State v. Campbell

Decision Date06 April 2023
Docket Number97A20-2
PartiesSTATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTIWUAN TYREZ CAMPBELL
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of North Carolina

Heard in the Supreme Court on 8 February 2023.

Appeal pursuant to N.C. G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 272 N.C.App. 554, 846 S.E.2d 804 (2020), finding no error in the trial court's determination that defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination during jury selection. On 15 December 2020, the Supreme Court allowed defendant's petition for discretionary review of additional issues.

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Nicholas R. Sanders, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Olivia Warren, for defendant.

University of North Carolina School of Law, Clinical Programs Civil Rights Clinic, by Erika K. Wilson; and Tiffany R Wright for North Carolina Black Lives Matter Activists, amici curiae.

Cassandra Stubbs, Elizabeth R. Cruikshank, Sarah H. Sloan Daniel Dubens, and Easha Anand for the Roderick and Solange Macarthur Justice Center and the American Civil Liberties Union, amici curiae.

BERGER, JUSTICE

Defendant appeals from a decision of the Court of Appeals concluding that there was no error in the trial court's determination that defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination during jury selection pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986). We affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On April 15, 2015, defendant was indicted for first-degree murder and second-degree kidnapping. Defendant's matter came on for trial in the Superior Court, Columbus County, on July 24, 2017.

Defendant's counsel filed a series of motions at the outset of trial, including a motion for complete recordation. Notably, although defendant's counsel stated that this motion was "[j]ust for appeal purposes," defendant's counsel specified she was "not requesting that [recordation] include jury selection." The trial court granted defendant's motion; thus, no transcript of voir dire is available. The record in this matter, as it relates to voir dire, contains only the deputy clerk's jury panel sheet and a transcript of the proceedings after defendant made his Batson objection.[1]

In seating twelve jurors for defendant's trial, the jury panel sheet shows that two prospective jurors were excused for cause. In addition, defendant exercised three peremptory challenges to excuse prospective jurors Pamela Moore, Richard Fowler, and Brentwood Parker, while the State excused prospective jurors Timothy Coe and Sylvia Vereen with peremptory challenges. The record contains no evidence of objections by defendant at the time the State used these peremptory challenges.

However, while selecting alternate jurors, the State exercised two peremptory challenges to excuse Justin Staton and Andria Holden. Defendant raised a Batson objection to the State's excusal of Ms. Holden, arguing that the State had used three of its four peremptory challenges to strike black prospective jurors and "ha[d] tried extremely hard for every African-American, to excuse them for cause." Defendant further contended that "the last two alternate jurors that were excused showed no leaning one way or the other or indicated that they would not be able to hear the evidence, apply the law, and render a verdict."

After hearing from defendant, the trial court allowed the State to respond. The State noted that although it had race-neutral reasons justifying each peremptory challenge, the trial court was first required to determine that defendant had made a prima facie showing under Batson. Defendant agreed that "it's a decision for the [c]ourt at this point." The trial court denied defendant's Batson challenge, concluding that defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case even though such a showing "is a very low hurdle."

After determining that defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case, the trial court again asked the State if it would like "to offer a racially-neutral basis" for its peremptory strikes. Because the State noted that offering race-neutral reasons "could be viewed as a stipulation that there was a prima facie showing," the State declined to offer its reasons for the strikes. The trial court again reiterated that "the [c]ourt has found at this point there's not a prima facie showing, and the [c]ourt will deny the Batson challenge." After a short recess, the trial court repeated that it "d[id] not find that a prima facie case has been established," but nevertheless "order[ed] the State to proceed as to stating a racially-neutral basis for the exercise of the peremptory challenges."

As to the first prospective juror, Ms. Vereen, the State explained:

[S]he had indicated that she was familiar with Clifton Davis and actually dated his brother, who is a potential witness, and a potential witness who was . . . alleged to have been in the vehicle with . . . defendant on the night of this encounter in those early morning hours.
....
. . . [W]e used our peremptory strike based upon blood relation to the people in the area of that community, . . . defendant's blood relation to the people in the area of the Bennett Loop community, and Mr. Davis, his blood brother being the person she dated around the time period or within a few years of this happening, and her being familiar with Mr. Clifton Davis, who is a witness.
Regarding the challenge to Mr. Staton, the State explained:
[He] made several conflicting statements during the State's questioning to try and ensure if he could be fair and impartial or not.
. . . [H]e was familiar with [a primary witness to the murder and alleged kidnapping] . . . any concern he may have preconceived notions about who she was and these events, was one of the State's concerns.
In addition, he stated he needed to hear from both sides . . . [h]e had flip-flopped back and forth or had stated he needed to hear from both sides, he could only hear from the State, he needed to hear from both sides.
. . . [S]ince he had gone from having to hear both sides to only hearing one side, being the State, back and forth on multiple occasions, that was a concern.
Also, he indicated that he had two friends, one who was transgender who was killed in Cumberland County, that friend, he indicated, those events, and the one in California for the girlfriend or female friend he had who had been killed. When the State asked whether that would substantially impair his ability to be fair and impartial as a juror in this case and a trier of fact being presented here for this particular case-in-chief, he indicated it would.

The State provided the following race-neutral reasons for the challenge to Ms. Holden:

[S]he was familiar with . . . [people] that are on the potential witness list, they are blood relatives to [a primary witness to the murder and alleged kidnapping] ....
And based upon her familiarity with those three names, which are related to the facts in this case and potential witnesses, we did not-from our viewpoint, we wanted to ensure that a potential juror did not bring in outside knowledge or facts into this case about those people they were familiar with and saw socially ....
...
[A]n additional reason for the peremptory strike . . . was the fact [that] when she was describing her political science background and nature as a student, she was also indicating that she was a participant, if not an organizer, for Black Lives Matter at her current college with her professor, and whether or not that would have any implied unstated issues that may arise due to either law enforcement, the State, or other concerns we may have.

Thereafter, the trial court stated that "the [c]ourt continues to find, as I've already indicated, that there has not been a prima facie showing as to purposeful discrimination." The trial court subsequently entered a written order denying defendant's Batson claim for failure to establish a prima facie showing:

The [c]ourt, pursuant to the Batson v. Kentucky objection made by the [d]efense during jury selection, finds that there was not a prima facie showing made to establish any violations by the State for its exercise of [per]emptory challenges to prospective jurors. The [c]ourt noted that the State excused two jurors by using [its per]emptory challenges before sitting the initial twelve jurors. When the State sought to use a [per]emptory challenge on the second prospective alternate juror, after excusing the previous alternate juror, the [d]efense made a Batson v. Kentucky based objection. During the subsequent hearing the [c]ourt found that the [d]efense did not make a prima facie showing.
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, that the [c]ourt finds that the State's use of [per]emptory challenges during jury selection did not constitute a violation of Batson v. Kentucky.

At the conclusion of trial, the jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder and not guilty of second-degree kidnapping. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole and timely appealed.

In the Court of Appeals, defendant argued that the trial court erred in concluding that he failed to establish a prima facie case of impermissible racial discrimination during jury selection. State v.Campbell (Campbell I), 269 N.C.App. 427, 838 S.E.2d 660 (2020). A majority of the Court of Appeals found no error. Id. at 435, 838 S.E.2d at 666. One judge dissented, contending that the case should be remanded to the trial court “for specific findings of fact in order to permit appellate review of the trial court's decision.” Id. at 439, 838 S.E.2d at 668 (Hampson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Defendant subsequently petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari which we allowed to...

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