State v. Canfield

• Decision Date: 22 July 2019
• Docket Number: No. 77560-0-I,77560-0-I
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE OF WASHINGTON, Appellant, v. CHRISTOPHER ALLEN CANFIELD, Respondent.

STATE OF WASHINGTON, Appellant, v. CHRISTOPHER ALLEN CANFIELD, Respondent.

No. 77560-0-I

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE

July 22, 2019

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

DWYER, J. — Christopher Canfield appeals from his conviction for assault in the second degree, asserting several errors relating to the instruction provided to the jury on the defense of lawful use of force to defend property, Instruction 15. According to Canfield, Instruction 15 (1) improperly relieved the State of its burden to disprove the defense of protection of property, (2) was incomplete and lacked clarity, and thus denied him the right to defend his property, and (3) constituted an improper comment on the evidence by the trial judge. None of his contentions merit appellate relief. We affirm.

I

In 2017, Canfield owned land, and several structures on his land, including a mobile home, two tow-behind trailers, and a camper, in Monroe, Washington. Canfield lived in the mobile home and permitted several homeless acquaintances to live in the mobile home and other structures on his property for free. While he had no formal lease agreement with any of the people he allowed to live at his property, he established rules and conditions for the individuals he permitted to live on his property, namely, no possessing or using hard drugs and no arguing.

In January 2017, Canfield met Cheryl Boersema and she moved onto Canfield's property. Canfield explained his rules concerning hard drugs and arguing and agreed that Boersema did not have to pay any rent until she was "on her feet," at which point she would pay him $300 per month to live on his property. There was no discussion of how long Boersema would be staying on the property, and no written lease. Canfield, however, considered their discussion about his rules and her staying on the property to be a verbal contract. Boersema, on the other hand, did not believe that she and Canfield had entered into any specific agreement about the terms of her stay on his property.

At approximately 10:30 p.m. on June 18, 2017, Canfield awoke to noise on his property, and was told by a roommate that Boersema "had dope and wasn't sharing." Upon hearing this, Canfield thought "Cheryl is breaking the rules and I'm going to have to ask her to leave." At this time, Boersema was staying in the camper and had a friend, John Fulcher, visiting. Canfield walked out to the camper from his mobile home, observed small bags of what he believed were methamphetamines in the camper,¹ seized the bags, and, screaming and using expletives, told Boersema and Fulcher that he did not tolerate drugs on hisproperty and that they had to leave the property. Canfield then returned to the mobile home and waited for Boersema and Fulcher to leave.

Approximately 10 minutes later, Boersema and Fulcher were still in the camper on Canfield's property and Canfield believed that they were not planning to leave. Grabbing a machete to protect himself,² he returned to the camper to again tell Boersema and Fulcher to leave the property.

Although the exact details of the encounter were later disputed at trial,³ all parties agreed that Canfield went back to the camper and, still screaming and swearing, ordered Boersema and Fulcher to leave immediately. Boersema and Fulcher immediately left the property.

Soon thereafter, Boersema reported the encounter to the police. Deputy Christopher Leyda responded to the scene, and Canfield turned over the baggies of what he believed to be methamphetamines, showed Deputy Leyda his machete, and denied assaulting Boersema or Fulcher. Deputy Leyda arrested Canfield.

The State charged Canfield with one count of assault in the second degree and one count of harassment. At trial, Canfield proposed an instruction on defense of self, defense of others, and defense of property. The State objected to the court instructing the jury on defense of property, arguing that if the court did so instruct the jury, the court should also instruct the jury on certainportions of Washington's Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 1973 (RLTA), chapter 59.18 RCW, to allow the jury to decide whether a residential agreement existed between Canfield and Boersema, and thus whether Canfield had the right to remove Boersema from his property without a court order.⁴

Canfield's attorney objected, arguing that the evidence did not support giving such instructions and that the State's proposed instructions on the RLTA did not make it clear to the jury that Canfield could not rely upon the defense of property as a defense if there was a landlord-tenant relationship between Canfield and Boersema. When the trial judge asked Canfield's attorney for an alternative instruction that might be clearer, she stated, "I've outlined the issue that I think the jury needs to be instructed on, but I think the onus is on the State to craft the instruction."

After further discussion, the State offered a modified form of the standard defense of property instruction as a solution to the issue raised by Canfield's attorney. This modified instruction combined the State's proposed instructions on the RLTA with Canfield's defense of property instruction, inserting a definition of "tenant" and "rental agreement" into the defense of property instruction and explaining that landlords cannot evict tenants without a court order.

As the trial court considered whether to give the State's proposed modified defense of property instruction, the court specifically asked Canfield's attorney if she had any objections to, or wanted to present any argument about, the wordingof what became Instruction 15. Although she objected generally to the issuance of a defense of property instruction setting forth any provisions of the RLTA,⁵ Canfield's attorney declined to be heard on the wording of what became Instruction 15.⁶ Thus, the trial court gave the following instruction to the jury as Instruction 15:

It is a defense to a charge of assault in the second degree that the force offered to be used was lawful as defined in this instruction.

The offer to use force upon or toward the person of another is lawful when offered by a person who reasonably believes that he is about to be injured or by someone lawfully aiding a person who he reasonably believes is about to be injured in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against the person, and when the force is not more than is necessary.

The offer to use force upon or toward the person of another is lawful when offered in preventing or attempting to prevent a malicious trespass or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in that person's possession, and when the force is not more than is necessary. An owner or possessor of real or personal property has the right to prevent malicious trespass or malicious interference of property by use of force as indicated in this instruction. Trespass occurs when a person enters or remains on premises unlawfully, that is when that person is not then licensed, invited, or otherwise privileged to so enter or remain. If a landlord-tenant rental agreement exists, it is unlawful for a landlord to remove or exclude from the premises the tenant thereof except under a court order so authorizing. It is unlawful for the tenant to hold over in the premises or exclude the landlord therefrom after the termination of the rental agreement except under a valid court order so authorizing. A tenant is a person who is entitled to occupy a dwelling unit primarily for living or dwelling purposes under a rental agreement. A rental agreement is an agreement whichestablishes or modifies the terms, conditions, rules, regulations, or any other provisions concerning the use and occupancy of a dwelling unit.

The person offering to use the force may employ such force and means as a reasonably prudent person would use under the same or similar conditions as they appeared to the person, taking into consideration all of the facts and circumstances known to the person at the time of and prior to the incident.

The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the force offered to be used by the defendant was not lawful. If you find that the State has not proved the absence of this defense beyond a reasonable doubt, it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty as to this charge.

The jury found Canfield guilty of assault in the second degree but acquitted him on the harassment charge. Canfield now appeals from his conviction for assault in the second degree.

II

Canfield contends that the trial court erred when it gave Instruction 15. According to Canfield, Instruction 15 (1) improperly relieved the State of its burden to disprove the defense of protection of property, (2) was incomplete and lacked clarity, and thus denied him the right to defend his property, and (3) constituted an improper comment on the evidence by the trial judge. None of his contentions have merit.

A

Canfield first contends that Instruction 15 improperly relieved the State of the burden to disprove Canfield's defense that he was entitled to use force to defend his property.

Canfield is incorrect. Instruction 15, after outlining the various situations in which the use of force or offering to use force against another is justified, states:

The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the force offered to be used by the defendant was not lawful. If you find that the State has not proved the absence of this defense beyond a reasonable doubt, it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty as to [the assault] charge.

Instruction 15 thus plainly explained that the prosecutor had the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, the absence of the defense of protection of property. Canfield's contention fails.

B

Canfield next contends that the inclusion in Instruction 15 of incomplete portions of the RLTA denied him his right to act in defense of his property. This is so, Canfield asserts, because ...