State v. Cardin

• Decision Date: 01 December 1959
• Citation: 102 N.H. 314,156 A.2d 118
• Parties: STATE v. Alfred CARDIN.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 118

156 A.2d 118

102 N.H. 314

STATE v. Alfred CARDIN.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Dec. 1, 1959.

Louis C. Wyman, Atty. Gen., Irma A. Matthews, Law Asst., Concord, and Robert A. Carignan, County Atty., Rochester, for the State.

Normand R. Pelletier, Nashua, for defendant.

BLANDIN, Justice.

The first question raised by the defendant's exceptions is whether he can properly be convicted of a second offense under RSA 262:19 (supp.) when his first conviction was in Massachusetts. The statute, so far as material, reads as follows: 'Any person who shall be convicted of operating, or attempting to operate, a motor vehicle upon any way while under the influence of intoxicating liquor * * * shall be imprisoned * * *. Upon a second conviction, he shall be imprisoned * * * his license shall be revoked and he shall be ineligible for a license for the next three calendar years.' The defense claims that the statute does not authorize our courts to consider a prior conviction in another state in determining whether the defendant is guilty of a second offense here.

The question is one of statutory interpretation, the solution depending upon the legislative intent. The governing statute (RSA 262:19 (supp.) provides that the convictions for operating while under the influence of intoxicating liquor shall be convictions for so operating 'upon any way.' 'Way' is defined in our statute RSA 259:1, subd. XXXV as follows: 'any public highway, street, avenue, road, alley, park or parkway, or any private way laid out under authority of statute.' State v. Duranleau, 99 N.H. 30, 104 A.2d 519, 45 A.L.R.2d 1166. The statute obviously refers to a public way within the State of New Hampshire. Whenever a conviction in another state is to be considered in determining whether a second offense has been committed under a local statute the Legislature has so stated in express terms. People v. Pardee, 306 N.Y. 660, 116 N.E.2d 495; 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1960 d. See Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 303, 12 S.Ct. 617, 36 L.Ed. 429. In the absence of any such express provisions anywhere in our statutes the defendant's exception must be sustained.

We turn now to the defendant's second and third exceptions, which in substance are that the record of his conviction for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in Lowell, Massachusetts, was improperly admitted in evidence and that the form of certificate used by the Motor Vehicle Commissioner is improper. The question again is one of statutory construction. RSA 259:10, relating to the custody and admissibility of records of convictions for motor vehicle offenses, so far as material, reads as follows: 'Copies of such records, duly attested and certified by the commissioner, shall be as competent evidence in any court within this state as the original record or document would be if produced by him as the legal custodian thereof.'

This statute must be considered together with RSA 262:30, which provides in substance that every court or justice in this state in which a person is charged with a violation of a motor vehicle law shall send an abstract of the record in cases of conviction to the Commissioner. Section 30 provides: 'Said abstracts shall be made upon forms prepared by the commissioner and shall...