State v. Byers
| Decision Date | 19 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | DOCKET NO. A-5225-15T1 |
| Parties | STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ANTIJUAN M. BYERS, a/k/a TONE, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
Before Judges Rothstadt and Gilson.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 13-06-1020.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (John W. Douard, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Christopher J. Gramiccioni, Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Lisa Sarnoff Gochman, Legal Assistant, of counsel and on the brief).
After the trial court denied defendant Antijuan Byers' motions to suppress his confession to police and to bar any reference to the police searching his home pursuant to a warrant, defendant was tried before a jury that convicted him of committing third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1); second-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(2); and third-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of school property, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7. Defendant made a motion for a new trial based upon what he claimed was new evidence that established his confession was not voluntary and the prejudice caused by the trial court's earlier ruling allowing a police witness to refer to the search warrant. The trial court denied his motion and sentenced defendant to six years in prison.
Defendant appeals from his judgment of conviction and contends that his statement to the police after his arrest should have been suppressed because the officers promised that he would be released on his own recognizance (ROR) in exchange for the confession. He also argues that he invoked his constitutional right to counsel, which should have ended the interrogation. In addition, defendant contends that he was denied due process and a fair trial when the jury learned that the police obtained a warrant to search his apartment and had earlier observed him conducting drug transactions for which he was not charged withany offense. Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on a statutory affirmative defense to the school zone offense.
We have considered defendant's contentions in light of our review of the record and applicable legal principles. We affirm.
We derive the salient facts from the record. They are summarized as follows. As part of an ongoing narcotics investigation, law enforcement officers obtained a search warrant for defendant's apartment that they executed on January 23, 2013. When they arrived, officers found defendant lying in bed, secured him, and informed him that they would be conducting a search pursuant to a warrant. Defendant stated to the police that they would find crack cocaine in a blue and white plastic bottle in the bathroom. The search led to the discovery of the plastic bottle and its contents were later confirmed to be crack cocaine. In addition, they located a clear bag containing a substance, which was also confirmed to be crack cocaine. The total weight of the CDS exceeded one-half ounce. The police also found other items related to the distribution of CDS, including lottery tickets, which are commonly used to package narcotics, and scales.
Defendant was arrested and taken to the police station for processing and questioning. Detective Keith Finkelstein of the Neptune Police Departmentadvised defendant of the narcotics investigation, administered Miranda warnings,1 and secured defendant's written waiver of his rights. During the ensuing videotaped interrogation, defendant made incriminating statements, admitting to possessing and selling crack cocaine.
Early in the interrogation, Finkelstein confirmed with defendant the circumstances of what transpired earlier at defendant's home. During the following portion of their conversation, Finkelstein referred to the search warrant three times:
During the course of Finkelstein's continuing interrogation of defendant, the following exchange occurred relating to Finkelstein's inability to understand something defendant was stating to him:
At the end of his questioning, Finkelstein told defendant Defendant's reply was recorded as him stating "With the (inaudible.)." Defendant was later released, ROR, to await trial, even though he was charged with a second-degree offense.
Prior to the commencement of trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress his statements to the police. Defendant argued that the court should not admitinto evidence anything he said regarding the location of contraband in his apartment after being placed in handcuffs and under arrest and not being advised of his Miranda rights. He also argued his statements should be suppressed because where the intake interview transcript is marked "inaudible," he was either requesting a lawyer or stating that he would like to stop the conversation. In addition, he claimed that any inculpatory statement he made after he received Miranda warnings was the product of a promise made to him by Finkelstein that although defendant was being held on a second-degree charge for which ROR is not usually available, he would be released if he confessed. Defendant cited to Finkelstein's statement at the end of the interrogation about "see[ing] what [they] can do" as referring to Finkelstein's promise.
The trial court conducted a Miranda hearing on March 8, 2016, at which Finkelstein testified and the videotape of the interrogation was played for the court. His testimony included a concession that during the inaudible portion of the interrogation, after he questioned defendant about his earnings, defendant may have said "lawyer" during the interview, but Finkelstein did not realize that during the interrogation. However, when he attempted to clarify during the interrogation what defendant said, defendant did not ask for a lawyer or to stop the questioning, but continued to be responsive to Finkelstein's questions about his criminal conduct. Finkelstein also testified that no promises were made todefendant in exchange for his statement and that he could not recall what "we'll get back to you and see what we can do" referred to.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and provided a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of those rights. As to the claim that defendant asked for a lawyer or otherwise said anything that required the police to terminate the interrogation, the trial court concluded that although defendant may have said either "lawyer" or "stop" during the inaudible portion, there was no clear statement made by defendant and when the officer asked him to repeat what he said, defendant never asked to stop the questioning or for a lawyer. Addressing the alleged promise of ROR bail for a confession, the court found that there was no evidence that a promise was made or proof that contradicted Finkelstein's testimony in which he "clearly stated that at no time did he make any promise or threats of any sort to defendant in order to induce a statement."
On March 15, 2016, the trial court addressed defendant's motion in limine to bar any mention of a search warrant during trial. After considering counsels' arguments, the trial court reviewed defendant's contention in light of applicable case law and observed that similar contentions were raised in the past but the "[a]ppellate courts have rejected it." The court denied the motion, but agreed todeliver a limiting instruction to the jury indicating that the fact that defendant's home was lawfully searched had no bearing on whether he was guilty of the crimes charged.2
Finkelstein testified at trial about defendant's arrest and interrogation. During his testimony, the videotape of his questioning of defendant was played for the jury. Afterward, Finkelstein testified that his statement at the end of the interrogation "might have been" in reference to bail, but that he could not recall.
After testifying, but before the jury deliberated, Finkelstein advised the prosecutor that he recalled that defendant had offered to work as a confidentialinformant (CI) and that his offer played a role in the determination of whether to seek a ROR release for him. Neither Finkelstein nor defendant had disclosed that information to either the prosecutor or defense counsel. The next day, the prosecutor advised defense counsel and the court of Finkelstein's disclosure. After being given an opportunity to consult with defendant, defense counsel entered into an agreement with the prosecutor in which both parties agreed there would be no testimony from either...
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