State v. Carroll
| Decision Date | 11 June 1945 |
| Docket Number | 39374 |
| Parties | State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Lawrence Carroll, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
From the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis Criminal Appeal Judge James F. Nangle
Affirmed
On the 15th day of April 1943 the appellant, Lawrence Carroll stabbed and killed Henry Smith. A jury has found that he was guilty of murder in the second degree and fixed his punishment at twenty years' imprisonment.
In his motion for a new trial there is but a single specification of error, - that the trial court permitted an Assistant Circuit Attorney to improperly cross-examine the witness who testified to his good reputation as a peaceable, law-abiding citizen. The witness was Bennie Love who was also the defendant's bondsman. The first admitted question on cross-examination was:
Thereafter twenty-two questions as to arrests for various offenses, over a period of twenty years, were inquired of in this manner:
"I further ask you, Mr. Love, for the same purpose, if you knew that as of January the 12th, 1933, this defendant, Lawrence Carroll, was arrested Suspect of Gambling?" Or,
"I further ask you, sir, for the same purpose, if you knew that as of January the 15th, 1924, he was arrested for Suspect of Robbery?" Sometimes the questions were framed in this manner:
"And I further ask you, sir, for the same purpose, if you knew that as of October 10th, 1934, he was arrested for Peace Disturbance?" Three of the questions related to convictions for peace disturbance, in 1940, 1941 and 1942, in which fines of $90.00 and $100.00 had been imposed. The witness remembered that Carroll had been arrested on some charge in 1926 but answered that he did not know of any of the other arrests or convictions. Three of the arrests were in 1924 and the witness was in Chicago during that year.
In his brief and argument it is urged that the cross-- examination was so improper and prejudicial that he was deprived of a fair trial. The specific objections urged are that the questions propounded on cross-examination (1) sought to elicit personal knowledge of prior arrests of the defendant without regard to reputed acts or conduct on the part of the defendant derogatory in character; (2) sought to elicit facts from the witness' personal knowledge as distinguished from rumors and reports in the neighborhood of defendant's residence; (3) were not confined to acts or misdeeds involving the same trait of character involved in the offense for which the defendant was on trial; (4) referred to acts and misdeeds too remote in point of time - extending over a period of twenty years prior to the trial; (5) assumed facts which had not been admitted or proved and (6) were not asked in good faith.
We are committed, up to now at least, to the view that a witness to one's good reputation may be cross-examined as to the fact of prior arrests or accusations of misconduct for the purpose of testing the trustworthiness, knowledge and good faith of the witness, (State v. Harris, 324 Mo. 139, 143, 22 S.W. 2d 1050, 1051; State v. Glazebrook, (Mo.) 242 S.W. 928, 931; State v. Finkelstein, (Mo.) 213 S.W. 465, 467) even though the basis of the rule may have been misconceived and subject to criticism. 3 Wigmore, Evidence, Sec. 980a. In ordinary circumstances it is improper to cross-examine such a witness as to remote or ancient charges, (State v. Parker, 96 Mo. 382, 9 S.W. 728; State v. Shouse, 188 Mo. 473, 87 S.W. 480) particularly when the defendant's evidence of good reputation has been confined to a time reasonably conterminous with the offense for which he is on trial and "unless the bad acts and events in the life of the defendant are shown by the proof to be so linked together in point of time as to leave no sufficient time or place for repentance." State v. Willard, (Mo.) 192 S.W. 437, 440. Furthermore, it is the general rule, which we have no intention of modifying, that such cross-- examination should refer to "rumors" and "reports" of fact of misconduct - derogatory in character - rather than to the witness' personal knowledge of particular facts. 3 Wigmore, Evidence, Secs. 981, 988; Annotation 71 A.L.R. 1505; State v. Crow, 107 Mo. 341, 17 S.W. 745; State v. Eddington, (Mo. App.) 286 S.W. 143. Neither is it proper to so frame the cross-examining questions that they are argumentative, or call for a conclusion, or assume...
To continue reading
Request your trial