State v. Campbell

Citation278 Mont. 236,924 P.2d 1304
Decision Date12 September 1996
Docket NumberNo. 95-427,95-427
PartiesSTATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Todd CAMPBELL, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtMontana Supreme Court

Vicki Knudsen, Attorney at Law, Roundup, for defendant and appellant.

Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, Patricia J. Jordan, Ass't Attorney General, Helena, Thomas P. Meissner, Fergus County Attorney, Lewistown, for plaintiff and respondent.

GRAY, Justice.

Todd Campbell (Campbell) appeals from the judgment and sentence entered by the Tenth Judicial District Court, Fergus County, on jury verdicts finding him guilty of two counts of sexual intercourse without consent and one count of sexual assault. We affirm.

We address the following issues on appeal:

1. Did the District Court err in denying Campbell's motion to suppress his confession?

2. Was Campbell's confession supported by independent corroborating evidence?

3. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying Campbell's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal?

4. Was Campbell denied effective assistance of counsel?

5. Did the District Court err regarding either its order for a psychological examination or a determination that Campbell was indigent?

In late 1992, the Montana Department of Family Services (DFS), now the Department of Public Health and Human Services, received several complaints of parental neglect regarding L.D., A.D. and M.M., ages six, four and two, respectively. It removed the three girls from their mother's home and placed them in foster care on January 28, 1993. While in foster care, the children displayed behavior and made statements indicating that they may have been sexually abused.

Jim Simonich (Simonich), a DFS social worker, reported the suspected abuse to the Lewistown Police Department (LPD) in February of 1993. Simonich also made arrangements for the girls to be examined by Dr. Nancy Maynard, a Great Falls pediatrician who specializes in conducting physical examinations in suspected child sexual abuse cases. Dr. Maynard examined the children on March 11, 1993, and found physical evidence that L.D. and A.D. had been sexually abused. Her examination of M.M. did not reveal any conclusive physical evidence of sexual abuse.

Officer David Sanders of the LPD began investigating Simonich's report that the children may have been sexually abused. During his investigation, Officer Sanders spoke with the children's maternal grandmother, who mentioned that Campbell had babysat the children on various occasions. She indicated that she felt uncomfortable when Campbell was around the children and that she suspected that Campbell may have had sexual contacts with the girls.

Officer Sanders telephoned Campbell on April 25, 1993, and made arrangements for an in-person interview; he did not tell Campbell what the interview would be about. When Campbell arrived at the police station for the interview two days later, Officer Sanders took him into an interview room and proceeded with an interview which lasted approximately one and one-half hours. During the interview, Campbell made oral admissions and also wrote a statement confessing to sexual offenses against each of the three girls. He recanted his confession later that day.

The State of Montana (State) subsequently charged Campbell with two counts of sexual intercourse without consent, involving L.D. and A.D., and one count of sexual assault, involving M.M. Campbell moved to suppress his written confession and the oral admissions made to Officer Sanders. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court denied the motion to suppress.

A jury trial was held in June of 1994, and the jury found Campbell guilty of all three charges. The District Court sentenced him to ten years in prison, with eight years suspended, on each charge, and ordered that the sentences run concurrently. Campbell appeals and is represented by new counsel on appeal.

1. Did the District Court err in denying Campbell's motion to suppress his confession?

Campbell moved to suppress both the written confession and the oral admissions (collectively, the confession) made to Officer Sanders during the interview on the basis that they were involuntary. He argued that he did not understand the meaning or consequences of his confession because of his low mental capabilities and also that the officer used improper tactics during the interview.

The District Court denied Campbell's motion to suppress. It found that Officer Sanders' testimony regarding what happened during the interview was more credible than Campbell's and determined, on that basis, that no improper police tactics were used during the interview. The court also found that, although Campbell did have a low intelligence quotient (I.Q.), his confession was made voluntarily. The District Court noted that Campbell had no problems hearing and responding to questions when he testified and that his responses were coherent. The court also found that Campbell exhibited the ability to recall past events and that his vocabulary was "greater than he was willing to admit."

When a defendant moves to suppress a confession on the basis that it was involuntarily given, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntary. Section 46-13-301, MCA. This Court reviews a district court's findings of fact on a motion to suppress to determine whether those findings are clearly erroneous. State v. Loh (1996), 275 Mont. 460, 474-75, 914 P.2d 592, 601. "A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by substantial evidence, if the district court misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or if this Court has a definite or firm conviction that the district court committed a mistake." Loh, 914 P.2d at 601 (citation omitted). It is within the province of the trial court to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony during a hearing on a motion to suppress and we do not review those determinations. State v. Gould (1985), 216 Mont. 455, 466, 704 P.2d 20, 27-28 (quoting State v. Grimestad (1979), 183 Mont. 29, 37, 598 P.2d 198, 203).

The voluntariness of a confession is a question of fact which must take into account the totality of the circumstances under which the confession was made. Loh, 914 P.2d at 601. The totality of the circumstances includes, but is not limited to, the defendant's age and level of education; the interrogation technique used by the police; whether the defendant was advised of his or her Miranda rights; the defendant's prior experience with the criminal justice system; the defendant's background and experience; and the defendant's demeanor, coherence, articulateness, and capacity to make full use of his or her faculties. Loh, 914 P.2d at 601-602.

In the instant case, both Officer Sanders' testimony and other evidence regarding the totality of the circumstances in which Campbell's confession was made support the District Court's finding that the confession was voluntary and, therefore, that the State had met its burden under § 46-13-301, MCA. Campbell was 22 years old when interviewed by Officer Sanders; he had completed the tenth grade with the help of special education classes and subsequently received his GED. Campbell's full-scale I.Q. is 81, which is less than what is considered the normal range, but is not so low as to constitute mental retardation.

Campbell arrived at the LPD with his mother at approximately 6:00 in the evening and was taken to an interview room by Officer Sanders. Officer Sanders told Campbell that he was not under arrest, that he could leave at any time and that he did not have to answer any questions. The officer then began to read a Miranda rights form but was interrupted by other business. He asked Campbell to remain in the interview room until he returned, at which time he resumed reading the Miranda rights form. Officer Sanders testified--and the rights form indicated--that Campbell signed the statement of rights form in the space indicating that he understood his rights; Campbell also signed the form in the space which indicated that he had read the statement of rights, understood what his rights were, and was voluntarily waiving his right to a lawyer and his right to remain silent. Both signatures were witnessed by Officer Sanders. According to the officer, Campbell also verbally stated that he understood the statement of rights.

At that point, Officer Sanders began to question Campbell regarding whether he knew the three girls and their mother. Campbell responded that he did know them and that he had babysat the girls. Officer Sanders then told Campbell that an investigation was under way regarding incidents of sexual abuse against the girls and that the investigation indicated that Campbell might be involved. Campbell initially denied having any sexual contact with the girls but, as the interview progressed, he admitted that he had sexual intercourse with the two older girls and sexual contact with the youngest one. During the interview, Campbell described various incidents that occurred with each of the girls and how the girls reacted.

After Campbell made these disclosures, Officer Sanders asked him if he would make a written statement outlining what he had said during the interview. Officer Sanders brought out a form and explained to Campbell that it was a voluntary statement form. The officer testified that he read the form, including another statement of rights, to Campbell and explained that he did not have to make a statement. Campbell then filled in his name and the date, time, and location of the interview, and wrote out a statement confessing to sexually abusing the girls.

Officer Sanders testified that he did not threaten Campbell during the interview or otherwise try to intimidate Campbell into confessing, and that he made no promises to Campbell regarding leniency from either the...

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12 cases
  • State v. Main
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • 12 Julio 2011
    ...record, and we have decided claims of this kind on direct appeal on numerous occasions.” Hagen, ¶ 20 (citing State v. Campbell, 278 Mont. 236, 250, 924 P.2d 1304, 1313, (1996); State v. Bradley, 262 Mont. 194, 197–99, 864 P.2d 787, 789 (1993); State v. Schoffner, 248 Mont. 260, 268, 811 P.2......
  • State v. Collard
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • 18 Diciembre 1997
    ...to be given their testimony during a hearing on a motion to suppress and we do not review those determinations. State v. Campbell (1996), 278 Mont. 236, 241, 924 P.2d 1304, 1307 (citing State v. Gould (1985), 216 Mont. 455, 466, 704 P.2d 20, 27-28; State v. Grimestad (1979), 183 Mont. 29, 3......
  • State v. Marquart
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • 7 Enero 2020
    ...Aside from his right-of-presence argument, Marquart does not challenge these evaluations on appeal.1 In State v. Campbell , 278 Mont. 236, 251-52, 924 P.2d 1304, 1314 (1996), we reviewed a criminal defendant’s claim that § 46-14-202(1), MCA, places an affirmative duty on the trial court to ......
  • State v. Hoffman
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • 19 Febrero 2003
    ...six years of formal education. However, we upheld the admissibility of a confession under similar circumstances in State v. Campbell (1996), 278 Mont. 236, 924 P.2d 1304. In that case, the defendant was twenty-two years old; and although he had graduated from high school, his I.Q. was well ......
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