State v. Carrizales, 51788
| Decision Date | 23 February 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 51788,51788 |
| Parties | STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Martin CARRIZALES, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and C. Marie King, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for petitioner.
Jack O. Johnson, Public Defender, and Douglas A. Wallace, Asst. Public Defender, Bradenton, for respondent.
By petition for writ of certiorari, the State seeks review of a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, reported at 345 So.2d 1113 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), which is alleged to be in conflict with Snell v. State, 302 So.2d 770 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), upon the issue of whether the trial judge must instruct the jury on Section 782.11, Florida Statutes (1975), 1 when the accused's defense is self-defense and where the trial judge instructs on the applicable degrees of homicide, excusable homicide, justifiable homicide, and self-defense. In Snell, the District Court of Appeal, First District, held that the trial judge was not required to instruct on Section 782.11 while in the instant cause, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, found that the judge is so required (Boardman, C. J., dissenting). We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution.
Respondent was charged by indictment with the first degree murder of Faustino Gonzalez. The homicide arose after respondent and a group of friends were joined by Gonzalez. All had consumed a substantial quantity of alcohol. As a result of such consumption, Gonzalez began firing a previously concealed revolver into the air, causing some apprehension among the group.
Later in the day, Gonzalez and respondent engaged in a quarrel which resulted in a fistfight. The fight was stopped but Gonzalez continued to push and shove the respondent. Gonzalez then raised his revolver whereupon respondent ran to a nearby filling station. There, he met one Jose Lopez who drove him home. Respondent equipped himself with a rifle and returned to the general scene of the fight, parking some distance from where Gonzalez was situated. He then asked Lopez to inform Gonzalez that he wished to make friends. Lopez left to approach Gonzalez, however, before Lopez reached Gonzalez, respondent fired two shots at Gonzalez, one of which was fatal.
According to respondent's testimony, his sole purpose in returning was to "make friends with Gonzalez." He brought the rifle only to protect himself in the event Gonzalez again threatened him with his revolver. Respondent testified further that when he exited Lopez's car, he heard gunshots and saw Gonzalez aiming his pistol at him. Consequently, he was forced to fire at Gonzalez in self-defense. However, two witnesses for the State gainsaid this testimony, stating that Gonzalez was only talking to friends when he was shot.
During the charge conference, counsel for respondent requested a jury instruction on Section 782.11, Florida Statutes (1975). The trial judge denied respondent's request for such instruction. However, he gave the standard jury instructions covering self-defense, excusable homicide, justifiable homicide, and manslaughter.
The jury rejected the respondent theory of self-defense and found him guilty as charged. By a separate sentencing proceeding, the jury recommended a life sentence. Respondent was adjudicated guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to imprisonment for life.
A timely direct appeal to the District Court of Appeal, Second District, resulted in a decision reversing and remanding for a new trial on the grounds that respondent was entitled to a jury instruction on Section 782.11, Florida Statutes (1975).
The competing philosophies as to whether an accused who relies on self-defense is entitled to an instruction on Section 782.11 are ably articulated by Judge McCord who concurred specially in Snell and by the majority opinion of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, in the instant cause. For the reasons enunciated by Judge McCord, we are persuaded by and therefore adopt the holding of the District Court of Appeal, First District, as the response of this Court in the instant cause. Judge McCord's concurrence is set forth in pertinent part below:
Appellee contends that it was not the intent of this statute to embrace an unnecessary killing under a claim of self-defense. I agree. The foregoing statute was originally enacted by the legislature in 1868 and from my research, I have not found that it has ever been applied as appellant seeks to have it applied here. Throughout the years and in our present standard jury instructions, trial courts have included in their instructions upon the...
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Golden v. State, s. AF-322
...DCA 1978), cert. denied, 362 So.2d 1056 (Fla.1978); Carrizales v. State, 345 So.2d 1113 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 356 So.2d 274 (Fla.1978); Duggan v. State, 189 So.2d 890 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966); and Brady v. State, 178 So.2d 121 (Fla. 2d DCA We cannot accept either Golden's i......
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Pierce v. State, 78-1829
...that they either have been mooted by our ruling on the second degree murder issue or do not present reversible error. See State v. Carrizales, 356 So.2d 274 (Fla.1978); State v. Nunez, 368 So.2d 422 (Fla.3d DCA The conviction of second degree murder is reversed and the cause is remanded for......
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Phippen v. State, 54664
...act under section 782.11, Florida Statutes (1977). The exact argument was considered but rejected by this Court in State v. Carrizales, 356 So.2d 274 (Fla.1978). With regard to the sentencing phase of the trial, appellant's contention that a sentence of death imposed by a trial court after ......
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Hoffman v. State, 97-714
...because the standard jury instruction on self-defense adequately covers unnecessary killings under claim of self-defense. State v. Carrizales, 356 So.2d 274 (Fla.), cert. den., 361 So.2d 831 (Fla.1978) The question as to which crime was committed (murder or manslaughter) was properly given ......