State v. Bustillo
| Docket Number | 56, Sept. Term, 2021 |
| Decision Date | 24 August 2022 |
| Citation | 480 Md. 650,281 A.3d 674 |
| Parties | STATE of Maryland v. Juan Pablo BUSTILLO |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Argued by Peter R. Naugle, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Petitioner.
Argued by Michael T. Torres, Asst. Public Defender (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Respondent.
Argued before:* Getty, C.J., Watts, Hotten, Booth, Biran, Gould, Robert N. McDonald (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
This case requires us to determine whether an error made during the sentencing of a defendant rendered the resulting sentence illegal. Here, the sentencing court imposed a split sentence of 25 years, suspending five years. Although the court mentioned probation and referenced "conditions of probation," it failed to advise the defendant of the duration of probation, as required by Maryland Rule 4-346(a). The court did, however, include the duration, a five-year term, and conditions of probation in the probation order that the defendant and his counsel signed prior to leaving the courtroom. The defendant appealed, alleging the sentence was illegal. The Court of Special Appeals reversed in a reported decision, holding that the violation of Rule 4-346(a) rendered the sentence illegal, and remanded the case to the circuit court to, among other things, strike the five-year probation from the sentence.
For the reasons that follow, we respectfully disagree with the Court of Special Appeals and hold that the violation of Rule 4-346(a) was a procedural defect in the sentencing proceeding that did not render the sentence illegal.
On November 20, 2018, Juan Pablo Bustillo was indicted in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County for sexually abusing his daughter from the time she was nine until she was 15, and for other related offenses. On October 16, 2019, he was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor, third-degree sexual offense, and second-degree assault.
At his sentencing, both sides sought a split sentence that included a period of probation. The State requested a sentence of 45 years, with all but 25 years suspended, plus five years of supervised probation.1 Defense counsel asked the court to sentence Mr. Bustillo "to a period of probation, suspending ... all but three or four years."
The trial court announced Mr. Bustillo's sentence as follows:
The court did not state the length of Mr. Bustillo's probation. The court explained to Mr. Bustillo his appeal rights and told him: "You do have some paperwork that you need to sign, so just have a seat."
The sentencing judge then signed and issued a written probation order. Mr. Bustillo and defense counsel both signed the order, the latter as a witness to the former's signature.2 The order stated that Mr. Bustillo was sentenced to supervised probation for five years, beginning upon his release, and contained various terms and conditions, including that he was required to attend alcohol and drug treatment, have no contact with the victim or her mother, and complete a sexual assault treatment program through the parole and probation department.
Mr. Bustillo noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals and raised two issues, only the second of which is relevant here. Mr. Bustillo argued that because the sentencing judge never articulated that he "would have to serve a specific period of probation when he finished his period of incarceration[,]" the inclusion of five years of probation on the docket entries, commitment record, and probation order were illegal. Mr. Bustillo contended that those documents required correction to reflect that the sentencing court did not order probation.
Mr. Bustillo asserted that because the sentence articulated at the hearing controls, and the sentencing court did not impose a term of probation, he was not sentenced to probation. Citing to Robinson v. Lee , 317 Md. 371, 379-80, 564 A.2d 395 (1989), and Maryland Rule 4-346(a),3 Mr. Bustillo further argued that because he had the right to be accurately apprised of his sentence at the sentencing hearing, the subsequent addition of probation violated his right to fundamental fairness.
The State argued that Mr. Bustillo was not entitled to raise this issue on appeal because he failed to preserve it in the circuit court. According to the State, there are limited exceptions to the preservation requirement, and this was not one of them because the court's failure to specify the duration of probation was a mere procedural error that did not render Mr. Bustillo's sentence "inherently illegal."
The Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court "illegally increased [Mr. Bustillo's] sentence by adding a five-year period of probation." Juan Pablo B. v . State , 252 Md. App. 624, 628, 260 A.3d 737 (2021). The Court first determined that the transcript from the sentencing hearing, which did not indicate that Mr. Bustillo's sentence included a five-year term of probation, conflicted with the probation order, which clearly reflected this term. Id. at 639, 260 A.3d 737. The Court noted that the trial court violated Rule 4-346(a), for failing to advise the defendant of the conditions and duration of probation in open court, and that the court compounded its error by failing to comply with the procedure for correcting mistakes in the sentencing, as outlined in Rule 4-345(c). 4
The Court next addressed whether the two Rule violations resulted in an inherently illegal sentence, as argued by Mr. Bustillo, or constituted a procedural error, as argued by the State. The Court observed that inherently illegal sentences generally come in three varieties: (1) a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum, id. at 642, 260 A.3d 737 (citing Carlini v. State , 215 Md. App. 415, 427, 81 A.3d 560 (2013) ), or is less than the required minimum, id. at 642, 260 A.3d 737 (citing Hoile v. State , 404 Md. 591, 620, 948 A.2d 30 (2008) ); (2) a sentence that "never should have been imposed," id. at 642, 260 A.3d 737 (quoting Johnson v . State , 427 Md. 356, 368-69, 47 A.3d 1002 (2012) ); or (3) a sentence that exceeds the cap imposed by a binding plea agreement, id. at 642, 260 A.3d 737 (citing Matthews v . State , 424 Md. 503, 518-19, 36 A.3d 499 (2012) ). The Court noted, however, that it is "less clear whether a sentence imposed in violation of a mandatory Maryland Rule likewise is inherently illegal." Id. at 642-43, 260 A.3d 737.
In analyzing this issue, the Court reviewed three cases involving the failure to comply with Rule 4-245(b) in the imposition of enhanced sentences: Armstrong v . State , 69 Md. App. 23, 515 A.2d 1190 (1986) ; Carter v . State , 319 Md. 618, 574 A.2d 305 (1990) ; and Bailey v. State , 464 Md. 685, 212 A.3d 912 (2019). Juan Pablo B. , 252 Md. App. at 643-44, 260 A.3d 737. The Court also discussed cases involving sentences in violation of binding plea agreements— Dotson v. State , 321 Md. 515, 583 A.2d 710 (1991) ; Cuffley v. State , 416 Md. 568, 7 A.3d 557 (2010) ; Baines v . State , 416 Md. 604, 7 A.3d 578 (2010) ; and Matthews v . State , 424 Md. 503, 36 A.3d 499 (2012). Juan Pablo B. , 252 Md. App. at 645-46, 260 A.3d 737. From its analysis of these two lines of cases, the Court concluded that "generally, but not always, sentences that are imposed in violation of a mandatory Maryland rule are inherently illegal." Id. at 646, 260 A.3d 737.
In determining whether that general rule should apply to Mr. Bustillo's sentencing, the Court focused its analysis on Jones v . State , 384 Md. 669, 866 A.2d 151 (2005) and Montgomery v. State , 405 Md. 67, 950 A.2d 77 (2008). Juan Pablo B. , 252 Md. App. at 646, 260 A.3d 737. Based on its review of these cases, the Court concluded that the duration of a term of probation is an integral part of a sentence, that a defendant has the right to rely upon the sentence announced orally by the trial court, and that, therefore, the trial court's failure to specify the term of Mr. Bustillo's probation, in violation of Rule 4-346(a), resulted in an illegal sentence. Id. at 650-51, 260 A.3d 737.
The Court concluded that, under Cathcart v. State , 397 Md. 320, 330, 916 A.2d 1008 (2007), the unsuspended part of the sentence—the 20 years—was the effective sentence. Juan Pablo B ., 252 Md. App. at 651-52, 260 A.3d 737. Observing that the "resulting sentence is a 20-year flat sentence on the flagship charge, and concurrent terms of two years’ imprisonment for...
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