State v. Camp
Decision Date | 26 November 1974 |
Docket Number | No. 73,73 |
Citation | 209 S.E.2d 754,286 N.C. 148 |
Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Samuel Lee CAMP. |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Atty. Gen. James H. Carson, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen. Jean A. Benoy, and Associate
Atty. Noel Lee Allen, Raleigh, for the State, appellant.
Nicholas Street, Gastonia, for defendant appellee.
The sole question presented by this appeal is the weight to be given a properly administered blood test that shows nonpaternity. The trial court instructed the jury that blood tests are not conclusive on the issue of nonpaternity but that the results of such tests are to be considered along with all the other evidence in determining the issue of paternity. The Court of Appeals awarded a new trial, saying that the instruction as given was erroneous, and that the court should have charged that under the law of genetics and heredity a man and woman of blood group 'O' cannot possibly have a child of blood group 'A', and that if they believed the testimony of the doctor and believed that the tests were properly administered, it would be their duty to return a verdict of not guilty.
Cases from other jurisdictions involving the question before us are collected in Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 1000 (1956). The positions taken by other courts are summarized by the Supreme Court of Nebraska in Houghton v. Houghton, 179 Neb. 275, 285--286, 137 N.W.2d 861, 869 (1965):
'In cases arising either under . . . statutes or by courts which have taken judicial notice of the reliability of such tests, the courts are not in harmony as to the weight to be given to such evidence. . . . Some cases have held that blood tests indicating nonpaternity are only entitled to the same weight as other evidence. Among them are Arais v. Kalensnikoff, 10 Cal.2d 428, 74 P.2d 1043, 115 A.L.R. 163; Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal.App.2d 652, 169 P.2d 442; and Ross v. Marx, 24 N.J.Super. 25, 93 A.2d 597. The reasoning of the courts holding this view is stated in Arais v. Kalensnikoff, supra, as follows: 'Expert testimony 'is to be given the weight to which it appears in each case to be justly entitled.' * * * 'When there is a conflict between scientific testimony and testimony as to the facts, the jury or trial court must determine the relative weight of the evidence. . . .''
In North Carolina, when paternity is in issue, statutes require that upon motion by defendant the court order blood tests for mother, child and alleged father. G.S. § 49--7; G.S. § 8--50.1. G.S. § 8--50.1 further provides that '. . . The results of such blood grouping tests shall be admitted in evidence when offered by a duly licensed practicing physician or other qualified person.' Neither statute prescribes the weight to be given such evidence.
It is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that where a statute is intelligible without any additional words, no additional words may be supplied. 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.38 (4th ed., 1973); State v. Humphries, 210 N.C. 406, 186 S.E. 473 (1936). Here, it is clear that G.S. § 49--7 and G.S. § 8--50.1 allow the results of blood-grouping tests into evidence, but the statutes are silent regarding the weight to be given such results. 'Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction and the courts must give it its plain and definite meaning, and are without power to interpolate, or superimpose, provisions and limitations not contained therein.' 7 Strong, N.C.Index 2d, Statutes § 5 (1968). This rule was applied in Board of Architecture v. Lee, 264 N.C. 602, 142 S.E.2d 643 (1965). In that case, the North Carolina Board of Architecture, pursuant to G.S. § 83--12, sought to enjoin the defendant from practicing architecture without a license. An exemption to the licensing requirement provided: '. . . Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prevent any individual from making plans or data for buildings For himself.' (Emphasis added.) One of the buildings construction of which was sought to be enjoined was an automobile sales and service building to be located on defendant's property. Defendant had drawn the plans for the building, though he planned to lease it to others. The Board contended that 'for himself' in the statute meant buildings that defendant would actually occupy. This Court disagreed. Justice Parker (later Chief Justice), speaking for the Court, said:
More recently, we applied this rule to the question now before us. In State v. Fowler, 277 N.C. 305, 177 S.E.2d 385 (1970), Justice Sharp, speaking for the Court, said
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is well reasoned and documented, and cogently presents the view of many jurisdictions that blood-grouping tests that point to nonpaternity are conclusive. Indeed, this Court, recognizing the reliability of such tests, has said: Wright v. Wright, 281 N.C. 159, 172 188 S.E.2d 317, 326 (1972). Perhaps the General Assembly should provide that the results of such tests showing nonpaternity should be conclusive. However, when public policy requires a change in a constitutionally-valid statute, it is the duty of the Legislature and not the courts to make that change. 2 Strong, N.C. Index 2d, Constitutional Law § 10 (1967); Clark's v. West, 268 N.C. 527, 151 S.E.2d 5 (1966); Insurance Co. v. Bynum, 267 N.C. 289, 148 S.E.2d 114 (1966); Fisher v. Motor Co., 249 N.C. 617, 107 S.E.2d 94 (1959). Clark's v. West, supra. 'The legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of State government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other.' Article I, section 6, North Carolina Constitution.
For the above reasons, we...
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