State v. Carrywater
| Decision Date | 05 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | DA 20-0390 |
| Citation | 512 P.3d 1180 |
| Parties | STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Jason Aaron CARRYWATER, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
For Appellant: Jeff N. Wilson, Office of the Public Defender, Missoula, Montana
For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Cori Losing, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Kelsie Harwood, Blaine County Attorney, Chinook, Montana
¶1 Defendant Jason Aaron Carrywater appeals the February 3, 2020 Order by the Seventeenth Judicial District Court, Blaine County, denying his motion to suppress. We reverse and restate the issue on appeal as follows:
Whether Sergeant Roberge had particularized suspicion to justify extending the traffic stop into a drug investigation.
¶2 Blaine County Sheriff's Sergeant Joshua Roberge was parked while on patrol around 1:00 a.m. on April 27, 2019, when he recognized a driver, Clayburn Grant, pull into the parking lot of the E Z Mark Casino in Harlem. Sergeant Roberge observed Grant and a passenger, Carrywater, exit the car and enter the casino together. Sergeant Roberge knew Grant and Carrywater from his previous employment with the Fort Belknap Police Department, and he was aware of an active warrant for Grant's arrest and that Grant did not have a valid driver's license.
¶3 Sergeant Roberge confirmed with dispatch that the vehicle was registered to Grant. While awaiting confirmation on the warrant and Grant's license status, the two men and a woman exited the casino and Grant drove to a nearby ATM. Sergeant Roberge briefly lost sight of Grant's vehicle as he turned his patrol car around and he did not see the vehicle leave the ATM. After observing the vehicle turn onto U.S. Highway 2, Sergeant Roberge initiated a traffic stop. The driver signaled and the car traveled for about 600 feet before coming to a stop on the shoulder.
¶4 Before leaving his patrol car, dispatch informed Sergeant Roberge that Grant's warrant was non-extraditable in Blaine County. At the suppression hearing, Sergeant Roberge testified that, as he approached the driver's window, he expected to find Grant in the driver's seat and was surprised to see Carrywater behind the wheel. Sergeant Roberge promptly advised Grant about the warrant and told him that he was not going to arrest him. Sergeant Roberge then asked Carrywater for his license and the car's registration and proof of insurance. Grant admitted he did not have insurance. As Grant searched the glove compartment for his registration card, Sergeant Roberge returned to his patrol car to run Carrywater's license. Carrywater's license was valid.
¶5 Sergeant Roberge testified that, at this point, his "reason for remaining on the stop was at some point and time they switched drivers." Sergeant Roberge testified that he had also made several immediate observations that further informed his suspicion the men were involved in criminal activity: (1) the vehicle did not immediately stop upon initiation of the patrol car's emergency lights; (2) Carrywater's lower jaw would often protrude to one side of his face, which he believed could be indicative of methamphetamine use; and (3) Carrywater and Grant appeared "nervous, fidgety, a little uneasy." On cross-examination, Sergeant Roberge conceded that a car traveling at 60 m.p.h. would cover his reported stopping distance of 600 feet in only about six seconds; a protruding lower jaw is not a "solid" indicator of active methamphetamine use; and it is normal for people to be fidgety and nervous around law enforcement. Sergeant Roberge testified that, while none of his initial observations alone established criminal activity, when combined, they were "possibly indicative of criminal activity."
¶6 Sergeant Roberge returned Carrywater's license, asked him to step out of the car, and walked him to the rear of the vehicle. Carrywater complied. Sergeant Roberge asked Carrywater "where they were coming from [and] where they were going," to which Carrywater replied that they had traveled the approximately 30 miles from Hays to Harlem to go to the casino, that they were inside for about 45 minutes, and they were headed home. Carrywater told Sergeant Roberge that he was driving Grant's car because Grant had asked him to drive. Sergeant Roberge commented that he smelled alcohol on Carrywater's breath and Carrywater admitted he had one beer earlier that evening. Sergeant Roberge asked Carrywater if there were any drugs, drug paraphernalia, or weapons in the vehicle, all of which Carrywater denied.
¶7 After questioning Carrywater, Sergeant Roberge directed him to remain behind the vehicle and walked to the front of the car to ask Grant a similar series of questions. Grant stated there was a pistol in the car, which Grant stated belonged to Carrywater, but denied there were drugs or other contraband in the vehicle. Sergeant Roberge asked Grant: Grant consented to the search.
¶8 Sergeant Roberge conducted a pat-down search of both men outside of the vehicle before searching the car. Grant had about $3,000 in cash and a small bag of homegrown marijuana in his pockets. Sergeant Roberge immediately located the gun under the driver's seat, and after searching the driver's side door moved to the car's center console where he discovered a baggie, which field tested positive for methamphetamine, a handful of pills, and a marijuana pipe. Additional officers arrived on scene and both men were arrested.
¶9 On May 13, 2019, the State filed an Information charging Carrywater with the following: Count I: Criminal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, a felony, in violation of § 45-9-102, MCA ; and Count II: Use or Possession of Property Subject to Criminal Forfeiture, a felony, in violation of § 45-9-206, MCA. Carrywater moved to suppress the evidence obtained after Sergeant Roberge confirmed that Grant was not the driver, claiming law enforcement exceeded the scope of the lawful traffic stop by asking for Carrywater's license and then questioning him behind the car after learning it was valid.
¶10 The District Court held an evidentiary hearing on December 10, 2019. On February 3, 2020, the District Court denied Carrywater's motion, holding that under the totality of the circumstances, Sergeant Roberge lawfully escalated his investigation from a traffic stop to an investigation of other criminal activity. On April 27, 2020, Carrywater pled guilty to both charges, reserving his right to appeal the court's denial of his motion to suppress.
¶11 We review a district court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence to determine whether the court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether those findings were correctly applied as a matter of law.
State v. Wilson , 2018 MT 268, ¶ 21, 393 Mont. 238, 430 P.3d 77. A finding is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by substantial credible evidence, if the trial court misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or if our review of the record leaves us with the firm or definite conviction that the trial court made a mistake. State v. Harning , 2022 MT 61, ¶ 13, 408 Mont. 140, 507 P.3d 145.
Whether Sergeant Roberge had particularized suspicion to justify extending the traffic stop into a drug investigation.
¶12 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 11, of the Montana Constitution protect Montana citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. State v. Graham , 2007 MT 358, ¶ 12, 340 Mont. 366, 175 P.3d 885. A law enforcement traffic stop is a seizure subject to constitutional scrutiny. State v. Hoover , 2017 MT 236, ¶ 15, 388 Mont. 533, 402 P.3d 1224. Evidence obtained as the result of a constitutionally invalid search or seizure is generally inadmissible against the accused in subsequent proceedings. Section 46-13-302, MCA ; State v. Laster , 2021 MT 269, ¶ 35, 406 Mont. 60, 497 P.3d 224.
¶13 The government's "interest in effective law enforcement demands that officers in the field have some latitude to reach, follow up on, and confirm or dispel initial suspicions of criminal activity." Hoover , ¶ 23 (internal quotations and citation omitted). A peace officer may conduct an investigatory stop of "any person or vehicle that is observed in circumstances that create a particularized suspicion that the person or occupant of the vehicle has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense." Section 46-5-401(1), MCA. A peace officer who has lawfully stopped a person or vehicle may request the person's name and present address and an explanation of the person's actions and, if the person is the driver of a vehicle, demand the person's driver's license and the vehicle's registration and proof of insurance. Section 46-5-401(2)(a), MCA.
¶14 Whether particularized suspicion justifies an investigative stop is a question of fact that the district court determines based on the totality of the circumstances, including the quantity, or content, of the information available to the officer at the time of the investigative stop, and its quality, or degree of reliability. State v. Kaufman , 2002 MT 294, ¶ 11, 313 Mont. 1, 59 P.3d 1166 ; State v. Elison , 2000 MT 288, ¶ 16, 302 Mont. 228, 14 P.3d 456 (citing State v. Pratt , 286 Mont. 156, 161, 951 P.2d 37, 40 (1997) ). The State carries the burden of proof in asserting that law enforcement had the requisite particularized suspicion. Pratt , 286 Mont. at 161, 951 P.2d at 40.
¶15 Particularized suspicion requires the officer to articulate "more than a mere generalized suspicion or an undeveloped hunch of criminal activity." Wilson , ¶ 28. An officer may temporarily detain a person for investigative purposes without probable...
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