State v. Carswell
| Docket Number | 50238 |
| Decision Date | 01 August 2023 |
| Parties | STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JACK CHRISTOPHER CARSWELL, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Gerald F. Schroeder, Senior District Judge. Hon. Michael Dean, Magistrate.
Decision of the district court on intermediate appeal affirming the judgment of the magistrate court, affirmed.
Jack Christopher Carswell, Nampa, pro se appellant.
Hon Raul R. Labrador, Attorney General; Andrew V. Wake, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
Jack Christopher Carswell appeals from his judgment of conviction for displaying a fictitious license plate and failing to provide proof of insurance. Carswell appealed to the district court which, in its intermediate appellate capacity, affirmed the judgment of the magistrate court. Carswell appeals. We affirm.
Meridian Police stopped Carswell after they observed his license plate did not have numbers or resemble a state-issued plate. Carswell's plate only stated "Idaho" on the top and "notice" on the bottom. Carswell refused to provide his driver's license, registration, or proof of insurance. Germane to this appeal, Carswell was cited for the infractions of displaying a fictitious license plate, Idaho Code § 49-456(3), and failing to provide proof of insurance, I.C. § 49-1232.
At a bench trial before the magistrate court, proceeding pro se Carswell asserted that federal law preempted the state law under which the charges were brought, citing 29 C.F.R. § 782.3 and 18 U.S.C. § 31(6) which define "driver" and "motor vehicle," respectively. Carswell further asserted that individuals have a natural right to travel. He argued that the federal statutes provide only for regulation of commercial or for hire vehicles and, therefore, preempted Idaho laws which purport to regulate noncommercial operation of a vehicle. The magistrate court concluded that compelling government interests justify regulations by states over the public roadways and that the statutes at issue were not preempted by federal law. The magistrate court found Carswell guilty of driving with a fictitious plate and failing to provide proof of insurance.[1]
On intermediate appeal to the district court, Carswell again argued that because he was not driving in commerce or for hire, he was not subject to Idaho laws requiring a license plate and proof of insurance and that federal preemption applied. The district court cited both federal and state authority supporting the applicable state regulatory schemes. The district court held that requiring licensing, registration, and insurance were a valid exercise of Idaho's police power. Therefore, the district court affirmed Carswell's infraction convictions. Carswell timely appeals.
For an appeal from the district court, sitting in its appellate capacity over a case from the magistrate court, we review the record to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate court's findings of fact and whether the magistrate court's conclusions of law follow from those findings. State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 415, 224 P.3d 480, 482 (2009). If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom, and if the district court affirmed the magistrate court's decision, we affirm the district court's decision as a matter of procedure. Id. However, as a matter of appellate procedure, our disposition of the appeal will affirm or reverse the decision of the district court. State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 968, 318 P.3d 955, 958 (Ct. App. 2014). Thus, we review the magistrate court's findings and conclusions, whether the district court affirmed or reversed the magistrate court and the basis therefore, and either affirm or reverse the district court.
Over questions of law, we exercise free review. State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 245, 796 P.2d 121, 122 (1990). Further, whether Idaho law is preempted by federal law is also a question of law. Christian v. Mason, 148 Idaho 149, 151, 219 P.3d 473, 475 (2009).
On appeal, Carswell asserts that the district court erred in affirming the magistrate court's convictions. Carswell again argues that the state laws at issue are invalid because they are preempted by federal law under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Carswell contends his "Notice Plate" informed Meridian Police that he was not operating in commerce and, therefore, they lacked authority to stop him and infringed upon his fundamental right to travel. The State argues we should decline to consider the merits of Carswell's preemption claim because Carswell failed to comply with the Idaho Appellate Rules, however, if we reach the merits, the district court's decision on intermediate appeal was not in error because Carswell failed to show that the Idaho laws are preempted.
Carswell appears to assert that the magistrate court did not have jurisdiction to resolve the infraction charges, ostensibly because the charges are "civil" and not criminal. Carswell does not provide support for this assertion. Regardless, the magistrate court had jurisdiction as Carswell was served with the citations in Idaho and appeared in court. Idaho Infraction Rule 4; Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 74, 803 P.2d 978, 980 (1990) ( service in state provides personal jurisdiction); see also State v. L'Abbe, 156 Idaho 317, 321-22, 324 P.3d 1016, 1020-21 (Ct. App. 2014) ().
Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a) describes the requirements for an appellant's brief. An appellant must list the issues presented on appeal for review in a short and concise statement. I.A.R. 35(a)(4). Pursuant to I.A.R. 35(a)(6), the argument section of the appellant's brief "shall contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon." Carswell makes a number of assertions about what was said, was submitted to, and transpired in the magistrate and district courts but he wholly fails to cite to any transcript or the record in support of these assertions. We will not scour the record for errors when an appellant fails to provide citations to the record. Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010). This Court will not consider issues or arguments that fail to cite the record or sufficient authority. Kelly v. Kelly, 171 Idaho 27, 45, 518 P.3d 326, 344 (2022). "Consequently, to the extent that an assignment of error is not argued and supported in compliance with the I.A.R., it is deemed to be waived." State v. McDay, 164 Idaho 526, 528, 432 P.3d 643, 645 (2018).
The appellant's brief must also articulate the appropriate standard of review and address the matters brought on appeal for our evaluation. State v. Byrum, 167 Idaho 735, 739, 476 P.3d 402, 406 (Ct. App. 2020). "Failure to identify the issue as error by the district court, rather than the magistrate court, include or apply the correct standard of review, or provide argument and authority relevant to the correct standard of review and claim on review may result in a waiver of the claims on appeal." Id. at 740, 476 P.3d at 407. A party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). If an appellant fails to articulate or provide analysis under the appropriate standard of review, the argument is conclusory and thus fatally deficient. Byrum, 167 Idaho at 739-40, 476 P.3d at 40607; State v. Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569, 575 n.2, 388 P.3d 583, 589 n.2 (2017).
Carswell has failed to support his position with citations to the record and transcripts of the proceedings in the magistrate and district courts. Additionally, Carswell has not identified the applicable standard of review nor argued under that standard for reversal. It is well established that pro se litigants are held to the same standards and rules as those represented by an attorney. State v. Davis, 165 Idaho 709, 713, 451 P.3d 422, 426 (2019). Due to these procedural deficiencies, we need not address Carswell's issues on the merits and affirm the district court's decision on intermediate appeal affirming the magistrate court's judgment of conviction.
Carswell does not dispute that he was driving with a fictitious plate and that he failed to provide proof of insurance. Instead, he argues that I.C. § 49-1232 and I.C. § 49-456 are preempted by federal statutes and regulations. Carswell contends that because he was not operating his personal vehicle in commerce or for hire, he was not subject to Idaho law. Even if we were to reach the merits of Carswell's argument, Idaho's exercise of police powers as reflected in the statutes at issue are not preempted by federal law.
The Supremacy Clause mandates that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land," and the United States Supreme Court has held a state law that conflicts with federal law is "without effect." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). We begin with the presumption that the state law is not preempted. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare v McCormick, 153 Idaho 468, 471, 283 P.3d 785, 788 (2012). Federal law may preempt state law in two ways: (1) field preemption, where Congress has exhibited an intent to occupy a given field of law; and (2) conflicting laws, where ...
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