State v. Case

• Decision Date: 11 December 1895
• Parties: STATE v. CASE.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

96 Iowa 264

65 N.W. 149

STATE

v.CASE.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 11, 1895.

Appeal from district court, Lyon county; J. F. Oliver, Judge.

The defendant was indicted, tried, and convicted of the crime of rape. Judgment was rendered against him that he be imprisoned in the penitentiary for 15 years, from which he appeals. Affirmed.J. M. Parsons, for appellant.

Milton Remley, Atty. Gen., for the State.

GIVEN, J.

1. The crime is charged to have been committed on or about the 27th day of January, 1895, and the prosecutrix gives the 27th as the time. William Bump, called by the state, testified that on the evening of the 27th the prosecutrix came to his shop, and “said some one had been to her house, shot off a gun, grabbed her, and raped her.” On cross-examination appellant's counsel asked: “Didn't she come to your place one evening, and try to get in and stay all night, and the marshal drove her away?” “Isn't it a fact that she had stayed there several times, nights?” Objections were sustained to these questions, as not proper cross-examination. They clearly called for affirmative matter, and had no reference to the matter called out in chief. The state called Mr. Heiney, who testified that he knew the reputation of the prosecutrix for chastity prior to January 27, 1895, and that it was good. He stated on cross-examination that he never heard any person say anything about it until after the 27th of January, 1895, whereupon appellant moved to strike out his answer that her reputation was good. This motion was properly overruled. The fact that he had heard nothing prior to the 27th is a circumstance tending to show that her reputation was good. We see no error in the rulings on taking evidence.

2. After both parties rested, the court adjourned until next morning. On court convening next morning, the state was permitted, over defendant's objection, to recall the prosecutrix, and she to testify that the defendant never had sexual intercourse with her with her consent. There was no abuse of discretion in allowing this. It was not only proper, as affirmative evidence that had been omitted, but especially proper in rebuttal of the defendant's testimony that he had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix with her consent on the evening of January 22, 1895.

3. The court instructed as follows: “A reasonable doubt is such a doubt as fairly and naturally arises in your minds, after fully and carefully weighing and considering all the evidence...