State v. Carrion

• Decision Date: 27 December 2021
• Docket Number: 084390,A-14 September Term 2020
• Parties: STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jose CARRION, a/k/a Jose Carrison, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

249 N.J. 253

265 A.3d 115

STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.Jose CARRION, a/k/a Jose Carrison, Defendant-Appellant.

A-14 September Term 2020

084390

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued October 13, 2021

Decided December 27, 2021

John P. Flynn, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; John P. Flynn, of counsel and on the briefs, and Gilbert G. Miller, Designated Counsel, on the briefs).

Barbara A. Rosenkrans, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Theodore N. Stephens, II, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney; Barbara A. Rosenkrans, of counsel and on the briefs).

William J. Munoz argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Whipple Azzarello, attorneys; William J. Munoz, on the brief).

Amanda G. Schwartz, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Andrew J. Bruck, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Amanda G. Schwartz, of counsel and on the brief).

JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

This appeal, and the companion case of State v. Hedgespeth, 249 N.J. 234, 265 A.3d 104, (2021), have in common an issue concerning the right to confrontation in the context of the admission of an affidavit attesting that a search of a State firearm registry revealed no lawful permit for an individual's possession of a handgun. See N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (making it an offense to possess a handgun without a permit as provided in N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4 ).

In this matter, defendant Jose Carrion contends the trial court erred in admitting information contained in an affidavit from a non-testifying detective of the Firearms Investigation Unit of the Department of Law and Public Safety (DLPS). The admitted evidence showed that the non-testifying detective's search of the database revealed no permit existed authorizing Carrion to lawfully possess a handgun when one was seized by police from his home. Applying the test from decisions interpreting the federal Confrontation Clause, which we have adopted in our state confrontation jurisprudence, we conclude that, while the raw data contained in the database listing issued firearm permits is not "testimonial" for purposes of a confrontation-right analysis, statements about the search of that database for information specific to defendant for use in his prosecution is testimonial. Here, the State's reliance on an affidavit by a non-testifying witness to introduce over defendant's objection the results of that search violated defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him.

Carrion also raises a suppression issue. He appeals the denial of his motion to suppress a statement that he made to law enforcement and for which he received Miranda ¹ warnings, but that he made after an earlier, unwarned statement. Specifically, defendant contends that State v. O'Neill, 193 N.J. 148, 936 A.2d 438 (2007), and its instructions for analyzing the voluntariness of his waiver of rights was misapplied in the two-step, unwarned-then-warned interrogation setting that led to his incriminating second statement. Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that his second statement -- in which he accepted responsibility for, among other things, the weapon found in his home -- also should have been suppressed. The Miranda warnings issued to Carrion prior to his second statement to police were insufficient in these circumstances to ensure that his waiver of rights was voluntary and knowing.

Because of our holding on the suppression issue, we cannot conclude that the denial of defendant's right to confrontation constituted harmless error. For the purposes of future matters, to ensure protection of defendants’ confrontation rights and the orderly production of essential witnesses in judicial proceedings, we address a method to avoid confrontation violations in these settings.

I.

On June 25, 2012, Newark law enforcement officers secured a warrant for Carrion's arrest. The warrant was based on allegations that on June 19, Carrion shot Juan Rivera in the ankle over a $420 debt. For purposes of this appeal, we focus on the events associated with the execution of Carrion's arrest, his statements to police, and the confrontation issue that arose at trial.

A.

1. The Arrest

Pursuant to testimony presented by the State at the suppression hearing, five officers from the Newark Police Department executed the arrest warrant for Carrion on June 28, 2012. The officers knocked on Carrion's apartment door, and his wife, Biomaryluz Gonzalez, answered. She told the officers that Carrion was inside. The officers entered the home and placed handcuffs on Carrion who was sleeping on the couch. Gonzalez's fourteen-year-old son, Abel Trevino, who is not Carrion's biological son, witnessed the arrest.

According to the State's witnesses, while carrying out the arrest, the officers observed a "black pouch" with narcotics protruding out of it sitting on a table. On spotting the pouch, Detective Maldonado examined it, saw drugs and a gun inside it, and alerted his fellow officers to the presence of a weapon. According to Maldonado's testimony, once the officers found the pouch, Carrion began "shaking" and "owned up to it, he said it was his and he wanted to kiss his son, because, you know, he didn't want to get handcuffed in the presence of his child." Maldonado testified that he did not ask Carrion any questions after Carrion admitted to owning the pouch, nor did he make any promises or threats to Carrion in exchange for Carrion admitting that the pouch was his.

Gonzalez and her son, Abel, also testified at the suppression hearing. Gonzalez explained that at the time of the arrest she was living with Carrion and her three children, the youngest of whom (two years old at the time of the arrest) is Carrion's biological son. She testified that upon handcuffing Carrion, the officers asked Carrion "if he had something in the house." And, as she put it, the officers told Carrion that "he had to tell [the officer] because, if not, if he didn't say, they were going to call DY[FS]² and take my children, and also, they were going to get me involved in this case." Gonzalez testified that the officers were moving items in the house as they were looking around, and eventually, Carrion "told them that there was something behind the green couch." According to Gonzalez, the "black purse," as she described it, was not found until the officers moved the couch.

Abel testified that he was sleeping upstairs when the officers entered the home. Upon hearing them, he came downstairs to the first floor and saw the officers looking around, which ultimately resulted in them finding "a bag." According to Abel, upon finding the bag, the officers began "trying to force my mom, my father, both of them, saying to admit" that the bag was Carrion's, otherwise the officers would take Abel and his siblings "to DYFS."

2. The Subsequent Interrogation and Charges

The details concerning Carrion's police station interrogation are derived from the suppression hearing as well as from defendant's trial, at which the full interview was admitted into evidence.

About six hours after Carrion was arrested at his home and transported to the police station, Detective Lydell James, who was not involved in the arrest, took a statement from him at 11:50 a.m. James began the interview by reading Carrion his Miranda rights. Carrion stated that he understood those rights; he then read a Miranda form, acknowledged that he understood the waiver provision of the form, initialed the waiver, and signed the form. Carrion also acknowledged that he has a high school diploma and two years of college, and that he can read, write, and speak English.

During his interrogation, Carrion alleged that someone else shot Rivera; however, he admitted that the gun found in his apartment was his, stating that he bought it from a friend and had not obtained a license for it.

Thereafter, an Essex County Grand Jury indicted Carrion for second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) ; second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) ; third-degree attempted aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2) ; second-degree possession of a firearm while committing a CDS offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(a) ; fourth-degree unlawful possession of a firearm without a permit, N.J.S.A 2C:39-10(a) ;³ three counts of third-degree possession of CDS (heroin, oxycodone, and 1-phenyl 2-1 pentanone), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) ; three counts of third-degree possession of CDS with the intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) ; and three counts of third-degree possession of CDS within 1,000 feet of a school, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.

B.

Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress both statements he made to the police. He argued that his first statement made while at his apartment -- admitting ownership of the black pouch containing the gun and drugs -- should be suppressed because it constituted an interrogation and the officers failed to give him Miranda warnings prior to their questioning. As for his later recorded statement at the police station, he argued that too should be suppressed as an unlawful extension of the prior failure to provide Miranda warnings.

After hearing testimony from Detectives James and Maldonado, as well as Gonzalez and Abel, the trial court found the detectives’ testimony to be credible, Gonzalez's testimony to be "partially credible," and Abel's testimony to be "minimally credible."

The court first determined that Carrion's initial statement to police while in the apartment should be suppressed. The court found that the statement was the product of a custodial interrogation and that the officers should have administered Miranda warnings. In making that determination, the court stated it was giving defendant "the benefit of the doubt" that the...