State v. Cahill
| Decision Date | 22 June 1923 |
| Docket Number | 34946 |
| Citation | 194 N.W. 191,196 Iowa 486 |
| Parties | STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. GEORGE CAHILL, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
REHEARING DENIED SEPTEMBER 28, 1923.
Appeal from Lee District Court.--JOHN E. CRAIG, Judge.
THE defendant appeals from a conviction of the crime of escape from the penitentiary.
Affirmed.
Omar E Herminghausen, for appellant.
Ben J Gibson, Attorney-general, Neill Garrett, Assistant Attorney-general, and G. L. Norman, County Attorney, for appellee.
The argument of counsel invites academic discussion of a large number and variety of subjects; but, as the decision must be controlled by the statute, we shall consider only such matters as are pertinently involved.
While serving a sentence in the penitentiary at Fort Madison, appellant was placed in solitary confinement by order of the deputy warden, for the infraction of a rule of the prison prohibiting prisoners from fighting. While thus confined, he escaped from the cell, and was apprehended on top of the wall by a guard, while he was attempting to escape from the inclosure. The indictment is based upon Section 4897-a of the Supplement to the Code, 1913, which, so far as material, is as follows:
I. Among the several grounds of a motion in arrest of judgment, the appellant alleged that the language of the indictment is insufficient to charge the offense defined by the statute, for the reason that it failed to allege that he escaped from the custody of the warden of the penitentiary. It is true that he was, at the time, in the constructive custody of the warden; and if the crime of escape was consummated, there is a technical sense in which his escape was from the custody of the warden. The indictment, however, fully and fairly apprised the defendant of the essential acts constituting the crime, and it is not void because it did not specifically charge that he escaped from the custody of the warden. He was charged with having escaped from the cell in which he was confined by the order of the deputy warden, without the permission or authority of any officer of the prison. The indictment meets all the requirements of the statute.
II. One of the principal contentions of the appellant is that the acts charged and proved are not consummated acts, and constitute only "an attempt to escape," which is not made a crime by the statute. The specific language of Section 4897-a makes the crime complete if a person committed to the penitentiary "break such prison and escape therefrom," or "escape from or leave without due authority any building * * * or any place whatsoever in which he is placed" or "to which he is directed to go" or "in which he is allowed to be by the warden or any officer or employee of the prison, whether inside or outside of the prison walls."
The evidence was undisputed that appellant escaped from solitary confinement by opening the door of his cell, which, because of the failure of an automatic lock to work, was unintentionally left unlocked; and his escape from the prison walls, as stated above, was prevented by the timely interposition of a guard. He did not, therefore, escape from the prison; and if this is necessary to the consummation of the offense, then an acquittal should have been directed by the court. The escape was complete, however when he opened the unlocked door of the cell, and went, as he claimed to have done, to another part of the prison. The statute is disciplinary in its nature, and the severe penalty for its violation was evidently designed to deter prisoners from breaking the rules of the prison, and to aid the authorities in the enforcement of reasonable and necessary prison rules. Appellant in his testimony admitted that he violated the rule of the prison against fighting, and his confinement in the solitary cell upon a diet of bread and water was intended as a punishment for this infraction, and as a warning to others...
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