State v. Carter

• Decision Date: 07 July 1896
• Citation: 15 Wash. 121,45 P. 745
• Parties: STATE v. CARTER.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

45 P. 745

15 Wash. 121

STATE v. CARTER.

Supreme Court of Washington

July 7, 1896

Appeal from superior court, King county; Carroll B. Graves, Judge.

Joseph Carter was convicted of manslaughter, and appeals. Affirmed.

Brady &amp Gay and McBride Bros., for appellant.

A. W. Hastie and J. T. Ronald, for the State.

GORDON J.

The appellant was convicted in the superior court of King county of the crime of manslaughter, and sentenced to imprisonment in the state penitentiary at Walla Walla for a period of 10 years, from which judgment and sentence he has appealed.

The information upon which he was tried charged him with the murder of one Charles D. Ling. The deceased (a Chinaman) was cook, and the appellant was a deckhand, on the steamer Idaho plying between the city of Seattle and down-Sound ports. It appears from the record that the appellant complained of the quality of the coffee served by the deceased at the mess table on the morning of the fatal encounter. Angry words ensued, and the appellant left the table and went towards the galley (within which the deceased was stationed), with the intention, as appellant says, of securing his hat, which he had left near the galley door, and entering complaint to the master of the boat against the cook. The state's theory, however, is that his object was to assault the deceased. It seems that the parties came together just within the galley door, at a point where they could not be seen by other employés then breakfasting. The affray terminated in the death of the deceased, resulting from a wound inflicted upon him with a butcher knife in the hands of appellant. The errors relied upon for reversal are-First, that the evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict; and, second, that the court erred in its charge to the jury.

1. We have examined the record carefully, and think that the verdict is not without sufficient legal evidence to support it. It accords with the theory of the state, and there was abundant testimony advanced in support of that theory.

2. It is alleged by counsel for appellant that the court erred in giving the following instruction: "The defendant invokes the law of self-defense, and claims that said killing was done necessarily, and in the necessary defense of his person or to prevent death to himself, or serious bodily injury, on the part of the deceased." The objection is that it is an "instruction upon the facts, instead of the law"; also, that it is in conflict with that part of the charge, "that only holds the defendant responsible for apparent danger." We think neither of these objections is well taken. We think there was no impropriety in the court explaining to the jury the nature and legal effect of defendant's plea, and the latter portion of the instruction must be considered in the light of the entire charge; and, when so considered, it is plain that the jury were given to understand that it was the right of the defendant to act upon the "apparent," as distinguished from the "actual," danger. In fact the court expressly charged that: "A person need not be in actual, imminent peril of his life or great bodily harm, before he may defend himself. It is sufficient if, in good faith, he has a reasonable belief, from the facts as they appear to him at the time, that he is in imminent danger. If he honestly believes such to be the case, then he has a right to act in self-defense." Further: "The term 'apparent danger' is to be understood as meaning, not apparent danger in fact, but apparent danger as to defendant's comprehension; that is, did the defendant believe there was an apparent danger of being killed, or of great bodily harm...