State v. Candelaria

• Decision Date: 15 November 2010
• Docket Number: No. 28,565.,28,565.
• Citation: 2011 -NMCA- 001,245 P.3d 69,149 N.M. 125
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Vincent CANDELARIA, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

245 P.3d 69

149 N.M. 125

2011 -NMCA- 001

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Vincent CANDELARIA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 28,565.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Sept. 23, 2010.

Certiorari Denied, Nov. 15, 2010, No. 32,655.

[2011 -NMCA- 71]

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, Ralph E. Trujillo, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.

Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender, Karl Erich Martell, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.

OPINION

KENNEDY, Judge.

{1} We hold in this case that officers, informed that the owner of a car observed under suspicious circumstances had a suspended driver's license, have reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. Subsequent events during the stop permitted an expansion of the scope of the stop without creating a constitutional problem. We therefore affirm the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress.

BACKGROUND

{2} Both arresting officers testified at the suppression hearing and, despite minor conflicts in their testimony, the facts on which the district court relied are undisputed. On the evening of November 2, 2005, Officers Sullivan and Gutierrez of the Albuquerque Police Department were patrolling in Albuquerque's Westgate neighborhood. As the two passed the Westgate baseball fields, they noticed two vehicles in the parking lot: a Monte Carlo driven by Defendant Vincent Candelaria and a white pickup truck. Officer Gutierrez recognized the Monte Carlo from a previous investigation. Police pulled into the parking lot and, upon doing so, both vehicles sped away. Police chose to follow the Monte Carlo. They ran a search on the license plate that indicated the car was owned by Michael Martinez, and a subsequent search of Martinez's driving record revealed that his driving privileges had been suspended. Concluding Martinez was the driver of the Monte Carlo, Officers Sullivan and Gutierrez pulled it over.

{3} Officer Sullivan approached on the driver's side, and Officer Gutierrez approached on the passenger side. Upon seeing Defendant, Officer Sullivan became aware that he was not, in fact, the owner of the car. As Officer Sullivan testified, based on a "prior law enforcement-related setting ... I knew he was not ... Martinez." Nevertheless, Officer Sullivan continued the detention and asked Defendant to produce his driver's license, along with vehicle registration and proof of insurance. Defendant cooperated and, while doing so, stated he had been stopped earlier in the day by police while in possession of a firearm. Concerned for his safety, Officer Sullivan asked Defendant to step out of the car so he could conduct a pat-down for weapons, and Defendant complied. The search revealed that Defendant was unarmed.

{4} As these events took place, Officer Gutierrez approached the vehicle on the passenger side and inspected the passenger compartment from the outside. On the back seat, Officer Gutierrez saw an empty handgun holster, a wallet full of cash, and a box of ammunition. Both windows of the vehicle were down, and Officer Gutierrez smelled the odor of marijuana emanating from inside. When Officer Sullivan completed his pat-

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down search of Defendant's person, Officer Gutierrez asked Defendant "if he was smoking marijuana in the car." Defendant replied that he had smoked marijuana six hours earlier in the day. The officers then asked Defendant's permission to search the vehicle, and Defendant consented both verbally and in writing. After discovering illegal drugs hidden under the car's center console, police arrested Defendant. They found no gun in the vehicle.

{5} A grand jury indicted Defendant on August 17, 2006, for drug trafficking and possession of drug paraphernalia, and Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence gathered during the stop. He argued the stop was improper because police could not have predicated their detention of him on their conclusion that Martinez was the driver of the car based solely on the fact that he was its owner. In the alternative, presuming the validity of the stop, Defendant contended police failed in their duty to terminate the stop the moment they ascertained that Martinez was not the driver.

{6} The district court convened a hearing on February 22, 2007, and after considering the testimony of Officers Sullivan and Gutierrez and the arguments of counsel, the court denied Defendant's motion. Entering extensive written findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court concluded: (1) the initial stop was supported by the reasonable suspicion that Martinez, an unlicensed driver, was operating the vehicle; and (2) the officers' subsequent interactions with Defendant met constitutional standards as they led up to Defendant's voluntary consent to the police search.

{7} Defendant pleaded guilty to trafficking a controlled substance in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-20 (1990) (amended 2006), on the condition that he could reserve his right to appeal the motion to suppress. On appeal, he reasserts his arguments made before the district court. He argues, first, that the initial stop was unsupported by reasonable suspicion and, second, that his continued detention exceeded the scope of the officers' suspicion once they became aware that no traffic violation had occurred. We discuss each.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{8} Motions to suppress present mixed questions of law and fact. State v. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, ¶ 17, 134 N.M. 566, 81 P.3d 19. We review them in two steps. Id. First, we assess the district court's findings of fact in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and ensure that those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Id. ¶ 18 (reviewing courts "do not sit as a trier of fact [because] the district court is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate the credibility of witnesses") (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Second, we consider de novo whether the disputed police activity was reasonable given the totality of the circumstances. Id. Such inquiries extend beyond fact-finding, and we abide by the principle that "appellate courts [are] to shape the parameters of police conduct by placing the constitutional requirement of reasonableness in factual context [.]" Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, any inferences made by the district court pursuant to its findings of fact are likewise reviewed de novo. Id.

DISCUSSION

{9} The constitutions of both the United States and New Mexico prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.M. Const. art. II, § 10. This Court has held that "[a] traffic stop constitutes a seizure of the vehicle and its occupants." State v. Rubio, 2006-NMCA-067, ¶ 11, 139 N.M. 612, 136 P.3d 1022. We analyze whether such a seizure is reasonable, first, according to whether the initial stop was valid and, second, according to "whether the officer's actions ... were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that initially justified the stop." Id. As the situation develops, officers may expand an investigation to answer any new reasonable and articulable suspicions that arise during the course of their lawful activity. State v. Romero, 2002-NMCA-064, ¶ 10, 132 N.M. 364, 48 P.3d 102.

{10} In order to validly stop an automobile, police officers must possess, at a

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minimum, reasonable suspicion that a law has been violated. Such suspicion arises only when officers can detect "specific articulable facts ... that, when judged objectively, would lead a reasonable person to believe criminal activity occurred or was occurring." Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, ¶ 21, 134 N.M. 566, 81 P.3d 19 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It is not enough for police to rely upon "[u]nsupported intuition [or] inarticulate hunches." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Any questions asked by police officers during the course of a stop must be either reasonably related to the reason for the stop or supported by reasonable suspicion. State v. Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 34, 138 N.M. 414, 120 P.3d 836.

A. The Initial Stop

{11} Defendant argues police possessed no reasonable suspicion to stop him. We disagree. At the time he was pulled over, police knew only that the Monte Carlo was registered to Martinez, whose license had been suspended. Thus, Defendant argues, to conclude based on such information that Martinez was the driver represents an unreasonable leap of logic and could not have given officers individualized, particularized suspicion to believe Defendant had broken the law. See State v. Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 20, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856. The issue is one of first impression in New Mexico, but it is somewhat common in other jurisdictions. Therefore, we look to those jurisdictions for guidance.

{12} At least two jurisdictions have issued opinions supporting Defendant's argument. See State v. Cerino, 141 Idaho 736, 117 P.3d 876, 878 (App.2005); Holly v. State, 888 N.E.2d 338, 341 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), vacated by 918 N.E.2d 323 (Ind.2009). In Cerino, for instance, police stopped the vehicle driven by the defendant with knowledge that it was: (1) registered to a male who did not possess an Idaho driver's license, and (2) driven by a male. 117 P.3d at 877. "In these circumstances," the court concluded, "there was little basis to infer that the male registrant was driving; it was as plausible and perhaps more likely, that the driver was someone else." Id. at 878. People frequently drive vehicles registered in the names of others, under a variety of legal circumstances; and so, as the court held, "the mere observation of a vehicle being driven by someone of the same gender as the unlicensed owner is insufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity." Id. Any other result "would endorse the sort of arbitrary invasions of personal liberty and privacy that the ...