State v. Carneh
| Decision Date | 23 December 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 75106-4.,75106-4. |
| Citation | 153 Wash.2d 274,103 P.3d 743 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Leemah CARNEH, Petitioner. |
James Jude Konat, Roger Scott Davidheiser, James Morrissey Whisman, King County Prosecutors Office/Appellate Unit, Seattle, for Respondent.
Carl Franz Luer, Louis Alan Frantz, Kent, for Petitioner.
On March 15, 2001, Leemah Carneh was charged with four counts of aggravated first degree murder. Carneh notified the court of his intent to rely on the defense of insanity and submitted to psychological examinations by defense experts. The trial court ordered Carneh to also submit to examinations by experts at Western State Hospital (WSH), but when interviewed, Carneh refused to answer questions where he believed the answers might incriminate him. Carneh relied on RCW 10.77.020(3), which allows defendants being examined by court appointed experts as the result of an insanity plea to refuse to provide potentially incriminating answers. Consequently, the WSH experts could not form an opinion as to Carneh's sanity at the time of the crimes.
The State moved to exclude all evidence of Carneh's alleged insanity at trial as a remedy for Carneh's refusal to answer. The trial court denied the motion but concluded that in explanation of the experts' inability to form an opinion as to Carneh's sanity, the WSH experts could reveal to the jury that Carneh had refused to answer certain questions. The State now argues that, as a remedy for his refusal to answer questions, the trial court should have prohibited Carneh from presenting evidence of his insanity. Carneh seeks cross-review of the portion of the trial court order that permitted the State to refer to Carneh's silence in front of the jury.
We affirm the order of the trial court and hold that Carneh may introduce evidence of his alleged insanity even though he has refused to answer certain questions posed by the WSH experts. We also hold that evidence of Carneh's refusal to answer may be introduced at trial, though only to the extent necessary to explain why the State's experts were unable to draw any conclusions regarding Carneh's sanity at the time of the alleged crimes. To that end, we hold that Carneh is entitled to a limiting instruction directing the jury that it may not infer sanity from Carneh's reliance on RCW 10.77.020(3).
Carneh is accused of shooting Richard and Leola Larson and their 17-year-old grandson, Taelor Marks, in their home. He is also accused of beating and stabbing to death Taelor's 17-year-old girlfriend, Josie Peterson, during the same incident. In March 2001, Carneh was charged with four counts of aggravated first degree murder. Carneh filed a notice asserting his intent to plead not guilty by reason of insanity pursuant to RCW 10.77.030(1). During the next few months, defense experts evaluated Carneh to determine whether he was legally insane at the time of the alleged crimes. In interviews with the defense experts Carneh discussed specific details related to the charged crimes. Carneh produced a summary of the experts' testimony, notes, and documents as part of discovery. Two of the three defense experts have indicated they will testify that Carneh was insane at the time of the charged crimes. The third expert will testify only generally as to Carneh's mental illness; she will not render an opinion as to his sanity at the time of the crimes.
On April 2, 2003, the State requested an order directing Carneh to submit to a sanity evaluation pursuant to RCW 10.77.060.1 Carneh did not object to the State's request but argued that he had a right under RCW 10.77.020(3) to refuse to answer any question that called for an incriminating answer. RCW 10.77.020(3) states:
Any time the defendant is being examined by court appointed experts or professional persons pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, the defendant shall be entitled to have his or her attorney present. The defendant may refuse to answer any question if he or she believes his or her answers may tend to incriminate him or her or form links leading to evidence of an incriminating nature.
The State countered that, by pleading not guilty by reason of insanity and thus putting his mental state at issue, Carneh waived his right under both the Fifth Amendment and RCW 10.77.020(3) to refuse to answer incriminating questions during the State's evaluation. Thus, if Carneh chose to invoke his right to remain silent during the State's evaluation, he should be precluded from presenting evidence at trial to support his insanity defense.
After considering these arguments, the trial court concluded:
Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 37 (Apr. 2, 2003). After this ruling, the State argued that if Carneh refused to answer questions during the evaluation, he should be prohibited from cross-examining the State's experts at trial about their lack of first-hand information regarding Carneh's state of mind at the time of the crime. On that issue the court concluded:
Well, I will cross that bridge when we get to it. One, I don't know what the defendant's responses are going to be when he is interviewed; two, I don't know if the doctors are going to say in light of whatever information they do get —
Following the hearing, the trial court entered an order directing Carneh to submit to a sanity evaluation by court appointed experts. The order specifically permitted Carneh's counsel to assist Carneh with invoking his right to refuse to answer incriminating questions under RCW 10.77.020(3). However, the trial court order did not specify what action, if any, would be taken if Carneh refused to answer questions necessary to successfully complete the court ordered evaluation.
The court ordered sanity evaluation began at Western State Hospital on April 25, 2003 with Carneh's counsel present. The questions posed to Carneh during the first interview focused primarily on his background. Carneh declined to answer one question, indicating that his reason for doing so was because the question had to do with the facts of the alleged crimes.
The second interview occurred on April 30, 2003, again with Carneh's counsel present. Approximately one-half hour into the interview, one of the WSH experts, Dr. Steven Marquez, asked Carneh to talk about the day of the alleged crimes. At that point Carneh's counsel informed Dr. Marquez that Carneh would not discuss his motivation, thoughts, feelings, and perceptions related to the alleged crimes for fear that such discussion might incriminate him. Soon thereafter the interview was terminated.
As a consequence of Carneh's refusal to answer such questions, the State filed a motion seeking to prevent Carneh from "presenting evidence and/or expert testimony on the issue of his sanity at the time of the commission of the crimes charged." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 36. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Dr. Marquez testified that he did not believe he could ethically or professionally render an opinion about Carneh's sanity. The State maintained its position that Carneh waived his right under RCW 10.77.020(3) to refuse to answer incriminating questions by pleading not guilty by reason of insanity. Because Carneh waived that right, the State asserted that Carneh's silence should result in the exclusion of evidence at trial supporting his insanity plea.
In response, Carneh argued that the State's motion to suppress evidence was essentially a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's April 2, 2003 ruling, and thus, the motion was time-barred. Carneh further asserted, as he had at the April 2, 2003 hearing, that RCW 10.77.020(3) provided him the unambiguous right to refuse to answer incriminating questions, and he should not be punished for exercising that right.
The trial court held that it had reserved ruling on the appropriate remedy in the event that Carneh exercised his right under RCW 10.77.020(3), and so the State's motion to suppress was not time-barred. On May 13, 2003, the trial court entered an order denying the State's motion to suppress. In its findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting the order, the trial court held:
[T]he State may introduce evidence at trial that during the State's sanity evaluation Mr. Carneh, on the advice of counsel, refused to answer all questions posed to him regarding the facts of the alleged offenses or regarding his thoughts, feelings and motivations at the time of the alleged offenses.
The State filed a notice for discretionary review in the trial court on May 13, 2003. Carneh opposed review, but if review were granted, he sought cross-review of the trial court's ruling permitting the State to introduce evidence of his refusal to answer questions. The trial court supported discretionary review by certification pursuant to RAP 2.3(b)(4). The Court of Appeals, Division One, granted review of both the State's motion for discretionary review and Carneh's cross-motion. We granted Carneh's motion to transfer the case to this court pursuant to RAP 4.4.
We review a trial court's conclusions of law in an order pertaining to suppression of evidence de novo. State v. Mendez, 137 Wash.2d 208, 214, 970 P.2d 722 (1999). Because there are no factual issues in dispute, we review only the trial court's legal conclusions.
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