State v. Carpenter

• Decision Date: 28 June 1996
• Docket Number: No. S-95-967,S-95-967
• Citation: 551 N.W.2d 518,250 Neb. 427
• Parties: STATE of Nebraska, Appellee, v. Todd C. CARPENTER, Appellant.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Page 518

551 N.W.2d 518

250 Neb. 427

STATE of Nebraska, Appellee, v. Todd C. CARPENTER, Appellant.

No. S-95-967.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

June 28, 1996.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Convictions: Appeal and Error. In determining whether evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction in a bench trial, an appellate court does not resolve conflicts in evidence, pass on credibility of witnesses, evaluate explanations, or reweigh evidence presented, which are within a fact finder's province for disposition.

2. Convictions: Appeal and Error. A conviction in a bench trial of a criminal case is sustained if the evidence, viewed and construed most favorably to the State, is sufficient to support that conviction.

3. Criminal Law: Judgments: Appeal and Error. While in a bench trial of a criminal case the court's findings have the effect of a verdict and will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent, correct conclusion regarding questions of law.

4. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Appeal and Error. The alleged unconstitutionality of a statute presents a question of law which must be determined by an appellate court independently from the conclusion reached by a trial court.

5. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Proof. The burden to clearly demonstrate that a statute is unconstitutional rests upon the party making the claim of unconstitutionality.

6. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Presumptions. A statute will be presumed to be constitutional, and all reasonable doubts will be resolved in favor of its constitutionality.

7. Constitutional Law: Criminal Law: Statutes. A penal statute must be construed so as to meet constitutional requirements if such can reasonably be done.

8. Constitutional Law: Statutes. A vagueness challenge to a statute is conceptually distinct from an overbreadth challenge.

9. Constitutional Law: Statutes. An overbroad statute need lack neither clarity nor precision, and a vague statute need not reach constitutionally protected conduct.

10. Constitutional Law: Statutes. As a general rule, in a challenge to the overbreadth and vagueness of a law, the court's first task is to analyze overbreadth.

11. Constitutional Law: Statutes. An attack on the overbreadth of a statute asserts that language in the statute impermissibly infringes on a constitutionally protected right.

12. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Standing. In determining whether standing exists for a challenge to a statute as overbroad, a court must first determine whether the statute reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct.

13. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Standing. If the statutory proscription does not reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct, there is no standing to challenge a statute on the basis the statute is overbroad, and such challenge must fail.

14. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Standing. To have standing to assert a claim of vagueness, a defendant must not have engaged in conduct which is clearly prohibited by the questioned statute and cannot maintain that the statute is vague when applied to the conduct of others.

15. Constitutional Law: Criminal Law: Statutes. The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.

16. Constitutional Law: Legislature: Statutes. Where the Legislature fails to establish minimal guidelines to prevent a standardless sweep that allows police officers, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections, the statute must fail as being unconstitutionally vague.

17. Constitutional Law: Criminal Law: Statutes: Intent. Challenging a criminal statute as having a deficient mens rea requirement is a constitutional challenge to the facial validity of the statute.

18. Statutes: Demurrer. A motion to quash or a demurrer are the proper procedural methods for challenging the facial validity of a statute.

19. Criminal Law: Trial: Motions to Suppress. Outside the context of a hearing on a motion to suppress, a trial court sitting without a jury is not required to articulate findings of fact or conclusions of law in criminal cases.

Robert B. Creager, of Anderson, Creager & Wittstruck, P.C., Lincoln, for appellant.

Don Stenberg, Attorney General, and Mark D. Starr, Lincoln, for appellee.

WHITE, C.J., and CAPORALE, FAHRNBRUCH, LANPHIER, WRIGHT, CONNOLLY, and GERRARD, JJ.

CONNOLLY, Justice.

Todd C. Carpenter was found guilty by the district court for Lancaster County of two counts of transferring a motor vehicle without stating the actual mileage to the best of his knowledge and belief, pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 60-2303 (Reissue 1988). The court also found Carpenter guilty of one count of knowingly causing an odometer of a motor vehicle to be changed to reflect a mileage different from what had actually been driven, pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 60-2301 (Reissue 1988). The district court sentenced Carpenter to three years' probation. Carpenter appeals the district court's decision. We determine that § 60-2303 is unconstitutionally vague and thus reverse Carpenter's convictions under that section. However, we determine that § 60-2301 is constitutional and that there was sufficient evidence to sustain Carpenter's conviction under that section. We therefore affirm in part, and in part reverse.

I. BACKGROUND

Carpenter Motors, Inc., is a Nebraska corporation in the business of selling used motor vehicles. Its principle place of business is located in Lincoln, Nebraska. Carpenter is the secretary/treasurer, vice president, and employee of Carpenter Motors. As such, Carpenter's duties include selling vehicles and purchasing vehicles for resale.

1. COUNT I

In July 1991, Carpenter Motors purchased through the Metro Auto Auction in the Kansas City, Missouri, area a 1989 Ford Taurus from the D.L. Peterson Trust Company. The buyer's copy of the "Title Warranty and Bill of Sale" listed the mileage on the odometer as 23,048. In a separate space on that document was written, "AS IS" and "Over Mech Limits." Carpenter's signature appears on the "buyer's signature" line. The odometer disclosure statement from the D.L. Peterson Trust Company was not received into evidence.

Later that month, Timothy Haakenstad purchased the 1989 Ford Taurus from Carpenter Motors. Haakenstad testified that at the time he purchased the vehicle, the odometer displayed approximately 24,000 miles. Haakenstad further testified that Carpenter told him that the vehicle had been a rental or leased vehicle, that the renter or lessee felt there was a discrepancy in the mileage, that it appeared to be a low-mileage car, and that it is customary for rental companies to get rid of their vehicles between 40,000 to 60,000 miles.

When the sale was consummated, Carpenter Motors provided Haakenstad with an odometer disclosure statement as required by Nebraska law. These statements are on a form prescribed by the Nebraska Department of Motor Vehicles that state in pertinent part:

I state that the odometer now reads _____ ... miles and to the best of my knowledge reflects the actual mileage of the vehicle described herein, unless one of the following statements is checked.

[ ] (1) I hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge the odometer reading reflects the amount of mileage in excess of its mechanical limits.

[ ] (2) I hereby certify that the odometer is NOT the actual mileage. WARNING--ODOMETER DISCREPANCY.

This form was signed by Ramona Hyde, an employee of Carpenter Motors, on behalf of Carpenter Motors. It stated that "the odometer now reads 23048 ... miles," and the second box was checked to indicate this mileage was not the actual mileage. At trial, Hyde testified that it was standard procedure for Carpenter to inform her which box, if any, to check for each car she sold. The first box, indicating that the odometer had exceeded its mechanical limits, was not checked.

2. COUNT II

In July 1991, Carpenter Motors purchased through the Metro Auto Auction in Kansas City a 1988 Ford Taurus from Premier Leasing Company. The buyer's copy of the "Title Warranty and Bill of Sale" listed the mileage on the odometer as 7,460. In a separate space on that document was written "As is" and "Over Mech Limits." Carpenter's signature appears on the "buyer's signature" line.

The odometer disclosure statement provided by Premier Leasing also indicated that "the odometer ... now reads 7460 ... miles." The box on that form designated "Warning--Odometer Discrepancy" was checked, indicating that the reading was not the actual mileage. The box for certifying that the "odometer reading reflects the amount of mileage in excess of its mechanical limits" was not checked. Carpenter's signature appears on the line designated "Transferee's Signature--Buyer."

In August 1991, Scott Johnson purchased the 1988 Ford Taurus from Carpenter Motors. Johnson testified that at the time he purchased the vehicle, the odometer displayed approximately 7,000 miles and that he asked Carpenter whether the vehicle had exceeded the 100,000-mile mechanical limit on its odometer. Johnson testified that Carpenter told him that it had not. Johnson further testified that Carpenter stated that the original odometer had been broken and replaced, that the 7,000 miles had been registered on the replacement odometer, and that the broken odometer read about 50,000 miles when it was replaced.

Carpenter Motors provided Johnson with an odometer disclosure statement which indicated the mileage on the odometer to be 7,460. The second box warning that the indicated mileage was not the true mileage was checked. The first box, certifying that to the best of the transferor's knowledge the odometer reading reflects the amount of mileage in excess of the odometer's mechanical...