State v. Cartwright
| Decision Date | 15 November 1919 |
| Docket Number | 33004 |
| Citation | 174 N.W. 586,188 Iowa 579 |
| Parties | STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. LEON CARTWRIGHT, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
REHEARING DENIED FEBRUARY 23, 1920.
Appeal from Boone District Court.--R. M. WRIGHT, Judge.
THE defendant was indicted upon charge of maliciously threatening to injure the property of one Anna Carson, with intent thereby to extort money from the said Anna Carson, against her will. To the charge, the defendant pleaded "not guilty," and, upon trial to a jury, was convicted. From the judgment entered on the verdict, he appeals.
Affirmed.
W. W Goodykoontz, for appellant.
H. M Havner, Attorney General, F. C. Davidson, Assistant Attorney General, and Charles W. Lyon, for appellee.
The points made by counsel for a reversal of the judgment of conviction are as follows:
I. The record shows that the trial of the defendant was begun on December 5, 1918. On that day, a jury was impaneled and, after the introduction of the State's evidence in chief, and after a beginning had been made upon the testimony for the defendant, the court was adjourned to December 16, 1918, because of sickness in the family of a juror. On the date last named, a further adjournment was made to December 30, 1918, because of the absence of jurors. On December 30, 1918, the defendant objected to proceeding further with the trial, because, after the last adjournment of court, and since the trial began, one of the members of the trial jury had been appointed administrator of the estate of one Elliot, deceased, and the firm of which J. R. Whitaker, assistant attorney for the State, was a member, was representing said administrator in that proceeding. Mr. Whitaker, being present in person, stated to the court that he had no personal knowledge of the facts of the matter referred to. The objection was thereupon overruled, and appellant assigns error thereon.
There are several good reasons why this exception cannot prevail; and of these we need only suggest one, which is that, so far as the record shows, the alleged fact upon which the objection was based, does not appear to have been admitted, or any evidence thereof submitted to the court.
II. Objection is also raised to several paragraphs of the court's charge to the jury, because they are obscure, if not ambiguous, and do not clearly and distinctly present to the jurors the simple essential questions upon which they were required to pass.
As to most of these paragraphs, counsel do not claim, nor do we think it can fairly be said, that, when read with an intelligent desire to ascertain their meaning and effect, they, or any of them, state an erroneous proposition of law. These instructions have special reference to what is meant by the words "intent," "motive," and "malice," and, if open to any objection at all, it is not because they are incorrect, but because the attempt to define and illuminate the meaning of simple words of common, everyday use tends oftener to confuse than to help the mind unaccustomed to critical definition of terms. We have read the court's charge in this respect with much care, and we find therein no prejudicial error.
III. The court gave an instruction upon the defense of alibi; and in so doing, made use of the language found in some of our cases, cautioning the jury that it is a defense "easily manufactured," and that the proofs should be "scanned with care and caution." That this cautionary instruction may properly be given, has been affirmed by this court in several cases. State v Whitbeck, 145 Iowa 29, 41, 123 N.W. 982; State v. Worthen, 124 Iowa 408, 100 N.W. 330. The writer of this opinion is convinced, however, that the rule is a vicious one, and ought to be displaced by one...
To continue reading
Request your trial