State v. Cabbage
| Citation | 571 S.W.2d 832 |
| Parties | STATE of Tennessee, Petitioner, v. Billy Wayne CABBAGE, Respondent. 571 S.W.2d 832 |
| Decision Date | 10 October 1978 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Tennessee |
Robert L. Jolley, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville (Brooks McLemore, Jr., Atty. Gen., Nashville, of counsel), for petitioner.
Edward H. Stevens, University of Tennessee Legal Clinic, Knoxville, for respondent.
Respondent, Billy Wayne Cabbage, was convicted of selling and delivering a Schedule II controlled substance in violation of T.C.A. § 52-1432(a)(1)(B) and received a sentence of not less than five nor more than seven years in the state penitentiary. Upon post-trial motion, the trial judge approved the verdict and overruled all assignments of error.
The Court of Criminal Appeals, however, reversed the conviction, finding that the evidence preponderated against the verdict, and remanded the case for a new trial. It found that the testimony of respondent and of an alibi witness who corroborated him outweighed the testimony of the undercover agent for the State, whose evidence was otherwise conceded to be sufficient to support the conviction.
With utmost deference to the Court of Criminal Appeals, our reading of the record, in light of fundamental and well-settled rules governing appellate review of criminal cases, leads us to a different conclusion. Further, as hereinafter discussed, the procedure followed by the Court of Criminal Appeals, in ordering a re-trial because it found the evidence to preponderate against the verdict, is no longer available under recent decisions emanating from the Supreme Court of the United States.
Other than a toxicologist who identified the tablets sold by respondent to the undercover agent as controlled substances, and a stipulation as to the chain of custody and delivery of the tablets to him, the only witness offered by the State was a 23-year-old undercover agent, Alan Taylor Smith. He testified positively that the respondent and one Robin Daniels sold him the drugs in question at a mobile home occupied by Daniels in the early afternoon of March 29, 1975. He testified in detail as to conversations he had with respondent and Daniels, and stated that respondent gave him without charge some blue "speed" tablets as samples to see if Smith might want to purchase some of these in the future.
Smith testified as to labeling and preserving the evidence, turning it over to narcotics officers of the Knoxville Police Department, and to the subsequent arrest of respondent in April. When recalled in rebuttal, he testified that he remembered seeing some boxes of shirts in the partially opened trunk of respondent's automobile as he was leaving the premises. He said that respondent asked Smith if the latter would like to purchase any of the shirts. Respondent told Smith that he was planning to leave the mobile home to make delivery of some of the shirts.
Respondent testified that he was engaged in selling irregular shirts which he purchased from a factory in Claiborne County. He testified that Robin Daniels was a relative by marriage and that he had visited the mobile home on a few occasions. On direct examination, he testified to a prior felony conviction in connection with worthless checks.
Respondent denied that he was at the Daniels trailer on March 29, 1975, denied making or participating in the drug sale, and testified that he did not know and had never talked to the undercover agent prior to the preliminary hearing following his arrest. He was arrested April 28, 1975, and the preliminary hearing was held in June. He was indicted on September 2.
Respondent said that he learned at the preliminary hearing that the alleged date of the drug sale with which he was charged was March 29, 1975. He testified that he then searched for records and found that he had been in Chattanooga, Tennessee on that date, and had had his automobile repaired there. He testified that he had left his father's home in Union County about 10 a. m. on the morning of March 29, 1975, drove to Chattanooga to sell shirts in that area and that he experienced car trouble shortly before reaching Chattanooga. He said that he arrived in that city about noon and took his car to Cox's Garage on Wilder Street for repairs. He testified that Mr. Jack King worked overtime on that Saturday afternoon to repair the automobile, and completed the work about 6:30 p. m. He stated that he then returned to his father's home in Union County. Because King had worked overtime and had stayed after the usual closing time for the garage, respondent had bought some Easter baskets for King to give to the latter's children, the date in question being Saturday immediately preceding Easter Sunday. He introduced in evidence a repair bill from Cox Auto Parts, in the amount of $90.52, bearing the date of March 29, 1975.
Respondent was corroborated in many respects by the testimony of Mr. Edward Jack King, the automobile mechanic employed by Cox Auto Parts in Chattanooga. This witness said that respondent arrived at the garage shortly before noon. The shop usually closed at about 3 p. m. on Saturday, but Mr. King remained late in order to repair respondent's automobile. He and respondent engaged in conversation while the repair work was being done, and he told respondent that he needed some money to buy things for his children for Easter. Respondent then went out and purchased two Easter baskets for the children.
The jury apparently rejected the alibi testimony offered on behalf of respondent, strong and persuasive though it may have appeared, and resolved the disputed factual issues in favor of the State. The jury was faced with the alternative of accepting the testimony of the undercover agent or that of respondent, a once-convicted felon, and his alibi witness. No other witnesses were produced by either side. The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the testimony of the alibi witness was totally unimpeached, was absolutely trustworthy, and that it was therefore of controlling significance.
In this regard, we are constrained to differ with that Court. There was one glaring discrepancy in the testimony of the alibi witness, which is pointed out to us by the State and may well have impressed the jury. This involved the testimony of Mr. King to the effect that respondent returned to King's shop at some time after the present criminal proceedings had been instituted. King testified that he recognized respondent. Both he and respondent said that this visit was in August or September, 1975. King testified:
(Emphasis supplied.)
Earlier he had also testified:
(Emphasis supplied.)
The principal difficulty with this testimony is that the Rambler automobile which respondent Cabbage was driving when he went to Chattanooga on March 29, 1975, was seized in April when Cabbage was arrested, confiscated by State officials and sold, so that Mr. Cabbage could not possibly have been driving the same automobile when he returned to Chattanooga to contact his alibi witness. Cabbage testified, "I never did get the car back."
This, in our opinion, is a circumstance which a finder of fact was entitled to consider, and which leads us to disagree with the conclusion of the Court of Criminal Appeals that the alibi testimony was totally and completely uncontradicted, credible, and worthy of belief in every respect.
Further, even if the alibi witness should not be totally discredited and the trier of fact should believe that respondent did in fact go to Chattanooga and did have his car repaired on March 29, the time sequences are such that the jury might conclude that respondent still made the drug sale as claimed by the State. In other words, they might partially accredit respondent's proof and still convict.
Respondent said that it took about two hours for him to drive to Chattanooga. Smith testified that the drug sale occurred about 1:40 and that he left the mobile home at 1:55. Respondent was then about to leave to sell shirts.
Both he and King said that the work was completed at about 6:00 or 6:30. King said that the repairs performed ordinarily could be done very quickly but he was delayed by having to send out for parts.
The jury could have believed that Cabbage arrived at the garage nearer to 4 p. m. than noon under the proof in the record, and this would have left time for the drug sale to have occurred as alleged.
We are unable to reconcile the disposition of this case by the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Brewer
...strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be drawn therefrom. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn.1978). Moreover, a guilty verdict against the appellant removes the presumption of innocence and raises a presumption of guilt on ......
-
State v. Bigbee
...entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences which might be drawn therefrom. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn.1978). Where, as here, the sufficiency of the convicting evidence is challenged, the relevant question for an appellate court i......
-
State v. Adkisson
...779 (Tenn.Crim.App.), per. app. denied, (Tenn.1990).4 Liakas v. State, 199 Tenn. 298, 305, 286 S.W.2d 856, 859 (1956).5 State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (1978).6 State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d at 835.7 493 S.W.2d 474 (Tenn.1973).8 493 S.W.2d at 476.9 State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 ......
-
State v. Harris
...the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable or legitimate inferences which may be drawn therefrom. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 836 (Tenn.1978). Moreover, a verdict against the Defendant removes the presumption of innocence and raises the presumption of guilt on ap......