State v. Cason
| Decision Date | 08 April 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 2,No. 61547,61547,2 |
| Citation | 596 S.W.2d 436 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Timothy Paul CASON, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Jeff S. Elson, Brookfield, for appellant.
John Ashcroft, Atty. Gen., Kathryn Marie Krause, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.
STOCKARD, Commissioner.
Timothy Paul Cason, age 16, was found guilty of capital murder, § 565.001 RSMo 1978, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. We affirm.
The sufficiency of the evidence is not challenged. A jury reasonably could find that on September 11, 1977, while highly intoxicated appellant was involved in a one-car accident. He was later taken home by his mother and the sheriff of Daviess County. Appellant's mother attempted, without success, to get him to go to bed, and the sheriff stated that he would return the following day to talk to him. After obtaining appellant's driver's license from his mother the sheriff left the house, and as he was backing his automobile out of the driveway appellant went to the sheriff's automobile and shot him three times in the head.
Prior to trial the State requested a mental examination pursuant to §§ 552.020 and 552.030, RSMo 1978. The examining doctor found, among other things, that appellant "has no mental disease or defect within the meaning of § 552.010;" that he "has the capacity to understand the proceedings against him and can assist in his own defense," and that he "did know and appreciate the nature, quality and wrongfulness of his alleged conduct and was capable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law." Appellant also requested and was granted a mental examination by a doctor of his own choosing, who found that appellant "has suffered mental disease for a period of years," but that "he does understand the proceedings, * * * the position of the judge, the prosecuting attorney, his own attorney and the conduct of the jury trial," and that "he did understand the nature of his action and the fact that what he had done was inappropriate and wrong." Before the trial started, appellant expressly abandoned the defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility. See § 552.030 RSMo 1978. However, in his opening statement to the jury appellant's counsel stated that the defense would be "that at the time of the commission of this crime, (he) was incapable or (sic) premeditation which is one of the elements that the Court will instruct you on as to the law."
The trial court gave, among others, the following instructions:
If you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt:
First, that on or about the 11th day of September, 1977, in the County of Daviess, State of Missouri, the defendant caused the death of S. L. Houghton by shooting him, and
Second, that the defendant intended to take the life of S. L. Houghton, and
Third, that the defendant knew that he was practically certain to cause the death of S. L. Houghton, and
Fourth, that the defendant considered taking the life of S. L. Houghton and reflected upon this matter coolly and fully before doing so, then you will find the defendant guilty of capital murder.
However, if you do not find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt each and all of those propositions, you must find the defendant not guilty of that offense.
If you do not find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt each and all of the following:
Then you must find the defendant not guilty of capital murder.
The trial court gave instructions submitting second degree murder and manslaughter. It also gave an instruction conversing the issue of intent in the instruction submitting second degree murder.
Appellant's first point is that the trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 8 because it "failed to instruct the jury about Appellant's defense of mental disease or defect." As noted, appellant expressly abandoned the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility, and no instruction submitting that defense was given. The statement of the point lacks appropriate clarity but from his argument it is apparent that appellant contends that Instruction No. 8 was insufficient because it, and the other instructions, did not submit the special negative defense, of which there was evidence, of "diminished mental capacity" which affected his mind so that he did not have the capacity to intend the act.
This defense is based upon the concept that mental derangement of an accused may not be of such quantity or quality to absolve him of all responsibility for his criminal actions, but may be sufficient to preclude him from having the requisite mental state for a particular offense; for example, he may lack the capacity to deliberate or premeditate. The doctrine was rejected in this State until 1963. For example, see State v. Holloway, 156 Mo. 222, 56 S.W. 734 (1900). In 1963 the General Assembly enacted a new mental responsibility law based upon the Model Code. See Missouri's Mental Responsibility Law. A Symposium: An analysis of the law. Richardson, Reardon and Simeone, 19 J.Mo.B. 645 (Dec. 1963); 32 M.L.Rev. 274 (1967). Included in that law is § 552.030.3(1) RSMo 1978, which gives statutory recognition to the defense relied upon by appellant. In State v. Anderson, 515 S.W.2d 534 (Mo. Banc 1974), this court recognized the statutory nature of the defense and held that where evidence was adduced to support such a defense it was required that the trial court instruct the jury on lesser crimes not containing the mental element or elements in dispute. The precise issue in State v. Anderson is not in this case because, as previously noted, the trial court did instruct the jury on murder in the second degree and on manslaughter, and the Anderson case did not address the question of whether the trial court must specifically instruct the jury that it may consider the evidence of "diminished mental capacity" in determining the requisite mental elements.
The trial of appellant was governed by instructions referred to as the "15.00 Series of MAI-CR," effective April 12, 1978 and applicable to all homicides committed after May 26, 1977. Note on Use No. 7 to MAI-CR 15.00 refers to the doctrine of "diminished mental capacity," and it states that "In appropriate situations the instructions to juries must take account of this doctrine." Although in that Note it is further provided "An MAI-CR form has been or will be adopted to cover the matter mentioned in Section 552.030.3(1)" (which provided that evidence that a defendant did or did not suffer from a mental disease or defect shall be admissible to prove that he did or did not have a state of mind which is an element of the offense), no such "MAI-CR form" had been adopted by December 7, 1978, the date on which this case was submitted to the jury. 1 Therefore, the requirement at the time of the submission of this case to the jury was that "the instructions * * * must take account" of the doctrine of diminished mental capacity.
In order for the jury to find appellant guilty of capital murder they were expressly required by Instruction No. 8 to find that he "caused" the death of Sheriff Houghton by shooting him, that in doing so appellant "intended" to take his life, that he "knew" that by shooting the sheriff he was practically certain to cause his death, and finally, that he "considered taking the life" of the sheriff and "reflected upon this matter coolly and fully before doing so." The jury was then told that if they did not find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt "each and all of those propositions, (they) must find (him) not guilty."
By Instruction No. 9, the jury was then told that if they did not find and believe "beyond a reasonable doubt" that appellant "intended to take the life" of the sheriff, and that he had not "considered taking (his) life" and had not "reflected upon this matter coolly and fully before doing so," they "must" find appellant not guilty of capital murder.
The issue of diminished mental capacity was clearly presented to the jury by the oral argument of counsel. Appellant's counsel admitted in argument that appellant "shot the sheriff three times in the head and killed him," and then stated to the jury that his defense was not that of "complete insanity," but as the examining doctor selected by appellant, Dr. Phillips, testified, "there was no way in God's green earth that (appellant) could have considered what he was about to do before he did it," and he then asked: "Do you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that what (appellant) did is the product of someone who is not suffering from some mental disease or defect?" He later argued, "The key to my side of the case and (appellant's) side of the case" is the testimony of Doctor Phillips.
In view of the instructions on lesser included offenses, as required by State v. Anderson, supra, and the converse instructions, supplemented by the evidence and the argument of counsel on the issue of lack of intent, the instructions did "take account" of the doctrine of diminished mental capacity as contemplated by the requirements applicable at the time of trial. See State v. Cole, 588 S.W.2d 94 (Mo.App.1979).
Appellant next asserts that the trial court erred in...
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