State v. Carpenter
| Decision Date | 15 May 1924 |
| Docket Number | 18463. |
| Citation | 130 Wash. 23,225 P. 654 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE v. CARPENTER. |
Department 2.
Appeal from Superior Court, Thurston County; Wright, Judge.
Ernest E. Carpenter was convicted of perjury, and he appeals. Affirmed.
Vance & Christensen, of Olympia, for appellant.
Roscoe R. Fullerton, of Olympia, for the State.
The appellant was charged with perjury in the first degree. Upon conviction he has appealed to this court.
The facts (which are unusual) are: The appellant was the plaintiff in a certain civil action, brought in the superior court of Thurston county. When the case was called for trial the appellant, as plaintiff in that action presented himself as a witness. After stating his name, but before giving any testimony, counsel for the defendant obtained permission to ask some preliminary questions of the witness. The appellant then testified that he had not previously been convicted of the crime of perjury and had not previously served a sentence in the penitentiary of this state because of conviction on the charge of perjury. Having so testified, the defendant in that case, so the record states, at once proved that these answers were false, and that the witness had previously been convicted in the courts of this state of the crime of perjury and had served a sentence in the penitentiary because thereof.
Although it is not expressly so stated in the record, yet we think a fair inference is that the witness either voluntarily left the stand or that the court refused him permission to testify. In other words, the real question involved here is Can the statutory crime of perjury in the first degree be based upon the false swearing of a witness in a case where he does not testify to anything concerning the case, or to anything whatsoever except to deny that he had previously been convicted of perjury?
Our perjury statute, R. C. S. § 2351, is as follows:
'Every person who, in any action, proceeding, hearing, inquiry or investigation in which an oath may lawfully be administered, shall swear that he will testify, declare, depose or certify truly, or that any testimony, declaration, deposition, certificate, affidavit or other writing by him subscribed is true, and who, in such action, proceeding, hearing, inquiry or investigation shall state or subscribe as true any material matter which he knows to be false, shall be guilty of perjury in the first degree and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not more than fifteen years.'
It will be noted that the statute requires that the matter so falsely testified to shall be 'material matter.'
Section 2352, Rem. Comp. Stat., states:
Section 1212, Rem. Comp. Stat., provides, in substance, that no person shall be excluded as a witness simply because he has been convicted of a crime, but such conviction may be shown to affect his credibility, but that no person who has been convicted of perjury shall be a competent witness in any case unless the conviction shall have been reversed or there shall have been a pardon.
It is plain that the appellant, while a witness in the civil case, was asked the questions which it is charged he falsely answered, with the view of testing his competency to be a witness.
The argument upon the part of the state is that the appellant having produced himself as a witness in the civil action, the defendant in that case had a right to ask the questions concerning his prior conviction, not only as tending to affect his credibility, but also his qualifications, and that his answers were with reference to a 'material matter'; that answers which tend to affect the credibility of a witness, or his competency, are material to the trial of the case, and for that reason a charge of perjury may be based on them. On the other hand, the appellant contends that the testimony, in so far as it might tend to affect his credibility, was necessarily immaterial to any issues or matter in connection with the case, because neither before his answers to the questions nor thereafter did he testify to anything whatsoever concerning the issues in the case, and that, there being no testimony, there was nothing upon which the credibility of the witness could rest; consequently the testimony, in so far as it tended to affect his credibility, was immaterial for...
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In re Recall of Pearsall-Stipek
...Issues affecting credibility can be material matters, if the witness testifies regarding material issues in a case. As we noted in State v. Carpenter: "The matter sworn to need not be directly and immediately material. It is sufficient if it be so connected with the fact directly in issue a......
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State v. Ingels
... ... they could determine whether or not any alleged false ... statements claimed to [4 Wn.2d 718] have been made by ... appellant related to a material matter ... In the ... case of State v. Carpenter, 130 Wash. 23, 225 P ... 654, 656, in which the defendant was charged with perjury, ... this court, considering an argument similar to that presented ... by appellant, said: 'It is further contended that the ... court erred in instructing the jury that the questions and ... ...
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State v. Beiermann, Nos. 28948-2-II Consolidated with 29431-1-II (Wash. App. 1/28/2004)
...461, review denied, 106 Wn.2d 1016 (1986). Here, Beiermann's statements were material. Our Supreme Court held in State v. Carpenter, 130 Wash. 23, 26, 225 P. 654 (1924): It has generally been held by the courts and text writers that testimony upon which a charge of perjury may be based need......
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Chmela v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles
...has been violated. Const. art. 1, § 22 (amendment 10) and the Sixth Amendment are each inapplicable in civil cases. State v. Carpenter, 130 Wash. 23, 28, 225 P. 654 (1924); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 440 n. 16, 80 S.Ct. 1502, 4 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1960), Reh. denied 364 U.S. 855, 81 S.Ct. 33......