State v. Calhoun
Citation | 86 Ohio St.3d 279,714 NE 2d 905 |
Decision Date | 01 September 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 98-1627.,98-1627. |
Parties | THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. CALHOUN, APPELLEE. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Ohio |
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecuting Attorney, and Julie Mitrovich King, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
R. Paul LaPlante, Lake County Public Defender, and Vanessa R. MacKnight, Assistant County Public Defender, for appellee.
We are called upon to answer three questions. First, must a trial court, when considering a postconviction relief petition, accept the affidavits presented as true? Second, did the trial court err in dismissing defendant's petition for postconviction relief on the allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel without holding an evidentiary hearing? Third, were the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law adequate to satisfy the requirements of R.C. 2953.21? For the reasons below, we answer the first two questions in the negative, the last question in the affirmative, and reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.
R.C. 2953.21, Ohio's Post-Conviction Remedy Act, was enacted in 1965 in response to the United States Supreme Court order that states must provide their prisoners with some "clearly defined method by which they may raise claims of denial of federal rights." Young v. Ragen (1949), 337 U.S. 235, 239, 69 S.Ct. 1073, 1074, 93 L.Ed. 1333, 1336.
State collateral review itself is not a constitutional right. State v. Steffen (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 399, 410, 639 N.E.2d 67, 76, citing Murray v. Giarratano (1989), 492 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 2765, 106 L.Ed.2d 1. Further, a postconviction proceeding is not an appeal of a criminal conviction but, rather, a collateral civil attack on the judgment. See Steffen at 410, 639 N.E.2d at 76, citing State v. Crowder (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 151, 573 N.E.2d 652. Therefore, a petitioner receives no more rights than those granted by the statute. State v. Milanovich (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 46, 51, 71 O.O.2d 26, 29, 325 N.E.2d 540, 543.
R.C. 2953.21 provides:
According to the postconviction relief statute, a criminal defendant seeking to challenge his conviction through a petition for postconviction relief is not automatically entitled to a hearing. State v. Cole (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 112, 2 OBR 661, 443 N.E.2d 169. Before granting an evidentiary hearing on the petition, the trial court shall determine whether there are substantive grounds for relief (R.C. 2953.21[C]), i.e., whether there are grounds to believe that "there was such a denial or infringement of the person's rights as to render the judgment void or voidable under the Ohio Constitution or the Constitution of the United States." (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2953.21(A)(1).
Postconviction relief is a remedy sought by a defendant who has either been tried and found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, or who has pled guilty and has been convicted. In the interest of judicial economy and efficiency, we have held that it is not unreasonable to require the defendant to show in his petition for postconviction relief that such errors resulted in prejudice before a hearing is scheduled. See State v. Jackson (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 107, 112, 18 O.O.3d 348, 351, 413 N.E.2d 819, 823. Therefore, before a hearing is granted, "the petitioner bears the initial burden to submit evidentiary documents containing sufficient operative facts to demonstrate the lack of competent counsel and that the defense was prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness." (Emphasis added.) Id. at syllabus.
In support of his assertions, defendant submitted his own affidavit with his postconviction relief petition. After the state responded to defendant's petition with an affidavit of petitioner's trial counsel, defendant was granted leave to supplement his petition with an affidavit of his mother, along with the pre-sentence report and psychiatric evaluation prepared for defendant's sentencing hearing.
The trial court, in reviewing defendant's claim that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his constitutional rights, reiterated the law regarding guilty pleas. In addition, the trial court reviewed the transcript of the plea hearing and concluded that defendant did not express to the court any misunderstandings he had regarding his rights or complain of any misleading information provided to him regarding his rights. Based on a review of the submitted documents and record, the trial court found that defendant's guilty plea was appropriately obtained and that it would be improper to vacate the plea. Accordingly, the trial court found the postconviction relief petition to be without merit and denied the petition without a hearing.
The court of appeals reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on defendant's petition. In reviewing the judgment of the trial court, the court of appeals assumed that when determining whether there are substantive grounds for relief under R.C. 2953.21, the affidavits presented in support of a petition are to be accepted as true. In addition, the court of appeals concluded that even if the affidavits of defendant, his mother, and his trial counsel contradicted each other, conflicts in the evidence should not be resolved without a hearing on the postconviction relief petition. We disagree with both conclusions and hold that in reviewing a petition for postconviction relief filed pursuant to R.C. 2953.21, a trial court should give due deference to affidavits sworn to under oath and filed in support of the petition, but may, in the sound exercise of discretion, judge their credibility in determining whether to accept the affidavits as true statements of fact. To hold otherwise would require a hearing for every postconviction relief petition. Because the statute clearly calls for discretion in determining whether to grant a hearing, accepting all supporting affidavits as true is certainly not what the statute intended. "[I]f we would allow any open-ended allegation or conclusory statement concerning competency of counsel without a further showing of prejudice to the defendant to automatically mandate a hearing, division (D) of R.C. 2953.21 would be effectively negated and useless." Jackson, 64 Ohio St.2d at 112,18 O.O.3d at 351,413 N.E.2d at 823.
Unlike the summary judgment procedure in civil cases, in postconviction relief proceedings, the trial court has presumably been presented with evidence sufficient to support the original entry of conviction, or with a recitation of facts attendant to an entry of a guilty or no-contest plea. The trial court may, under appropriate circumstances in postconviction relief proceedings, deem affidavit testimony to lack credibility without first observing or examining the affiant. That conclusion is supported by common sense, the interests of eliminating delay and unnecessary expense, and furthering the expeditious administration of justice. See Civ.R. 1(B) and 1(C); Cole, 2 Ohio St.3d at 114, 2 OBR at 663, 443 N.E.2d at 171 (); Sumner v. Mata (1981), 449 U.S. 539, 545-546, 101 S.Ct. 764, 768-769, 66 L.Ed.2d 722, 730 (...
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