State v. Carney

• Decision Date: 25 April 2008
• Docket Number: No. 33522.,33522.
• Citation: 222 W.Va. 152,663 S.E.2d 606
• Parties: STATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff Below, Appellee v. Wanda CARNEY, Defendant Below, Appellant. State of West Virginia, Plaintiff Below, Appellee v. Betty Jarvis, Defendant Below, Appellant.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

663 S.E.2d 606

222 W.Va. 152

STATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff Below, Appellee v. Wanda CARNEY, Defendant Below, Appellant.

State of West Virginia, Plaintiff Below, Appellee v. Betty Jarvis, Defendant Below, Appellant.

No. 33522.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted March 12, 2008.

Decided April 25, 2008.

Syllabus by the Court

1. "The function of an appellate court when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, is sufficient to convince a reasonable person of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995).

2. "A person upon witnessing a police officer issuing a traffic citation to a third party on the person's property, who asks the officer, without the use of fighting or insulting words or other opprobrious language and without forcible or other illegal hindrance, to leave the premises, does not violate W. Va. Code, 61-5-17 [1931], because that person has not illegally hindered an officer of this State in the lawful exercise of his or her duty. To hold otherwise would create first amendment implications which may violate the person's right to freedom of speech. U.S. Const. amend. I; W.Va. Const. art. III, § 7." Syllabus, Wilmoth v. Gustke, 179 W.Va. 771, 373 S.E.2d 484 (1988).

C. Michael Sparks, Mingo County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, Williamson, WV, for Appellee.

Lonnie C. Simmons, DiTrapano, Barrett & DiPiero, PLLC, Michael T. Clifford, Charleston, WV, for Appellants.

PER CURIAM:

Appellants Wanda Carney and Betty Jarvis seek to have this Court set aside their convictions for one count each of obstructing a police officer and conspiracy to obstruct a police officer on grounds that insufficient evidence was adduced at trial to sustain the convictions. While the obstruction statute under which they were convicted¹ requires conduct that is either forcible or illegal which operates to hinder or obstruct the official acts of a police officer, Appellants argue that none of the acts they were accused of committing were accomplished with force or were illegal in nature. In addition, Appellants argue that none of the acts the State relied upon to secure the convictions at issue were directed at or towards a police officer. Upon our review of this matter, we conclude that the evidence upon which the State relied to secure convictions against Appellants for obstructing a police officer does not meet the elements required for the statutory offense. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the lower court to sustain the convictions.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In 2004, the West Virginia State Police were conducting a major drug enforcement investigation in the Matewan area of Mingo County. In connection with this investigation, Carla Collins became a cooperative witness for the police.² Following the disappearance of Ms. Collins in April 2005, the police began an extensive search which eventually resulted in the discovery of her body in a makeshift grave near an abandoned trailer.³ Through the ensuing investigation into her death, it was later determined that Valerie Friend murdered Ms. Collins on April 16, 2005, at the direction of George "Porgie" Lecco.⁴

While the State initially filed charges in connection with the murder of Ms. Collins, those charges were dismissed and the federal government charged the following six individuals with various crimes in connection with the murder: George Lecco, Valerie Friend, Patricia Burton, Walter Harmon, Charles Burton, and Jake Hatfield. One of the individuals accused of involvement in the murder of Ms. Collins — Walter Harmon— was represented by Michael T. Clifford. Mr. Clifford employed Appellant Wanda Carney as an investigator. Appellant Betty Jarvis, an aunt of Mr. Harmon, offered to assist Mr. Clifford and Ms. Carney in connection with providing a defense for her nephew.

As part of Ms. Carney's investigation on Mr. Harmon's behalf,⁵ Ms. Carney spoke to Carmella Blankenship and Valerie Friend. Both women⁶ told Ms. Carney that Mr. Harmon was not present at the murder of Ms. Collins.⁷ Two additional leads which came to light through the interviews conducted by Ms. Carney were that the police were allegedly involved in the drug trafficking under investigation and that State Trooper Nelson was rumored to have had a sexual relationship with the murder victim — Ms. Collins.

Claiming that Appellants had hindered their investigation into the murder of Ms. Collins by deceiving and intimidating a material witness, Alola Boseman, with false and defamatory statements about lead investigators First Sergeant D.M. Nelson, Trooper First Class A.S. Perdue, and First Lieutenant C.E. Akers, the State filed charges against Ms. Carney and Ms. Jarvis for obstructing a police officer and conspiracy to obstruct a police officer. As additional grounds for the indictment that was issued against Appellants on grounds of obstruction, the State alleged that they temporarily relocated a material witness — Carmella Blankenship — and that they unlawfully entered the residence where Valerie Friend had been living whereupon they removed and concealed certain evidentiary items.

On September 8, 2006, a jury returned a verdict of guilty against Appellants on both of the charges: obstruction and conspiracy to commit obstruction.⁸ By order entered on October 26, 2006, the trial court sentenced Appellants to a definite term of one year of confinement at the Southwest Regional Jail for each of the two charges, to be served concurrently. Crediting Appellants for forty-five days of home confinement already served, the trial court suspended the jail sentences and placed Appellants on probation for a term of three years. Under the terms of their probation, Appellants were required to serve a total of 120 days of electronic home confinement (60 days for each of the two offenses for which they were convicted); fulfill 200 hours of community service; and complete a higher education class in criminal justice/procedure.

Through this appeal, Appellants seek a reversal of their respective convictions for obstruction of a police officer and conspiracy to commit obstruction.⁹

II. Standard of Review

Because Appellants assert that the facts of this case are insufficient to support their convictions as a matter of law, the standard of review to be applied is whether the evidence admitted at trial was sufficient to sustain the convictions. As we held in syllabus point one of State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995):

The function of an appellate court when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, is sufficient to convince a reasonable person of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

In a recent case involving the offense of obstructing a police officer, this Court observed: "It is a fundamental principle `[i]n a criminal prosecution, [that] the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every material element of the crime with which the defendant is charged...." State v. Srnsky, 213 W.Va. 412, 417, 582 S.E.2d 859, 864 (2003).

With these standards in mind, we proceed to review this matter to determine whether the lower court committed error in refusing to set aside the convictions at issue.

III. Discussion

Appellants contend that the State failed to establish the material elements of the offense of obstructing a police officer. See W.Va.Code § 61-5-17(a). As Appellants observe, a conviction under West Virginia Code § 61-5-17(a) requires proof that the actions alleged to have hindered or obstructed a police officer were either forcible or illegal. The statutory provision at issue provides that:

Any person who by threats, menaces, acts or otherwise, forcibly or illegally hinders or obstructs, or attempts to hinder or obstruct, any law-enforcement officer, probation officer or parole officer acting in his or her official capacity is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not less than fifty nor more than five hundred dollars or confined in the county or regional jail not more than one year, or both.

Id. (emphasis supplied).

The evidence the State relied upon initially to obtain an indictment¹⁰ and later to convince the jury that Appellants were guilty of obstruction was that they had hindered the police investigation into the Collins' murder by removing Ms. Blankenship from Mingo County and delaying a police interview; that Appellants made derogatory remarks about the police to Ms. Boseman that affected her ability to trust them; and that Appellants committed trespass and removed certain items having relevance to this case from the house where Ms. Friend resided prior to the murder. Before we examine these evidentiary items to determine whether such conduct supports the statutory offense of obstructing a police officer, we find it useful to review those cases in which we have previously applied West Virginia Code § 61-5-17.

In State v. Johnson, 134 W.Va. 357, 59 S.E.2d 485 (1950), this Court examined the statutory terms "forcibly or illegally" and stated that such terms as "used in the statute clearly mean any unlawful interference with the officer in the discharge of his official duties, whether or not force be actually present." Id. at 360, 59 S.E.2d...