State v. Capasso

• Decision Date: 16 March 2021
• Docket Number: AC 43051
• Citation: 203 Conn.App. 333,248 A.3d 58
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Mark Steven CAPASSO, Jr.

203 Conn.App. 333

248 A.3d 58

STATE of Connecticut

v.Mark Steven CAPASSO, Jr.

AC 43051

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued January 4, 2021

Officially released March 16, 2021

W. Theodore Koch III, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Beth M. Kailey and Geoffrey B. Young, certified legal interns, with whom were Jennifer F. Miller and Matthew A. Weiner, assistant state's attorneys, and, on the brief, Michael L. Regan, state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Bright, C. J., and Moll and DiPentima, Js.

MOLL, J.

The defendant, Mark Steven Capasso, Jr., appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of reckless burning in violation of General Statutes § 53a-114.¹ On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of reckless burning, and (2) his conviction of reckless burning was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of conviction.

The following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history are relevant to our disposition of the defendant's claims. In December, 2004, the defendant moved to China to perform missionary work, and he lived there for nearly twelve years prior to returning to Connecticut. In September, 2017, the defendant, his wife, and their two children were living temporarily with his parents at 145 Bloomingdale Road in Quaker Hill. The defendant and his family intended to return to China but were having difficulty obtaining travel documentation for their children. As a result of these difficulties, the defendant devised a plan that he hoped would expedite the travel documentation process. Specifically, the defendant sought to leverage one Chinese agency against another by making it appear as though the Chinese government had attempted to intimidate him and his family by entering his parents’ house and starting a fire.

To accomplish this goal, the defendant purchased Sterno, a flammable, fire starting gel, from a Walmart store. Three days later, on September 4, 2017, at approximately 2 a.m., the defendant spread Sterno throughout the house while his parents, his wife, and their children were sleeping. The defendant then lit a candle and used it to burn a sheet for thirty to sixty seconds. After extinguishing the fire, the defendant awakened his parents and told them that he had heard someone in the house and that the person had spread accelerant and started a fire. The defendant's father then called 911.

When the police arrived, the defendant informed them that he was in the basement on the phone with the Chinese consulate when he heard footsteps upstairs. He then went upstairs and found a burning candle and sheet, along with a bottle of Sterno that he had never seen before. The defendant also told the police that he believed the Chinese consulate was responsible for the incident.

While at the scene, the police searched the premises for signs of forced entry but found none. An officer wrote down the stock keeping unit (SKU) number that was on the Sterno bottle to help determine where the bottle had been purchased and began investigating whether any local stores carried Sterno products with the same SKU number. The officer determined that the SKU number on the Sterno bottle matched that of a Sterno product sold at a Walmart store in Waterford. He viewed the store's security footage and observed the defendant purchasing the Sterno. The officer contacted the defendant and asked him to come to the police department to discuss the case further. During the interview, the defendant admitted that he had purchased the Sterno and had spread it around his parents’ house.

Thereafter, the defendant was arrested and charged by way of a substitute information with one count of reckless burning in violation of § 53a-114 and one count of false reporting of an incident in the second degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2016) § 53a-180c (a) (1). The jury found the defendant guilty of both counts, and the court sentenced the defendant to four years of incarceration, execution suspended after one year, followed by three years of probation. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that his conviction of reckless burning must be reversed because the state failed to present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he recklessly endangered a building "of another." See General Statutes § 53a-114 (a). The defendant's claim distills into two closely related parts, namely, that the state failed to prove that (1) the defendant did not have an ownership interest in the house, and (2) the house at 145 Bloomingdale Road was owned by someone other than the defendant. In response, the state argues that (1) proof of exclusivity of ownership by someone other than the defendant is not required under § 53a-114, and (2) it produced ample evidence from which the jury reasonably could have found that someone other than the defendant (i.e., the defendant's parents) owned the house. We agree with the state.

Before we reach the merits of the defendant's contentions, we set forth the following relevant legal principles and standard of review. "In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we apply a two part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [jury] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt .... This court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the jury if there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict....

"While the jury must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.... If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt....

"On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the jury's verdict of guilty." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Crafter , 198 Conn. App. 732, 737–38, 233 A.3d 1227, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 957, 239 A.3d 318 (2020).

To the extent our analysis of the defendant's claim requires us to interpret the reckless burning statute, "our review is de novo.... When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language.... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to [the broader statutory scheme]. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.... The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.... When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and [common-law] principles governing the same general subject matter." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pond , 315 Conn. 451, 466–67, 108 A.3d 1083 (2015).

A

We begin by addressing the defendant's argument that the state had the burden to prove that he did not have an ownership interest in the house at 145 Bloomingdale Road. Stated differently, the defendant contends that the phrase "building ... of another" in § 53a-114 (a) is satisfied only if the endangered building is owned exclusively by someone else. We disagree.

We turn to the text of § 53a-114 (a), which provides: "A person is guilty of reckless burning when he intentionally starts a fire or causes an explosion, whether on his own property or another's, and thereby recklessly places a building, as defined in section 53a-100, of another in danger of destruction or damage." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 53a-114 (a). We observe that there is no statutory language to support the defendant's proposition that the state must prove that the endangered building is owned (or possessed) exclusively by someone else. Nor does such a proposition make sense as a matter of public policy. "[T]he purpose of § 53a-114 ... [is] to penalize those who endanger another's property through recklessness." (Footnote omitted.) State v. Parmalee , 197 Conn. 158, 164, 496 A.2d 186 (1985). It would make little sense for the reckless burning statute to except from its purview an individual—whose conduct otherwise would fall within its reach—merely because that individual also has some ownership or possessory interest in the endangered building. Accordingly, we consider the language "of another" to be unambiguous because it is not susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. In short, we construe the phrase "of another" to apply plainly and unambiguously to any proprietary or possessory interest in the endangered building by someone other than the defendant, whether exclusive or...