State v. Carr
Decision Date | 27 July 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 85,238.,85,238. |
Citation | 29 Kan. App.2d 501,28 P.3d 436 |
Parties | STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. TIMOTHY A. CARR, Appellant. |
Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Cory D. Riddle, assistant appellate defender, and Jessica R. Kunen, chief appellate defender, for appellant.
Lesley A. McFadden, assistant district attorney, Nola Foulston, district attorney, and Carla J. Stovall, attorney general, for appellee.
Before BEIER, P.J., PIERRON, J., and BUCHELE, S.J.
Defendant-appellant Timothy A. Carr seeks reversal of his upward dispositional departure sentence for his conviction of criminal possession of a firearm.
Carr was arrested 26 days after his release from the Youth Center in Topeka, where he was serving a sentence arising from an earlier juvenile adjudication on drug charges. Wichita police officers pulled Carr over after observing him driving without a license tag. When Carr admitted to driving on a suspended license, he was placed in custody and the car was impounded and inventoried. The police recovered a stolen revolver from the passenger compartment.
Carr and the State entered into a plea agreement under which the State agreed to recommend the mid-range sentence in the applicable grid box, no fine, and probation under the guidelines presumption.
At sentencing, the district judge stated Carr had a criminal history score of E and criminal possession of a firearm was a severity level 8 offense. After verifying that neither side disputed the criminal history score or the offense severity level and soliciting comments from Carr, his lawyer, and the prosecutor, the district judge immediately and without notice pronounced a dispositional departure sentence of 15 months' imprisonment. The judge stated Carr was "not amenable to rehabilitation" and noted the firearms offense occurred shortly after Carr's release from the Youth Center. The judge also said Carr had failed at juvenile probation and had a lengthy criminal history of drug possession. He authorized placement at Labette Correctional Conservation Camp if Carr was willing to go and the facility accepted him. The transcript contains no subsequent comment or objection from either side.
Our evaluation of the adequacy of the district judge's summary procedure in this case requires interpretation of K.S.A. 21-4718(b). This is a question of law over which we exercise unlimited review. State v. Patterson, 25 Kan. App.2d 245, 247, 963 P.2d 436, rev. denied 265 Kan. 888 (1998).
K.S.A. 21-4718(b) states:
Carr did not object to lack of notice after the judge's pronouncement of sentence or request a postponement in order to prepare a response or motion for rehearing. He also made no proffer of the evidence that would have been presented to refute the departure factors, if notice had been sufficient. Ordinarily such omissions bar consideration of the issue on appeal. See State v. Billington, 24 Kan. App.2d 759, 762-63, 953 P.2d 1059 (1998) ( ). However, our review of the transcript of the sentencing hearing in this particular case persuades us that the district judge provided no meaningful opportunity for such an objection, request, motion, or proffer. His mind had been made up before either side was made aware he was even considering departure.
The plain language of K.S.A. 21-4718(b) clearly requires more than Carr and his counsel were provided here. The notice it says the district judge "must" give of his or her intention to depart need not be elaborate; it need not even be in writing; but it must be reasonable in all of the circumstances. At a minimum, this means it must be provided at such a time and with such specificity that the defendant and the State have a fair opportunity to marshal and present their arguments for or against the proposed departure before sentence is pronounced. The inadequacy of the notice of departure requires us to vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.
Carr also takes issue with the district judge's stated reasons for departure, arguing they were not substantial and compelling as required. This is a question of law subject to de novo review by this court, State v. Jackson, 262 Kan. 119, 134, 936 P.2d 761 (1997), and, because it may arise again on remand, we address its merits.
The term "substantial" refers to something that is real, not imagined, something with substance and not ephemeral. The term "compelling" implies that the court is forced, by the facts of the case, to leave the status quo or go beyond what is ordinary. State v. Eisele, 262 Kan. 80, 84, 936 P.2d 742 (1997).
Here the district judge stated:
A court's comments at the time of sentencing govern as its reasons. Jackson, 262 Kan. at 135. Although "[a] defendant's criminal history cannot be used to justify a departure sentence when the sentencing guidelines have already taken the criminal history into account in determining the presumptive sentence," State v. Hawes, 22 Kan. App.2d 837, Syl. ¶ 4, 923 P.2d 1064 (1996), the fact that a defendant is found not to be amenable to probation is, if supported by the evidence, a substantial and compelling reason to justify an upward dispositional departure, State v. Meyer, 25 Kan. App.2d 195, Syl., 960 P.2d 261, rev. denied 265 Kan. 888 (1998).
According to Carr's presentence investigation report, he had six juvenile adjudications and five adult convictions between 1994 and 1999. Although there is no explicit record of a violation of probation, the sheer frequency of his convictions permitted the district judge to reason that Carr had been on probation when he committed at least one of his prior...
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