State v. Calvin

Decision Date10 December 1945
Docket Number38025.
Citation209 La. 257,24 So.2d 467
CourtLouisiana Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE v. CALVIN.

Appeal from Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court Parish of St. John the Baptist; L. Robert Rivarde Judge.

Robert E. Baird, of Reserve, for defendant and appellant.

Fred S. LeBlanc, Atty. Gen., M. E. Culligan, Asst. Atty. Gen., and John E. Fleury, Dist. Atty., and Frank H. Langridge, Asst Dist. Atty., both of Gretna, for appellee.

KENNON Justice.

In this case an affidavit was filed on June 7, 1945, charging that Carey Lee Calvin '* * * did unlawfully and wrongfully hit and bit one Andrew DeCarlo. Said Carey Lee Calvin (did) willfully disturb the peace in said Andrew DeCarlo business place contrary, etc. * * *' (Italics and parenthesis ours.)

On July 9, 1945, in a bill of information, the defendant was charged with having '* * * on or about the Seventh (7th) day of June in the year of our Lord One Thousand Nine Hundred and Forty-five (1945) with force and arms, in the Parish aforesaid, and within the jurisdiction of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District Court of Louisiana, in and for the Parish aforesaid, then and there being committed a battery upon one Andrew DeCarlo with a dangerous weapon,

'Count 2: And the District Attorney further gives the Court to be informed and to understand that the said Carey Lee Calvin did then and there disturb the peace, contrary * * *.' The minutes of the court state that the Assistant District Attorney 'Prior to argument * * * moved to abandon the charge of Disturbing the Peace and proceeded with argument on the charge of Aggravated Battery. * * *'

The minutes further recite that: 'The jury then retired to their room, to deliberate upon this case, said Jury returned to the Court Room, with the following verdict 'Guilty as charged.' July 24, 1945. (Signed) N. E. Keller, Foreman.'

A photostat of the bill of information in the record shows the verdict as follows:

'July 24 45

'Jilty as chage

'N. E. Keller

'Jorman.'

The defendant's counsel filed, on July 27, 1945, a motion to set aside the verdict rendered by the jury as being unresponsive, illegible, unreadable, improperly dated, and not indicative of 'which of the several charges the defendant was found guilty on'; and prayed for a suspension of judgment and, in the alternative, for a new trial. There is no notation in the record of any action on this motion prior to the imposition of a sentence for seven years at hard labor in the State Penitentiary, given by the court on August 1, 1945. On the same day a motion for appeal to the Supreme Court was requested by the defendant and granted by the court.

The one bill of exception in the record is to the judge's refusal to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial. It is unsigned and the judge of the district court gives as his reasons for refusing to sign the same that it was presented to the court for signature on Tuesday, August 7, 1945, six days after sentence was imposed and the motion for a suspensive appeal was granted and, therefore, came too late.

The district judge properly refused to sign the belated bill of exception and we cannot consider this exception, although in the record, in view of Article 545 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Law and Procedure, and the settled jurisprudence of this State. State v. Young, 153 La. 605, 96 So. 275; State v. Smith, 156 La. 685, 101 So. 22; State v. Early, 183 La. 664, 164 So. 620; State v. Goury, 184 La. 955, 168 So. 113; State v. Cooley, 185 La. 1032, 171 So. 435; State v. Carlson, 192 La. 501, 188 So. 155; State v. Odom, 192 La. 257, 187 So. 659; State v. Festervand, 189 La. 226, 179 So. 297; State v. Childers, 196 La. 554, 199 So. 640.

Although we find no proper bill of exception for consideration by this Court, an examination of the record discloses errors patent on the face thereof which are fatal to a valid verdict and sentence.

There were two counts in the bill of information and the minutes show that the defendant was arraigned and that the trial progressed to the conclusion of the evidence on both counts, one for disturbing the peace and one for aggravated battery. The minutes show that, after the evidence was in and 'prior to argument' the district attorney moved to abandon the charge of disturbing the peace and that the court instructed the jury to disregard that charge.

Article 103 of the Louisiana Criminal Code, Act No. 43 of 1942, defines the crime of 'Disturbing the Peace' and provides punishment by fine of not more than $100 and imprisonment of not more than 90 days, or both. Such a case is necessarily triable by the judge alone and, under no circumstances is a trial by jury proper. Had this count gone to the jury and a verdict of disturbing the peace been rendered, it would have been an absolute nullity. The effect of including this additional count in the bill of information against the defendant and the introduction of evidence under it, permitted proof to be made to the jury of the commission, by the defendant, of a crime other than that for which she was convicted. This Court has uniformly held that this is prejudicial error.

In State v. Bates, 46 La.Ann. 849, 15 So. 204, 205, Chief Justice Nicholls, as the organ of the Court, annulled the verdict of the jury and remanded the case for a new trial, stating:

'The general rule is that, when a man is put upon trial for one offense, he is to be convicted, if at all, by evidence which shows that he is guilty of that offense alone and that other offenses committed by him are wholly excluded; therefore, the introduction of collateral evidence of extraneous crimes to show intent, motive, guilty knowledge, are exceptions to this general rule; and, in order that this evidence be admissible at all, it must bear directly and materially upon, and have some connection with, the issue before the jury. People v. Sharp, 107 N.Y.

427,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
27 cases
  • Warren v. State
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • June 5, 1992
    ... ... In support of this statement, Chief Justice Rooney then recited in footnote: ... 2. Fists or bare hands are not dangerous weapons, per se. State v. Calvin, 209 La. 257, 24 So.2d 467 (1945); People v. Eaton, 25 A.D.2d 692, 268 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1966); Bean v. State, 77 Okl.Cr. 73, 138 P.2d 563 (1943); and People v. Vollmer, 299 N.Y. 347, 87 N.E.2d 291 (1949). Shoes, per se, are not dangerous weapons. Smith v. State, 79 Okl.Cr. 151, 152 P.2d 279 ... ...
  • U.S.A v. Rocha, 08-50175.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • March 18, 2010
    ...80 Mich.App. 352, 263 N.W.2d 370 (1977) (bare hands); State v. Ireland, 22 Utah 2d 17, 447 P.2d 375 (1968) (hands); State v. Calvin, 209 La. 257, 24 So.2d 467 (1945) (bare hands and teeth); Bean v. State, 77 Okla.Crim. 73, 138 P.2d 563 (App.1943) (fists); Warren v. State, 88 Ark. 322, 114 S......
  • State v. Steen
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • December 18, 2020
  • Stamper v. State
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • April 8, 1983
    ... ... 2 Fists or bare hands are not dangerous weapons, per se. State v. Calvin ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT