State v. Caruso
| Decision Date | 24 June 1980 |
| Citation | 613 P.2d 752,289 Or. 315 |
| Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Nicholas Edward CARUSO, Petitioner. TC 78-26700; CA 14143 and SC 26704. |
| Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Dan E. Neal, Eugene, argued the cause and filed the petition and briefs for petitioner.
Frank R. Pagagni, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., Eugene, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was J. Pat Horton, Dist. Atty., Eugene.
James M. Brown, Atty. Gen., Walter L. Barrie, Sol. Gen., and Thomas H. Denney, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, filed a brief amicus curiae.
Gary D. Babcock, Public Defender, and Thomas J. Crabtree, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, filed a brief amicus curiae.
We accepted review of this criminal case in order to consider the extent to which ORS 135.037 requires pretrial omnibus hearings. 1 Instead, after supplemental briefing, we conclude that ORS 138.060, which regulates the scope of state's appeals in criminal cases, is dispositive.
Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of intoxicants in violation of ORS 487.540. The prosecutor moved for a pretrial hearing to determine the admissibility of a breath test result. The trial court refused to hear the matter prior to trial and called the case for trial. The prosecutor represented that the state could not proceed to trial without a pretrial determination of the admissibility of its essential evidence, the breath test result. The trial court, on its own motion, dismissed the case. The state appealed, contending that the duty of the trial court to provide a pretrial hearing is mandatory under ORS 135.037. 2 The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded on the merits. We allowed defendant's petition for review.
The state's right to appeal is regulated by ORS 138.060, which provides:
The order of dismissal appealed from in this case comes within the definition of subsection (1). In this respect, at least, the appeal is properly taken and we have jurisdiction of the case.
The trial court's general authority to dismiss a charge, as it relates to this case, is provided for by ORS 135.755:
"The court may, either of (sic ) its own motion or upon the application of the district attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order the proceedings to be dismissed; but in that case, the reasons of the dismissal shall be set forth in the order, which shall be entered in the journal." 3
The reason for the dismissal set forth in the order is the readiness of defendant for trial and the representation of the prosecutor that, without a pretrial omnibus hearing, the state was not prepared to go to trial. Although the state and the order speak of unpreparedness for trial, there is no suggestion that the state could have become prepared by taking action such as finding a witness or waiting out a conflicting trial. Cf. State v. Sharp, 28 Or.App. 429, 559 P.2d 930 (1977). Rather, the prosecutor's action was implicitly a refusal to go to trial and an invitation for a dismissal. In that situation, the court had little choice but to dismiss the case "in the furtherance of justice" and the dismissal was proper.
The intention of the state in inviting dismissal was not simple obstinacy; it was to obtain appellate review of the preceding ruling denying a pretrial evidentiary ruling through an appeal from the order of dismissal. Although the state may appeal pursuant to ORS 138.060(1) from a pretrial order of dismissal, the dispositive question of this case is whether the scope of such an appeal includes orders which precede the order of dismissal appealed from. We hold that it does not.
The right of the prosecution to appeal is subject to limitations and considerations which do not apply to any other litigant, the foremost of which arise from the defendant's protection against double jeopardy. In other appeal and review contexts, as a general rule, an aggrieved litigant may appeal from any final order. See, e. g., ORS 19.010, 419.561, 183.480(1). By contrast, ORS 138.060(1) and (2) list the specific final orders from which the state may appeal: pretrial dismissal and arrest of judgment.
A similar difference exists regarding scope of appeals. Other appellants, when appealing from an appealable order, may also obtain appellate review of all preceding or "intermediate" orders which inhere in the order appealed from. The general pattern of civil and criminal appeals, subject to exception, is that a litigant who is dissatisfied with a nonfinal order has no interlocutory appeal. Rather, he proceeds with the litigation until there is a final order and, if aggrieved by it, he appeals the final order and assigns as error the preceding rulings of which he complains.
With particular regard to criminal procedure, ORS 138.040, which regulates the scope of appeal by a defendant after trial, provides an instructive comparison to the provision for state's appeals. It provides:
" * * * Upon an appeal * * * any decision of the court in an intermediate order or proceeding may be reviewed. * * * " 4
By contrast, ORS 138.060 contains no general reference to intermediate orders or proceedings. Because the state cannot appeal from an adverse judgment after jeopardy has attached, there is special provision for pretrial interlocutory appeals by the state. It is not a general provision. Rather, it applies only to those pretrial orders which the legislature deemed sufficiently significant to warrant the delay, expense, interruption and continuing restraint which result from such an exceptional procedure. Subsections (3) and (4) list the nonfinal orders from which an interlocutory appeal is allowed, i. e., pretrial orders for suppression and return. There is no suggestion implicit in ORS 138.060 that the legislature intended that the state could use an appeal from a proper dismissal as a conduit for appellate review of the correctness of other preceding orders. Cf. State v. Langlois, 287 Or. 503, 600 P.2d 872 (1979); State v. Koennecke, 274 Or. 169, 174-75, 545 P.2d 127 (1976).
Were we to assume for argument that the words of ORS 138.060(1) are capable of a broader interpretation, the legislative history does not support such a reading. ORS 138.060(1) formerly allowed the state to appeal only from a judgment for defendant upon demurrer. In 1971, the legislature expanded the subsection to include pretrial dismissals generally. 1971 Or.Laws, ch. 644, § 1. The proponent of the amendment, speaking on behalf of the Department of Justice, explained that its purpose was to allow the state to appeal dismissals of indictments on grounds other than grounds for demurrer, particularly constitutional grounds, whether raised by demurrer or motion. As an example, he referred to the "outrageous" result in State v. Sieckmann, 251 Or. 259, 445 P.2d 599 (1968), in which an indictment was erroneously dismissed because it failed to list a grand jury witness, but the Supreme Court held that the state's appeal of that erroneous ruling was foreclosed by the exclusive statutory reference to judgments on demurrers. There is no mention that there was a larger purpose intended for the amendment i. e., to allow a prosecutor to invite a dismissal as a vehicle for the appeal of each and every pretrial ruling which he finds unsatisfactory. See Testimony of Solicitor General Tanzer, Minutes, Senate Criminal Law and Procedure Committee, April 14, 1971. There may be a remedy for such wrongs, see, e. g., ORS 34.010, 34.110, but it is not direct appeal.
Nor is any support for the state's contention to be found in ORS 135.037, set out above at note 1. A purpose of that statute is to preserve the state's right of appeal of those rulings which are appealable under ORS 138.060. It was not intended to expand the scope of the state's right of appeal. 5 The Court of Appeals reached the opposite resolution of this issue in State v. Lewis, 39 Or.App. 151, 591 P.2d 414 (1979). It reasoned that a denial of a state's motion for a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of defendant's statements and breath test results was erroneous under ORS 135.037, an issue we do not reach here. It further reasoned that the state was prejudiced in that it would have to forego its right under ORS 138.060(3) to appeal the suppression order if it went to trial without a pretrial ruling and that the state's refusal to proceed was therefore "proper." It concluded that "the court's dismissal in the face of that refusal was an abuse of discretion." 39 Or.App. at 155, 591 P.2d at 415. Discretion, however, lies in the choice of permissible alternative actions. A trial court faced with a plaintiff which refuses to proceed because the plaintiff is dissatisfied with an earlier court ruling has scant alternative to...
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State v. Ferguson, 000666FE; A116493.
...138.060(2), the appeal was taken directly to the Oregon Supreme Court. 5. In reaching that conclusion, the court cited State v. Caruso, 289 Or. 315, 613 P.2d 752 (1980), as well as our decision in Hoare. Shaw, 338 Or. at 610, 113 P.3d 6. We acknowledge that our analysis falls short of the d......
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State v. Shaw
...reasons explained below, we agree with the state's first argument and, consequently, do not reach its second one. In State v. Caruso, 289 Or. 315, 613 P.2d 752 (1980), this court considered the propriety of a trial court's dismissal of an accusatory instrument after the state refused to pro......
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State v. Williams
...the scope of appeal from the dismissal does not include an order "which precede[d] the order * * * appealed from." State v. Caruso, 289 Or. 315, 319, 613 P.2d 752 (1980). However, in Caruso, the pretrial order from which the state sought review was not an appealable order under ORS 138.060.......
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State v. Montgomery
...at 542, 331 P.2d 338. "Intermediate order" within the meaning of ORS 138.040 means an order made before judgment. See State v. Caruso, 289 Or. 315, 320, 613 P.2d 752 (1980) (dictum). An intermediate order is "[a]n order made between the commencement of the action and its final determination......