State v. Carpenter
| Decision Date | 07 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 80804-4-I,80804-4-I |
| Parties | STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. BRANDON LEE CARPENTER, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CHUN, J. —The State charged Brandon Carpenter with one count of possession of a stolen vehicle, one count of evading pursuing police, and three counts of second degree assault. The State amended the information to include another count of possession of a stolen vehicle for a different car. Carpenter objected to the joinder of this count and alternatively moved to sever it from the others, if the trial court decided that joinder was proper. The trial court determined that joinder was proper and denied the motion to sever. A jury found Carpenter guilty as charged. On appeal, Carpenter raises the joinder issue and, for the first time, claims prosecutorial misconduct. We affirm.
In early March 2018, someone stole David Knudson's 1995 green Honda Accord from his house in Everett. He reported the theft to law enforcement. Around 1:00 a.m. on March 25, on a highway in Sultan, Deputy Christopher Johnson changed lanes and began driving behind the green Accord. The driver of the Accord made an immediate exit off the highway. Because of this behavior, Johnson followed the car, ran its license plate, and confirmed it was stolen. Johnson could not see who was inside the car. The driver took a series of right turns and Johnson lost sight of it.
Shortly after, Johnson found the car on a riverbank with its front bumper in some brush. He found a woman, Jeannene Ramos, walking away from the car. Ramos told the officer that the driver had fled towards the river, but Johnson could not locate anyone using a canine tracker. At trial, Ramos testified that "Brandon" was the driver of the green Accord and identified Carpenter. She said that she had been at a social gathering with Carpenter earlier that night and he had offered to drive her home. Johnson searched the car and found Carpenter's wallet and checkbook; the wallet contained Carpenter's identification and credit cards.
Also in the early morning of March 25, someone stole Tacia Beaumont's maroon 1992 Honda Civic from her house in Sultan, around half a mile from the abandoned green Accord. She reported the theft to law enforcement.
Around 14 hours later, at about 3:40 p.m., Officer Devin Tucker saw the Civic parked in the driveway of a house in Monroe. He ran the license plate and confirmed it was a stolen vehicle. A few minutes later, a man came out of the house, got into the Civic, and started the car. Tucker activated his sirens and flashing lights and pulled into the driveway to block the Civic. He was about four feet away from the driver's seat of the Civic. At trial, Tucker testified that he"locked eyes" with the driver through the Civic's window and identified the driver as Carpenter. Tucker described Carpenter as a white man wearing a grey hat. Tucker yelled at Carpenter to stop but he accelerated around Tucker's car, cutting through the neighboring yard to escape. Tucker followed and alerted other units of the pursuit. With Tucker and other units in pursuit, Carpenter sped through town, exceeding the speed limit of 25 miles per hour (mph), driving on the shoulder of the road, and driving on the sidewalk. Carpenter then ran a red light at which time, in the interest of public safety, the officers terminated their pursuit.
Officers Hannah Snavely and Jake Carswell were in a police vehicle and coordinating with other officers to apprehend Carpenter. The maroon Civic approached them and then swerved into their lane, moving directly towards the front of their vehicle. Snavely tried to position her vehicle behind a light pole to create a buffer in case of collision. The Civic returned to its lane without hitting the patrol vehicle. Snavely did not get a good look at the driver and testified that he was a white male wearing a light-colored, flat-billed cap.
Sergeant Ryan Boyer was stopped at a stop sign in his police vehicle when the maroon Civic appeared in front of him. The Civic switched into Boyer's lane and drove directly at him at about 50 mph. The Civic swerved back into its own lane and did not hit Boyer's car. Boyer also did not get a good look at the driver and said that he was a white male in his twenties to early thirties, wearing a flat-billed white hat.
Several hours later, around 6:45 pm, Officer Trevor Larson was in his vehicle and stopped at a light when the maroon Civic approached him from behind. The Civic braked, its tires squealed, and it turned around and sped in the opposite direction. Rather than pursue the Civic, Larson drove to a different road, planning to deploy spike strips to stop the Civic. As the Civic approached, Larson realized he did not have enough time to deploy the strips and instead stood on the road's median to get a look at the driver. At trial, Larson identified the driver as Carpenter and testified that Carpenter was wearing a "gray baseball-style hat." Larson testified that the Civic was going 75 to 80 mph as it travelled past him.
Sergeant Spencer Robinson had positioned his marked vehicle across the southbound lane of an intersection just beyond where Larson was standing. The Civic, heading north, switched lanes and drove directly at Robinson's car at around 80 mph. Robinson accelerated quickly out of the intersection. The Civic came within a "car length" of the back of Robinson's car and continued driving. Robinson did not see the driver.
The State at first charged Carpenter for offenses involving only the maroon Civic: one count of possession of a stolen vehicle, one count of attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle, and three counts of second degree assault. The State then amended the information and added another count of possession of a stolen vehicle for the green Accord. The State also separated the second degree assault count involving Snavely and Carswell into two counts.
Before trial, Carpenter objected to the joinder of Count 1 (involving the green Accord) with Counts 2-7 (involving the maroon Civic). Carpenter alternatively moved to sever Count 1 from Counts 2-7 if the trial court determined that joinder was proper. The trial court determined that joinder was proper and denied the motion to sever.
At the beginning of trial, Carpenter renewed his motion to sever and the trial court again denied the motion. The jury found Carpenter guilty as charged.
After trial, Carpenter moved for a new trial based partially on the denial of the motion to sever. The trial court denied the motion.
Carpenter says that the trial court erred by joining Count 1 with Counts 2-7 over his objection and by denying his motion to sever the counts. We conclude the trial court acted within its discretion.
We review a joinder or severance decision for abuse of discretion. See State v. Bluford, 188 Wn.2d 298, 310, 393 P.3d 1219 (2017) ; State v. Nguyen, 10 Wn. App. 2d 797, 814-15, 450 P.3d 630, review denied 195 Wn.2d 1012, 460 P.3d 178 (2020) (). "A trial court abusesit [sic] discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons." State v. Ramirez, 7 Wn. App. 2d 277, 286, 432 P.3d 454, review denied, 193 Wn.2d 1025, 445 P.3d 567 (2019).
Under CrR 4.3(a), a trial court may join multiple counts together in one charging document when the offenses are "of the same or similar character" or are "based on the same conduct or on a series of acts connected together" unless joinder would be prejudicial to the defendant.1 See Bluford, 188 Wn.2d at 310. And under CrR 4.4(b), the trial court must sever counts when it determines that severance will promote a fair trial and avoid prejudice. See Nguyen, 10 Wn. App. 2d at 815. But "[t]he law does not favor separate trials." State v. Huynh, 175 Wn. App. 896, 908, 307 P.3d 788 (2013).
State v. Slater, No. 98795-5, slip op. at 18 https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/987955.pdf (quoting State v. Russell 125 Wn.2d 24, 63, 882 P.2d 747 (1994)); Bluford, 188 Wn.2d at 311-12. This inquiry seeks to prevent a trial in which the defendant is forced to present separate or conflicting defenses or which "invites the jury to cumulate evidence to find guilt or infer a criminal disposition." Slater, slip op. at 17 (quoting Russell, 125 Wn.2d at62-63). Defendants not only have to show that the four factors show prejudice, they must also establish that a joint trial would be so "'prejudicial as to outweigh concern for judicial economy.'" Slater, slip op. at 17 (quoting State v. Bythrow, 114 Wn.2d 713, 718, 790 P.2d 154 (1990)).
Before trial, the court ruled that joinder was proper and denied Carpenter's motion to sever. The trial court noted that "the evidence is cross-admissible because of the actions that occurred in a relatively short period of time" and that the jury could reasonably infer that the driver of the green Accord stole the maroon Civic. The court also pointed out that the concept of judicial economy is not limited to whether witnesses would have to testify more than once, but that it also includes the time and resources for the whole court system. The court said that Carpenter's defenses did not conflict. It...
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