State v. Butler
Decision Date | 17 December 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 16610.,16610. |
Citation | 262 Conn. 167,810 A.2d 791 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Harold Trent BUTLER. |
Avery S. Chapman, for the appellant (defendant).
Robert J. Scheinblum, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, Michael Pepper, senior assistant state's attorney, and Susan C. Marks, supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
The sole issue in this interlocutory appeal is whether the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, on double jeopardy grounds, the charges pending against him. We affirm the trial court's decision.
The defendant was convicted of murder as an accessory in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-54a (a)1 and 53a-82 and conspiracy to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-54a (a) and 53a-48 (a).3 The Appellate Court overturned his conviction in State v. Butler, 55 Conn.App. 502, 739 A.2d 732 (1999), and remanded the case for a new trial. Id., 519, 739 A.2d 732. Following our grant of certification; State v. Butler, 252 Conn. 941, 747 A.2d 520 (2000); we affirmed that decision in a per curiam opinion. State v. Butler, 255 Conn. 828, 769 A.2d 697 (2001).
In its opinion overturning the defendant's conviction, the Appellate Court set forth the following relevant facts:
State v. Butler, supra, 55 Conn.App. 503-506, 739 A.2d 732. The Appellate Court ruled that a mistrial should have been granted, reversed the judgment of guilty and remanded the case for a new trial. Id., 503, 519, 739 A.2d 732. We affirmed the Appellate Court's decision. State v. Butler, supra, 255 Conn. 830, 769 A.2d 697.
Thereafter, pursuant to the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution, article first, §§ 7 through 9, of the constitution of Connecticut, and Practice Book § 41-8(6), the defendant moved to dismiss the charges, maintaining that a retrial would deprive him of his right not to stand trial twice for the same offense. The trial court concluded that, in the present case, a retrial would be permissible unless the prosecutor's misconduct in the first trial was done with the intent to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial. The trial court found that there had been no such intent, finding instead that Accordingly, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Thereafter, the defendant filed an interlocutory appeal with the Appellate Court, which we transferred to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199(c) and Practice Book § 65-1. We affirm the decision of the trial court.4
The defendant challenges both the legal conclusion and the factual finding of the trial court with regard to his double jeopardy claim. We find neither argument persuasive.5 We consider the defendant's legal claim first.
The defendant claims that the trial court applied an improper legal standard in determining whether double jeopardy barred his retrial. Specifically, although the defendant acknowledges that the double jeopardy clause does not ordinarily bar retrial where, as in the present case, a defendant has moved for a mistrial in the first trial, he claims that there are two exceptions to this rule under which double jeopardy principles will bar retrial notwithstanding a defendant's motion for a mistrial. He claims that retrial is barred when either (1) prosecutorial misconduct in the first trial was designed to provoke a defendant into moving for a mistrial or (2) the misconduct was motivated by an intent to harass or prejudice a defendant, and that the trial court improperly concluded that he could prevail on his double jeopardy claim only if he could demonstrate that the first exception applied. We conclude that the trial court properly recognized that the defendant could not prevail on his double jeopardy claim merely by demonstrating that prosecutorial misconduct in the first trial was motivated by an intent to harass or prejudice the defendant.
We begin by noting that, because this claim presents an issue of law, our review is plenary. See, e.g., State v. Tuchman, 242 Conn. 345, 351, 699 A.2d 952 (1997), cert. dismissed, 522 U.S. 1101, 118 S.Ct. 907, 139 L.Ed. 2d 922 (1998). The basic contours of double jeopardy jurisprudence are well established. 6 (Citation omitted.) State v. Ferguson, 260 Conn. 339, 360, 796 A.2d 1118 (2002).
...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Legrand
...cert. denied, 283 Conn. 902, 926 A.2d 670 (2007); see also State v. Gibson, 270 Conn. 55, 66, 850 A.2d 1040 (2004); State v. Butler, 262 Conn. 167, 174, 810 A.2d 791 (2002). For the purposes of our discussion, we assume, with-out deciding, that the state seized the medical records8 and the ......
-
State v. Burnell, No. 18139.
...double jeopardy. The defendant's double jeopardy claim presents a question of law, over which our review is plenary. State v. Butler, 262 Conn. 167, 174, 810 A.2d 791 (2002). "The fifth amendment to the United States constitution provides in relevant part: No person shall ... be subject for......
-
State v. Thomas
...or prejudice defendant); State v. Michael J., 274 Conn. 321, 345, 348, 875 A.2d 510 (2005) (applying Kennedy); State v. Butler, 262 Conn. 167, 175-77, 810 A.2d 791 (2002) (same). The double jeopardy clause bars such attempts because otherwise the prosecution would be able to test trial stra......
-
Crocker v. Comm'r of Correction, 30786.
...the prosecutor "intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Butler, 262 Conn. 167, 175, 810 A.2d 791 (2002), quoting Oregon v. Kennedy, supra, at 679, 102 S.Ct. 2083 The habeas court clearly concluded that "[t]he record reveals......