State v. Cappetta

Decision Date10 December 1968
Docket NumberNo. 37099,37099
Citation216 So.2d 749
PartiesSTATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Nicholas CAPPETTA, Appellee.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Charles W. Musgrove, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.

Parkhurst & Hayes, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

HOPPING, Justice.

The State of Florida, by direct appeal, contests a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, which reversed the conviction of appellee and granted a new trial. See Cappetta v. State, 204 So.2d 913 (4th DCA Fla.1968).

Appellee alleged for the first time on appeal that fundamental error had been committed by the trial court regarding his right to waive counsel and singlehandedly conduct his own defense. The District Court upheld appellee's interpretation of the events at trial (which we shall review presently) as repugnant to what it initially deemed to be essential standards of fairness guaranteed to an accused by Section 11 of the Declaration of Rights, F.S.A. In essence, the District Court held that Section 11 was a 'specific organic directive' guaranteeing 'one of the most elementary prerequisites of a fair trial,' the right of an accused to be defended by himself, or counsel, or both himself and counsel.

The District Court's decision was clearly predicated on its initial construction of a controlling provision of the Florida Constitution, namely Section 11, Declaration of Rights, thus giving this Court appellate jurisdiction. See Armstrong v. City of Tampa, 106 So.2d 407 (Fla.1958).

Appellee was an indigent and the trial court appointed counsel for him. However, at the trial but prior to the taking of testimony, appellee stated that he had previously filed a motion for proceeding in proper person without aid of counsel. The following exchange then occurred:

'THE COURT: If you do not want this attorney, that is your business, but he is going to sit there at that table and if you want his advice you can ask him for it.

'MR. CAPPETTA: No, sir, I would like to conduct my own cause, please, sir.

'THE COURT: All right, but he will sit there and the record will show that he is there, you have an attorney and he is there. (Emphasis supplied)

'MR. CAPPETTA: I have a right to waive attorney, I want to conduct my own cause and waive counsel. I would like to have the court's permission to have at least 30 days to prepare a case. As you know, I just came from Raiford, I thought it was all over with.

'THE COURT: Motion denied.

'MR. CAPPETTA: I am not going to get a continuance?

'MR. RICH: I would like the record to reflect that I am here, Charles Rich, and appointed by the court as attorney of record and I am ready to proceed and prepared.

'THE COURT: Call your first witness.

'MR. RICH: Before we start the trial your Honor, I would like to invoke the Rule.'

The District Court reversed the trial court because it felt that this exchange evidenced a denial of the accused's right to waive counsel and conduct his own defense, a right which the District Court deemed not subject to limitation without proper judicial consideration of the circumstances at hand.

Upon a careful reading of the record, we are conviced that the trial court did not deny appellee's motion to proceed in proper person. We note that in his reply to appellee's statement that he would like to conduct his own cause, the trial judge granted the motion with an affirmative 'All right * * *.' Immediately after this motion was granted, appellee proceeded to conduct his own defense by requesting a continuance on grounds that he needed more time to prepare his own defense.

Since the District Court's Decision to reverse was predicated on what it construed to be a denial of appellee's motion we are tempted to simply dispose of the case on this ground. However, some additional points require our attention. We are satisfied with the general rule as delineated by the District...

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  • Indiana v. Edwards
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • June 19, 2008
    ...decisions and two secondary sources). See, e.g., Cappetta v. State, 204 So.2d 913, 917–918 (Fla.App.1967), rev'd on other grounds, 216 So.2d 749 (Fla.1968), cited in Faretta, supra, at 813, n. 9, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (assuring a “mentally competent” defendant the right “to conduct his own defense”......
  • Major v. Com., No. 2007-SC-000734-MR.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • January 22, 2009
    ...decisions and two secondary sources); e.g., Cappetta v. State, 204 So.2d 913, 917-918 (Fla.App.1967), rev'd on other grounds, 216 So.2d 749 (Fla.1968) a "mentally competent" defendant the right "to conduct his own defense" provided that "no unusual circumstances exist" such as, e.g., "menta......
  • Bowen v. State, s. 93-03918
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • May 29, 1996
    ...in the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. In Cappetta v. State, 204 So.2d 913 (Fla. 4th DCA1967), rev'd on other grounds, 216 So.2d 749 (Fla.1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1008, 89 S.Ct. 1610, 22 L.Ed.2d 787 (1969), the Fourth District considered, pre-Faretta, the constitutionalit......
  • Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California Fourth App. Dist.
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • January 12, 2000
    ...2d 281, 287, 272 P. 2d 195, 199 (1954) (same); Cappetta v. State , 204 So. 2d 913, 918 (Fla. App. 1967) (same), rev'd, State v. Capetta , 216 So. 2d 749, 750 (Fla. 1968) (finding voluntary and intelligent waiver of right to proceed pro se 5 See, e.g., SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103 (1978) ( pr......
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