State v. Buxton

Decision Date16 January 1894
Citation89 Iowa 573,57 N.W. 417
PartiesSTATE v. BUXTON.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from district court, Jones county; J. D. Giffen, Judge.

Defendant was indicted, tried, and convicted of the crime of seduction, and judgment entered against him, from which he appeals.Welch & Welch, for appellant.

John Y. Stone, Atty. Gen., and Thomas A. Cheshire, for the State.

GIVEN, J.

1. In impaneling the jury, one Young was called as talesman, and, after examination, was passed for cause. Afterwards, and after another juror had been examined and passed for cause, and another peremptory challenge made, defendant asked leave to further examine Mr. Young for cause, to show that he had served in that court as talesman within one year, counsel stating that that “fact was overlooked in the examination for cause.” The court refused the leave asked, and thereupon the defendant challenged Mr. Young peremptorily, and thereafter exercised his only remaining peremptory challenge. Appellant assigns this refusal as error. It is conceded that it was within the discretion of the court whether to grant the leave asked. There is nothing appearing to show an abuse of that discretion, therefore the judgment cannot be disturbed on this ground.

Appellant complains of certain rulings of the court sustaining objections to questions put by him to the witnesses. They are not questions that will necessarily arise upon a retrial, and, as we conclude that the case must be reversed, it is unnecessary that we consider those questions.

2. In the eighth paragraph of the charge, the court, after instructing that the prosecutrix was presumed to have had a previously chaste character, and that the burden was on the defendant to overcome this presumption, instructed as follows: “In this case there has been evidence offered tending to show that the prosecutrix, some time prior to the time of the alleged seduction, had sexual intercourse with one Lee Wilbur; and, if you believe this, then she would be of unchaste character at the time of the alleged seduction by defendant, unless she had reformed, and then he could not be convicted.” No evidence whatever was offered by the state with a view to establish reformation. The prosecution was upon the basis that the prosecutrix had always been of chaste character up to the time of the alleged seduction. While the instruction states the law correctly, we think it was inapplicable to this case, as there was no claim nor evidence of...

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