State v. Calloway, 8843-6-I
| Decision Date | 23 December 1985 |
| Docket Number | 8414-7-II,No. 8843-6-I,8843-6-I |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Darrin Michael CALLOWAY, a.k.a. Gooding, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Bruce D. Hovey, (Court appointed), Tacoma, for appellant.
Barbara L. Corey-Boulet, Deputy Pros. Atty., Tacoma, for respondent.
Darrin Calloway, a juvenile, appeals his juvenile court orders of commitment. We affirm.
On November 28, 1984, Calloway was convicted in Pierce County Juvenile Court on his plea of guilty to one count of Taking a Motor Vehicle Without the Owner's Permission. On May 22, 1985, he again was convicted on his plea of guilty to attempted Burglary in the Second Degree and to Possessing Stolen Property in the Third Degree, both committed while he was on release from detention pending appeal of his sentence for the earlier conviction. He has appealed both sentences on the same ground, and the two appeals have been consolidated.
Calloway argues that the court erred in ordering commitments of 13 to 16 weeks and 21 to 28 weeks because, in determining his sentence, the court included in his criminal history two prior burglaries, committed within a period of one hour. Calloway asserts that, under RCW 13.40.020(6)(a), 1 only one of the two burglaries should have been included in his criminal history for the purpose of calculating the standard range of disposition, because the two burglaries arose out of the "same course of conduct."
According to defendant, the burglaries arose out of the same course of conduct because they were committed, within the span of an hour, for the single purpose of obtaining money to buy drugs. In his statement to the police following his arrest for those two burglaries, Calloway stated: "As we were walking back to my house, that's when we schemed upon the idea to hit a couple of houses." Calloway and his cousin went to Calloway's home. Upon noticing that his neighbor was gone, Calloway and his cousin burglarized the neighbor's house. The two returned to Calloway's home for a short time and then decided to take a bus to the cousin's home. As they were walking to the bus stop, they noticed an apparently empty house. They then committed the second burglary.
At each of the disposition hearings, the court commissioners rejected Calloway's argument that these burglaries arose out of the same course of conduct. In each case, the court imposed a standard range of disposition based partly on a criminal history that included both burglaries, among other offenses.
Under the guidelines established by the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, RCW ch. 13.40, the standard range of disposition for a juvenile offender is to be based on the offender's age the instant offense, and the offender's criminal history. RCW 13.40.030. In determining a juvenile offender's criminal history, only the highest charge among two or more offenses counts as an offense if the offenses arose "out of the same course of conduct." The issue on appeal is whether that phrase encompasses the two burglaries in question.
The Juvenile Justice Act does not define "same course of conduct." In the only decision to have considered its meaning, State v. Adcock, 36 Wash.App. 699, 676 P.2d 1040 (1984), the phrase was viewed as a term of art; because the phrase was not defined in the act, and in order to determine its common meaning, the court resorted to Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1969). Utilizing that dictionary's definition of "course of," the court found that the defendant's offenses had not been "committed as part of any ordered or continuing sequence or under any recognizable scheme or plan." Adcock, 36 Wash.App. at 706, 676 P.2d 1040. The Adcock court also referred to this court's consideration of similar phraseology in the joinder rules when, in State v. Erickson, 22 Wash.App. 38, 587 P.2d 613 (1978), we stated that "[a] criminal event which is intimately related to or connected to another criminal event is held to arise out of the same criminal conduct." Adcock, 36 Wash.App. at 706, 676 P.2d 1040.
Although we believe that Calloway's offenses do not fall within the meaning attributed by the Adcock court to "same course of conduct," we also believe there is a need for further refinement of that phrase. The phrase implies, in the context of the statute, some physical or causal connection between offenses that, in many cases, may be more circumscribed than the connection between offenses committed as part of a "recognizable scheme or plan." We find that connection to be appropriately described in the Model...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Knight, 42130–5–II.
...Huff, 45 Wash.App. 474, 478–79, 726 P.2d 41 (1986); State v. Edwards, 45 Wash.App. 378, 382, 725 P.2d 442 (1986); State v. Calloway, 42 Wash.App. 420, 424, 711 P.2d 382 (1985). Additionally, neither crime furthered the commission of the other. While the attempted murders may have been commi......
-
State v. Hall
...was identical (possession), each crime was distinct and separately realized upon the completion of each incident. State v. Calloway, 42 Wash.App. 420, 424, 711 P.2d 382 (1985). We find no The decision of the trial court is affirmed. THOMAS, C.J., and MUNSON, J., concur. * Judge John J. Ripp......
-
State v. Dunaway
...between criminal events is met only if there is "no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective." State v. Calloway, 42 Wash.App. 420, 423-24, 711 P.2d 382 (1985). This test is an objective one, not dependent on the juvenile's subjective intent. Calloway, at 424, 711 P.2d 382......
-
State v. Collicott
...have been motivated by a single subjective intent, such as a need for money or an intent to harass another. See State v. Calloway, 42 Wash.App. 420, 424, 711 P.2d 382 (1985); State v. Huff, 45 Wash.App. 474, 478-79, 726 P.2d 41 (1986); Dunaway, at 216-17, 743 P.2d 1237. The determination of......