping and aggravated assault. The jury could also conclude that defendant made the ransom calls and that he was guilty of theft by extortion. Even if the jury did conclude, however, that defendant was not the man involved in the initial kidnapping, the jury could have nevertheless concluded that he was responsible for the charged offense. Kidnapping is an offense that continues as long as the victim is restrained. See State v. Jones, 185 Ariz. 403, 406–07, 916 P.2d 1119, 1122–23 (App.1995). “Restrain” means to “restrict a person's movements without consent, without legal authority, and in a manner which interferes substantially with such person's liberty.” A.R.S. § 13–1301(2) (2010). Restraint is without consent if it is accomplished by physical force or intimidation. A.R.S. § 13–1301(2)(a). The jury could have reasonably inferred from the circumstantial evidence that defendant, either as a principal or an accomplice, restrained the victim at gunpoint in the backseat of the vehicle while he, Lewis, and Cano attempted to retrieve the Mercedes left in the parking lot as ransom. The evidence was accordingly sufficient to convict defendant of the offenses of kidnapping, theft by extortion, and aggravated assault.

¶ 9 We are not persuaded by defendant's argument that the evidence was insufficient because of the absence of any testimony from the officer who actually found the cell phone used to make ransom calls on defendant. The case agent testified:

When Mr. Bustamante was taken into custody by the SAU [Special Assignment Unit] squad team detectives, they searched him ... for safety reasons. When they did that, they removed his property and placed it in a property bag, which wethey carry and detectives carry. When I approached Mr. Bustamante, they provided me with same.

* * *

So what I did in this case is, I obtained the cell phone that was in Mr. Bustamante's property bag, and I looked at ... to retrieve the cell phone number, which I did.

Records showed that this cell phone was used to make the ransom calls the night the victim was kidnapped. The state also showed the jury a video depicting the case agent walking up to defendant immediately after an officer had searched him and bagged the property taken from defendant's person. On this evidence, the jury could have found the case agent's testimony credible and her description of the source of the impounded property sufficiently persuasive to support a conclusion that the phone used to make the ransom calls was in defendant's possession during the commission of the charged offenses.

B. Prohibited Possessor

¶ 10 Finally, we reject defendant's argument that the evidence was insufficient to show that he knowingly possessed the firearm on the driver's side floorboard. A person commits misconduct involving weapons by “knowingly ... possessing a deadly weapon ... if such person is a prohibited possessor.” A.R.S. § 13–3102(A)(4) (2010). “Possess” means “knowingly to have physical possession or otherwise to exercise dominion or control over property.” A.R.S. § 13–105(33) (2010). The state thus bore the burden of proving that defendant 1) knew that the gun was on the driver's side floorboard and 2) he exercised control over it. See State v. Cox, 217 Ariz. 353, 357, ¶ 26, 174 P.3d 265, 269 (2007).

¶ 11 The gun was found in the car.4 The gun and the car were essential to a two-day criminal enterprise by defendant and his co-conspirators which commenced with kidnapping the victim at gunpoint and transporting him in the car. Within an hour of the kidnapping, the victim started calling his girlfriend—on defendant's cell phone—asking her to cooperate. Multiple calls were made from defendant's cell phone and the victim indicated the kidnappers were going to kill him if they didn't get the ransom. The following day, when the car was used to transport the battered victim and to collect the ransom, defendant was in the front passenger seat with the gun visible and within reach.5 Defendant had the present ability to use the gun to subdue...

To continue reading

Request your trial
48 cases
  • State v. Ortiz
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • October 16, 2015
    ...interviewer. The jury was therefore able to assess the credibility of the witnesses and weigh their testimony accordingly. SeeState v. Bustamante,229 Ariz. 256, ¶ 5, 274 P.3d 526, 528 (App.2012).¶ 18 Additionally, the fact that Dutton's description of how children disclose abuse was consist......
  • State v. Hunter
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • May 15, 2013
    ...515, 517, 502 P.2d 1334, 1336 (1972). On appeal, therefore, "we resolve all conflicts in the evidence against [the] defendant," State v. Bustamante, 229 Ariz. 256, ¶ 5, 274 P.3d 526, 528 (App. 2012), and we do not reweigh the evidence to determine its sufficiency. State v. Tucker, 231 Ariz.......
  • State v. Yates
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • July 15, 2015
    ...at 337. And "[t]he credibility of witnesses and the weight given to their testimony are issues for the jury, not the court." State v. Bustamante, 229 Ariz. 256, ¶ 5, 274 P.3d 526, 528 (App. 2012); see also State v. Lehr, 201 Ariz. 509, ¶ 29, 38 P.3d 1172, 1180 (2002) ("'[a]dmissibility is f......
  • State v. Francis, 2 CA-CR 2013-0074
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • March 19, 2014
    ...what he got." The jury, of course, was free to judge the credibility of the witness and weigh the testimony accordingly. State v. Bustamante, 229 Ariz. 256, ¶ 5, 274 P.3d 526, 528 (App. 2012). And Francis has not shown how the jurors' skepticism of the FBI agent's testimony would have compe......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT