State v. Carroll
| Decision Date | 20 December 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 587A01.,587A01. |
| Citation | 356 N.C. 526,573 S.E.2d 899 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. George Malcolm CARROLL. |
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Gail E. Dawson, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.
Staples Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Constance E. Widenhouse, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant.
On 26 March 2000, George Malcolm Carroll (defendant) was charged in a superseding indictment with one count of first-degree arson and with the first-degree murder of his live-in girlfriend, Debra Whitted; this indictment was further amended on 8 May 2001 in open court. Defendant was also indicted on 26 March 2001 as an habitual felon. Defendant was tried capitally before a jury at the 14 May 2001 session of Superior Court, Cumberland County. At the conclusion of the State's evidence, the trial court dismissed the charges of first-degree arson and for habitual felon status. The jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder based on malice, premeditation and deliberation and under the felony murder rule. Following a capital sentencing proceeding, the jury recommended a sentence of death. The trial court entered judgment in accordance with that recommendation.
Evidence presented at trial showed that Whitted was retired from the military and lived on disability. She and defendant had been living together on and off for about a year and a half in a trailer at 239 Eleanor Avenue in Fayetteville, North Carolina. Whitted's best friend, Amanda McNeil, visited her regularly. On Monday, 15 November 1999, Whitted told McNeil that she wanted defendant out of her trailer. Whitted also complained of back problems to McNeil, and McNeil agreed to take her to the hospital the next morning.
McNeil arrived at Whitted's trailer the next morning, Tuesday, 16 November 1999, but found the door locked. After knocking on the door and getting no response, McNeil left. McNeil returned to the trailer at a later time and saw defendant walking out the door. She asked defendant where Whitted was, and defendant told her that she had gone to the hospital. Defendant never looked directly at McNeil when answering her and appeared to be "high" and acting "like a wild man."
Around 10:00 a.m. on 17 November 1999, defendant purchased seventy-seven cents' worth of gas from the Clinton Road Amoco. He told the attendant that he needed gas to cut the grass.
Whitted's niece, Tanisha Whitted, stopped by Whitted's trailer on Wednesday morning, 17 November 1999, but was unable to get anyone to come to the door. Tanisha returned to the trailer again after 11:00 a.m. and discovered that the trailer was on fire. Tanisha called 911 from a neighbor's house. Several neighbors tried to determine if Whitted was inside the trailer. However, because the front door was blocked by a stereo cabinet and the smoke from the fire was too heavy, they made it only a few steps inside before having to retreat.
The Fayetteville Fire Department responded to the call and discovered that two separate fires were burning, one small fire in the den and a second, larger fire in the bedroom. Whitted's partially charred body was discovered on the bed. Evidence at the scene indicated that an accelerant had been used to start the fires. A machete was found on the living room floor.
Investigator Ralph Clinkscales of the Fayetteville Police Department arrived at the scene and began trying to locate defendant. At approximately 7:30 p.m. on 17 November, Clinkscales received a page from defendant's mother, indicating that defendant would turn himself in at a church on the corner of Monagan and Cumberland Streets. Clinkscales met with defendant at the church. Defendant told police, Defendant then began crying uncontrollably. Officers arrested defendant and took him to the Police Department.
Clinkscales and his partner read defendant his Miranda rights. Defendant signed a waiver of his rights and voluntarily began telling the officers what had happened.
According to defendant, on Monday, 15 November 1999, defendant and Whitted were drinking gin and beer when they got into an argument around 11:30 p.m. Defendant slapped Whitted with his hand and she began fighting him. Defendant picked up a machete, slapped Whitted on her leg with the flat side of the machete, and hit her in the face. Whitted moved to avoid another strike and the machete struck her in the back of the head. Defendant stated that "[b]lood poured out in a steady stream." Defendant placed Whitted on the couch, and Whitted asked him not to leave her. Blood started to flow from Whitted's nose and mouth and she started to scream. Defendant put his hand over Whitted's mouth and told her to be quiet.
Defendant carried Whitted into the bedroom and tried to quiet her screams by putting his hand on her neck and by putting a sheet around her neck. After a long time, Whitted became quiet and still. Defendant placed her in the bed and covered her with a blanket. Defendant began to think about how to get Whitted some help without being there, but he fell asleep. When defendant awoke, he realized that Whitted was dead.
Defendant cleaned himself up and left the trailer. He returned that evening and fell asleep on the couch. When he woke up, he decided to burn the trailer with Whitted's body in it. Defendant purchased gasoline and poured it over the victim, throughout the bedroom, and in the living room. After first changing his clothes, defendant lit a piece of newspaper and set fire to the bedroom and then the living room. Defendant exited through the front door.
Associate Chief Medical Examiner Robert Thompson performed an autopsy on Whitted's body on 19 November 1999. Dr. Thompson opined that the cause of death was ligature strangulation, or strangulation using a rope or sheet wrapped around the neck and pulled taut. The victim also had a cut on the back of her head that pierced the scalp and cut into the bone. Dr. Thompson determined that this wound was not fatal. A toxicology report showed less than five percent saturation of carbon monoxide, an indication that Whitted was not alive at the time of the fire. The report also indicated no trace of alcohol, cocaine, or morphine.
In his first assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred by concluding that defendant had waived his right to testify. Defendant asserts he did not knowingly waive his right to testify because the trial court's inquiry of him regarding his right to testify was inadequate.
Following closing arguments at the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, the trial court took a brief recess before instructing the jury. At the end of the recess, the trial court questioned defendant as follows:
Defendant contends that his responses to the trial court's questions demonstrate he was unsure that it was in his best interest not to testify. Defendant therefore contends that the trial court was required to offer defendant the opportunity to testify or, at a minimum, to question him further. Defendant concedes that we have never required trial courts to inform a defendant of his right not to testify and to make an inquiry on the record indicating that any waiver of this right was knowing and voluntary. Nonetheless, defendant cites numerous cases from other jurisdictions as persuasive authority for us to adopt such a rule.
In the present case, the trial court exercised an abundance of caution in determining that defendant was aware of his right to testify. The court's inquiry sufficiently determined that defendant was intellectually capable of understanding his right to testify, had communicated with his attorneys, and had agreed with his attorneys that it was not in his best interest to testify. Defendant's later decision not to testify during the sentencing phase further supports the trial court's conclusion that defendant waived his right to testify on his own behalf. We therefore conclude that defendant waived his right to testify. We find no error in the trial court's actions.
This assignment of error is overruled.
In his next two assignments of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred by submitting first-degree felony murder to the jury based on felonious assault as the underlying felony. According to defendant, because the assault on the victim was actually part of a continuous...
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...argument and decline to overrule this Court's previous holding that this argument is without merit. See State v. Carroll, 356 N.C. 526, 552, 573 S.E.2d 899, 915-16 (2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 949, 123 S.Ct. 2624, 156 L.Ed.2d 640 Additionally, defendant argues the following: (1) the espec......
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State v. Bell
...first-degree murder based on theories of premeditation and deliberation and of felony murder is significant.'" State v. Carroll, 356 N.C. 526, 554-55, 573S.E.2d 899, 917 (2002) (quoting Bone, 354 N.C. at 22, 550 S.E.2d at 495), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 949, 156 L. Ed. 2d 640 Further, defendan......
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State v. Thompson
...was not entitled to the mitigating circumstance. This Court recently addressed a similar assignment of error in State v. Carroll, 356 N.C. 526, 573 S.E.2d 899 (2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 949, 156 L. Ed. 2d 640 (2003). In Carroll, the Court determined that the defendant was not entitled t......