State v. Campbell

• Decision Date: 06 August 1985
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Andrews B. CAMPBELL.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 467

497 A.2d 467

STATE of Maine v. Andrews B. CAMPBELL.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued March 14, 1985.

Decided Aug. 6, 1985.

James E. Tierney, Atty. Gen., Eric E. Wright (orally), Thomas L. Goodwin, Charles K. Leadbetter, Asst. Attys. Gen., Augusta, for plaintiff.

Berman, Simmons & Goldberg, P.A., Jack H. Simmons (orally), Steven D. Silin, Julian Sweet, Lewiston, Campbell Law Offices, Jura A. Burdinik, Portland, for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C.J., ^* and NICHOLS, VIOLETTE, WATHEN, GLASSMAN and SCOLNIK, JJ.

VIOLETTE, Justice.

The defendant appeals from a judgment of criminal contempt entered against him after a summary proceeding in the Superior Court, Knox County. He contends that his conduct did not justify the finding of contempt, that the summary proceeding before the trial judge was improper, and that the court imposed an excessive sentence for the contempt. We disagree with the defendant's contentions and deny the appeal.

I.

On April 13, 1984, the Superior Court, Androscoggin County, appointed the defendant, attorney Andrews Campbell, to represent Dennis Friel in a criminal prosecution. A grand jury had indicted Friel and a co-defendant, Donald Lagasse, for committing aggravated criminal mischief by damaging the property of various churches.

On September 7, 1984, the case was transferred to Knox County. The jury trial of Friel and Lagasse began on September 10. Both before and during trial, Campbell and his client Friel repeatedly questioned the fairness of the proceedings and specifically challenged the impartiality of the Superior Court justice. On several occasions, the presiding justice warned Friel and his attorney concerning Friel's courtroom behavior.

The courtroom behavior of attorney Campbell was also of concern to the presiding justice. On the second day of the trial, September 11, Campbell shook hands with a witness for the State as the witness was leaving the stand. The court instructed the jury not to draw any inference from this gesture by defense counsel.

On the third day of the trial, September 12, after the presiding justice found Dennis Friel to be in contempt of court and had him removed from the courtroom, attorney Campbell questioned the basis of the court's action. When Campbell continued to protest, the presiding justice warned him that he would find him in contempt as well if he did not cease his objections. At this point, the court announced that it would recess briefly.

After the recess, but before the jury returned to the courtroom, there was a discussion between the presiding justice and counsel concerning the contempt finding made against Friel. Campbell again protested the court's decision to find his client in contempt, and referred to the incident as a "judicial trap." Despite being interrupted by Campbell on more than one occasion, the court informed him that his client was barred from the courtroom and that the trial would continue. In a vigorous and lengthy continuation of his objection, Campbell made the following statements: he referred to the contempt finding directed at his client as "the most grave violation of the United States Constitution [he had] ever seen"; he urged the presiding justice to disqualify himself from hearing the underlying criminal matter and to grant a mistrial; he indicated that he could not proceed "in good faith, ... as a member of the Bar and as a lawyer," and observed that "it cause[d] [him] great grief to have to stay at a proceeding where the rulings have been as such as [the] Court has done"; he stated that, by choice, he would be in "the Maine Supreme Court or the First District Court of Appeals of the United States District Court [sic]"; and he indicated that he would remain mute throughout the remainder of the trial. The presiding justice observed that he was extremely concerned about Campbell's performance in representing his client, particularly his behavior concerning the contempt finding made against Friel. After the court indicated that the jury should be brought in so that the trial could be resumed, Campbell informed the court of his intent to leave the courtroom to speak with his client and to remain mute throughout the rest of the trial. The presiding justice told Campbell that he would pursue such conduct "at his peril."

The jury was then brought into the courtroom. Campbell almost immediately requested a conference at sidebar to make an additional point regarding the contempt finding made against Friel and to request that "a transcript of all proceedings to date in this trial ... be prepared on an expedited basis immediately." After the court deferred action upon this request, Campbell left the courtroom and the trial resumed.

A short time later, during the State's examination of a witness, Campbell returned to the courtroom and immediately interrupted the proceedings to request permission from the court to leave again to consult with his client. The court refused to authorize such action and told Campbell to be seated. The presiding justice reminded Campbell that he had a duty to represent his client effectively in the matter before the court. Campbell remarked, "I don't think I need authorization, do I?" and left the courtroom again. Three minutes later Campbell returned to the courtroom. After listening to some testimony, he again interrupted the trial by stating, "Excuse me, Your Honor. I just want to talk to my client." Campbell then left the courtroom without comment from the presiding justice. He returned to the courtroom two minutes later.

A short time later, the presiding justice asked Campbell if he intended to cross-examine a witness. Campbell responded, "Your Honor, I have already stated to the Court that my client and I--," at which point the court cut him off and excused the jury. The following exchange between the presiding justice and Campbell, culminating in the justice summarily finding Campbell to be in contempt of court, then took place:

THE COURT: Before you begin, let me caution you, counsel. You are an attorney at law licensed to practice in the state of Maine.

MR. CAMPBELL: I hope so.

THE COURT: Let me finish, because it is very, very important that the record reflect what I am saying. As an officer of the court and an attorney at law, you are obligated to represent your interest or your client's interest with respect to any given case in a manner that is required of you as a lawyer.

MR. CAMPBELL: I don't think anybody has ever done more than I have as a lawyer for this client.

THE COURT: Let me finish. That would include being in this courtroom whenever he's on trial to represent his interests and protect him.

MR. CAMPBELL: Your honor--

THE COURT: Let me finish, Mr. Campbell. And protect his interests fully by virtue of listening to the evidence that is offered against him during the course of the trial, and, if necessary, to cross-examine any witness to make sure your client is duly protected and his interest is fully protected.

MR. CAMPBELL: May I respond?

THE COURT: You will have an opportunity to respond in due course. Let me finish.

MR. CAMPBELL: Of course.

THE COURT: That is when you say your client has ordered you to stand mute that, sir, does not permit you to stand mute.

MR. CAMPBELL: Your Honor, I made that decision myself.

THE COURT: Let me finish. If you make a conscious choice you are, in effect, jeopardizing your profession and your professional status.

MR. CAMPBELL: If this was a trial I think the Court, as I have said, has jeopardized his status under the Constitution. He's been denied the fundamental right to a fair trial. He's been booby trapped. All the evidence indicates--I don't know if he has been booby trapped, I have argued four times and he's been denied the right to a fair trial.

THE COURT: Mr. Campbell--

MR. CAMPBELL: Let me finish. The right to a fair trial, his interests are not to be subjected to what he has called an inquisition. In my opinion the facts in court, in open court, are such to give reasonable credence to what he has said. His decision, I will tell you mine, too, sir, is that his interests demand my being in the federal court. If I have to stay here I cannot get that man out of jail before he's put at Thomaston by this Court, and myself, possibly, sir, sentenced without any fair ground.

THE COURT: This Court does hereby find that you have committed contempt in the actual presence of this Court. I do hereby hold you in contempt. I sentence you to five days to the County Jail--

MR. CAMPBELL: Sir, that makes, that means my client can't get out.

THE COURT: That sentence will be stayed until such time as this trial is concluded or you, of your own choosing, are not here, whichever first occurs.

MR. CAMPBELL: I understand. Thank you.

THE COURT: I am going to take a five-minute recess.

MR. CAMPBELL: You may.

On September 13, the presiding justice filed an order of contempt pursuant to M.R.Crim.P. 42(a) reciting the facts underlying his finding of September 12 that Campbell was in contempt of court. Campbell appeals from the judgment of contempt entered against him.

II.

"A contempt of court has been defined as 'any act which is calculated to embarrass, hinder or obstruct the court in the administration of justice or to lessen its authority or dignity.' " State v. DeLong, 456 A.2d 877, 881 (Me.1983) (quoting In re Holbrook, 133 Me. 276, 280, 177 A. 418, 420 (1935)); In re Bernard, 408 A.2d 1279, 1281 n. 2 (Me.1979). Under M.R.Crim.P. 42, contempt may be punished criminally in two different ways: summarily pursuant to Rule 42(a), ¹ and after a plenary procedure pursuant to Rule 42(b). ² Although the right of a court to punish contempt summarily is firmly established, see In re Bernard, 408 A.2d at 1282; United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 319, 95 S.Ct. 1802, 1808, 44 L.Ed.2d 186 (1975), ³ the exercise of this power is subject to definite limitations. By its own terms, Rule 42(a) restricts summary...