State v. Butler
Decision Date | 08 June 1999 |
Citation | 739 A.2d 732 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | (Conn.App. 1999) STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. HAROLD TRENT BUTLER AC 17753 Argued: |
Avery S. Chapman, for the appellant (defendant).
Mitchell S. Brody, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and Michael A. Pepper, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
Before: Foti, Lavery and Landau, JJ.
The defendant, Harold Trent Butler, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of murder as an accessory in violation of General Statutes 53a-54a (a) and 53a-8 and conspiracy to commit murder in violation of General Statutes 53a-54a (a) and 53a-48 (a). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) denied his motions for a mistrial that were based on the existence of egregious prosecutorial misconduct, (2) adopted a curative instruction that was insufficient to cure the prejudice caused by the misconduct, (3) denied his motion to set aside the verdict on the basis of juror misconduct and (4) admitted evidence of uncharged misconduct. We agree with the defendant and reverse the judgment of the trial court.1
The record discloses the following information that is relevant to the resolution of this appeal. On March 21, 1994, Officer William Coppola of the New Haven police department was dispatched to 305 Exchange Street, where he discovered the body of the victim, Amenophis Morris. The victim had sustained fatal gunshot wounds. At the defendant's trial, Jeffrey Dolphin testified for the state concerning the circumstances surrounding the murder. Dolphin testified that on March 21, 1994, Terrance Stevenson forced him at gunpoint into a motor vehicle driven by James Baker. Jermaine Harris and the defendant were passengers in Baker's vehicle.
Dolphin testified that when Baker was driving on Exchange Street, one of the vehicle's occupants noticed the victim standing on the front porch of 305 Exchange Street. Baker then parked the vehicle farther down the block. Dolphin testified that Stevenson and Harris exited the vehicle and walked toward the victim. Baker and the defendant then exited the vehicle and waited near the front of the car. Dolphin testified that shortly after he heard six or seven gunshots, Harris, Baker, Stevenson and the defendant returned to the vehicle, and either Harris or Stevenson stated, "I got the mother . . . I got the asshole."
Dolphin did not immediately contact the police. On April 22, 1994, the police arrested Dolphin on unrelated narcotics charges, and he provided information about the murder. The police subsequently arrested Harris, Stevenson, Baker and the defendant, and charged them with murder as accessories and conspiracy to commit murder. Dolphin testified at the trials of Baker and Stevenson, which preceded the defendant's trial, and Baker and Stevenson were convicted on both charges. In the present case, the jury found the defendant guilty of murder as an accessory and conspiring to commit murder. He received a total effective sentence of forty-five years imprisonment. This appeal followed.
The defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied his motions for a mistrial, which he based on the existence of egregious prosecutorial misconduct that deprived him of his due process right to a fair trial in violation of the federal constitution. After careful examination of the specific circumstances in this case, we agree with the defendant.2
The following additional facts are relevant to a resolution of this issue. The defendant was charged with accessory to murder and conspiring to commit murder. At trial, the prosecutor claimed that the defendant aided and abetted Baker, Harris and Stevenson in murdering the victim, and conspired with them to commit the murder. In its appellate brief, the state concedes that the jury was informed that the trials of Baker and Stevenson had preceded the defendant's trial and that Dolphin had testified in those trials.
In closing argument to the jury, defense counsel stated: The prosecutor neither objected to this statement when it was made, nor did he object at the conclusion of defense counsel's closing argument, nor did he request a curative instruction or some other remedy.
Instead, in rebuttal, the prosecutor stated: (Emphasis added.) At the conclusion of the prosecutor's rebuttal, after the court had excused the jury, defense counsel orally moved for a mistrial.3 The court stated: 4 After the lunch recess, defense counsel filed a written motion for dismissal, mistrial, surrebuttal time or a corrective instruction. The prosecutor claimed that his statement was invited by defense counsel and that he was merely attempting to counteract defense counsel's assertion that Dolphin had lied to other juries. Defense counsel responded that his statement merely referred to the inconsistencies in Dolphin's testimony in this trial and the two previous trials. The court agreed with defense counsel. Despite stating that the prosecutor's comment was prejudicial, improper and unprofessional, the court denied the defendant's motions for dismissal and a mistrial, but granted the request for a curative instruction.
The following principles govern our review of the defendant's claim. It is well recognized that the state's attorney State v. Ferrone, 96 Conn. 160, 168-69, 113 A. 452 (1921).
(Citation omitted.) State v. Ubaldi, 190 Conn. 559, 562, 462 A.2d 1001, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 916, 104 S. Ct. 280, 78 L. Ed. 2d 259 (1983).
"[A] state's attorney should scrupulously avoid questions of probable impropriety . . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Piskorski, 177 Conn. 677, 719, 419 A.2d 866, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 935, 100 S. Ct. 283, 62 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1979). " ...
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...case at bar i.e. that defense counsel opened the door for the introduction of otherwise impermissible testimony. See State v. Butler, 55 Conn.App. 502, 739 A.2d 732 (1999); cf. United States v. Napue, 834 F.2d 1311, 1324 (7th Cir.1987); Terry v. Maryland, 332 Md. 329, 631 A.2d 424 ¶ 16. In ......
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