State v. Campbell

• Decision Date: 11 February 2020
• Docket Number: WD 82209
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Austin Joseph CAMPBELL, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

600 S.W.3d 780

STATE of Missouri, Respondent,

v.Austin Joseph CAMPBELL, Appellant.

WD 82209

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

OPINION FILED: February 11, 2020

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to the Supreme Court Denied March 31, 2020

Application for Transfer to Supreme Court Denied June 30, 2020

Daniel N. McPherson, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.

Elizabeth U. Carlyle, Kansas City, MO, for appellant.

Before Special Division: Zel M. Fischer, Special Judge, Presiding, Cynthia L. Martin, Judge and Gary D. Witt, Judge

Cynthia L. Martin, Judge

Austin Campbell ("Campbell") appeals his conviction of rape in the first degree. Campbell challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction; the trial court's restriction of his cross-examination of a witness and of his closing argument; the trial court's admission of evidence; and the trial court's failure to provide a curative instruction during the State's closing argument. Finding no error, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background¹

On January 17, 2016, Victim returned to the University of Missouri-Columbia after an extended break between semesters. Victim lived in an on-campus dormitory. Victim and her friends organized a party in Victim's dorm room. A group message invited a large number of other dormitory residents to the party. Campbell, among other residents, attended the party, where he drank whiskey from a water bottle.

During the evening, those in attendance at the party moved from Victim's dormitory room to another room down the hall. Victim, who had been drinking, fell asleep on a bed. Eventually, Victim's friend assisted Victim back to her own room, where she fell asleep. The party ended shortly thereafter.

Lauren Lahey ("Lahey") lived in a dorm room down the hall from Victim. Lahey left her room to use the hallway restroom and saw Campbell standing outside of Victim's room. Campbell said he was missing his water bottle and thought he might have left it in Victim's room. Lahey looked in Victim's room, which was unlocked, but could not find the water bottle. Victim was asleep. Lahey told Campbell she would look for the water bottle in the morning. Lahey and Campbell went different directions down the hallway. After using the restroom, Lahey again checked on Victim, who was still asleep.

Campbell later entered Victim's room. Victim awoke to find Campbell on top of her, and having sexual intercourse with her. Victim pushed Campbell onto the floor. Victim fled to the hallway bathroom. When she returned to her room, Victim found Campbell sitting on the floor. Victim ordered Campbell to leave, and locked her door.

Later that evening, Campbell saw Tanner Stetzel ("Stetzel") near the dormitory lounge. Campbell asked to speak with Stetzel alone. Stetzel described Campbell's appearance as sweaty and disheveled. Campbell told Stetzel that he had just finished "tucking in" Victim. When Stetzel asked "why," Campbell said because "that's what friends do," and walked away.

The next day, Victim went to the hospital and underwent a sexual assault examination. Victim's injuries were consistent with the sexual assault she described. Victim reported the incident to the police. Campbell was arrested and charged with rape in the first degree, and burglary in the first degree.

At Campbell's first trial, the jury was unable to reach a verdict. The State dropped the burglary charge and indicated its intent to retry Campbell on the charge of rape in the first degree. Prior to his second trial, Campbell filed a motion pursuant to section 491.015.3² seeking permission to interrogate Stetzel about Victim's prior sexual encounter with Stetzel. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Campbell's motion.

At Campbell's second trial, the jury found Campbell guilty of rape in the first degree, and the trial court entered a judgment of conviction and sentence. Campbell filed this timely appeal.

Analysis

Campbell raises six points on appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction; the trial court's restriction of his cross-examination of Stetzel; the trial court's admission of evidence of Campbell's sexual encounter with a man; the trial court's admission of lay opinion evidence from Lahey; the trial court's failure to provide a curative instruction during the State's closing argument; and the trial court's restriction of Campbell's closing argument. We address each point in turn.

Point One

Campbell's first point on appeal argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of rape in the first degree.

Our "review of sufficiency of the evidence is limited to whether the State has introduced sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could have found each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Ajak , 543 S.W.3d 43, 46 (Mo. banc 2018) (quotation omitted). "To determine whether the evidence presented was sufficient to support a conviction and to withstand a motion for judgment of acquittal, this Court does not weigh the evidence but, rather, accept[s] as true all evidence tending to prove guilt together with all reasonable inferences that support the verdict, and ignore[s] all contrary evidence and inferences." Id. (quotations omitted) (alterations in original).

"A person commits the offense of rape in the first degree if he or she has sexual intercourse with another person who is incapacitated[.]" Section 566.030.1. Campbell challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to establish that Victim was incapacitated.

"Incapacitated" is defined as the "physical or mental condition, temporary or permanent, in which a person is unconscious, unable to appraise the nature of such person's conduct, or unable to communicate unwillingness to an act." Section 556.061(13). Given this definition, sufficient evidence permitted the jury to find that Victim was incapacitated at the time Campbell had intercourse with her. Victim had been drinking and had to be assisted to her own room. Victim was asleep in her room when Lahey entered the room on two occasions. This was not long before Campbell entered Victim's room. Victim awoke to find Campbell on top of her, kissing her, and sexually penetrating her. Victim testified that Campbell did not have permission to have sexual intercourse with her. Victim testified that after she awoke, she pushed Campbell off of her and retreated to a bathroom.

Campbell asserts that this evidence was insufficient to establish that Victim was incapacitated because "the only evidence presented [on incapacity] was that [Victim] did not recall speaking with [ ] Campbell or giving consent and believed she was asleep at the time the intercourse began." Campbell contends that Victim's "lack of memory of what happened" is "equally consistent with the fact that, as the result of her intoxication, she did not later remember the beginning of the encounter," thus the "two inference" rule operates to preclude a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Appellant's Brief, pp. 21-22]. Campbell's argument relies on State v. Alul , 948 S.W.2d 215 (Mo. App. E.D. 1997), and its discussion of the equally valid inferences rule.

Campbell's reliance on Alul is unavailing. The equally valid inferences rule has been abrogated. State v. Chaney , 967 S.W.2d 47, 54 (Mo. banc 1998) (holding that "[t]he equally valid inferences rule was effectively abolished"); State v. Freeman , 269 S.W.3d 422, 424, n. 4 (Mo. banc 2008) ("In Chaney , this Court expressly abrogated the ‘equally valid inferences rule.’ "); see also State v. Hudson , 970 S.W.2d 855, 859 (Mo. App. S.D. 1998) (recognizing that Alul 's application of the two inference rule was abrogated by Chaney ). Instead, review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is governed by principles of due process. See Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ; State v. Grim , 854 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Mo. banc 1993) ; Chaney , 967 S.W.2d at 52. Thus, "appellate review is limited to a determination of whether there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror might have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Chaney , 967 S.W.2d at 52 (citing Grim , 854 S.W.2d at 405 ).

Given this standard of review, there was sufficient evidence to find that Victim was incapacitated at the time Campbell had sexual intercourse with her.

Point One is denied.

Point Two

Campbell's second point on appeal argues that his constitutional rights were violated when the trial court refused to permit him to cross-examine Stetzel about Stetzel's prior sexual encounter with Victim for the purpose of impeachment. Specifically, Campbell argues that his rights to effectively confront and cross-examine witnesses pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, and to Missouri Constitution Article I, section 18(a),³ were violated.

In prosecutions involving rape in the first degree and other criminalized sexual conduct, section 491.015.1 (known as the rape shield law) prohibits the introduction of "evidence of specific instances of the complaining witness' prior sexual conduct ..." unless the specific instance falls within one of four enumerated exceptions. Section 491.015.1(1)-(4). Even then, section 491.015.2 provides that "[e]vidence of the sexual conduct of the complaining witness offered under this section is admissible to the extent that the court finds the evidence relevant to a material fact or issue." See State v. Jones , 716 S.W.2d 799, 800 (Mo. banc 1986) (holding that "subsection 2 [of section 491.015 ] is directed only at the exceptions set forth in [section 491.015.1] (1), (2), (3), and (4)," such that evidence offered under the exceptions to section 491.015.1 is admissible "only ‘to the extent that the court finds [it] relevant to a material fact or issue’ "); see also State v. Rycraw , 507 S.W.3d 47, 56-57 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) ("Generally, evidence is not independently admissible under the relevance test in Section 491.015.2;...