State v. Castaneda

Decision Date18 January 2001
Docket NumberNo. 98-0835.,98-0835.
Citation621 N.W.2d 435
PartiesSTATE of Iowa, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John CASTANEDA, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J. Japuntich, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas S. Tauber, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas S. Mullin, County Attorney, and Paul E. Kittredge, Jr., Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered en banc.

LAVORATO, Chief Justice.

A jury convicted John Castaneda of sexual abuse in the second degree of his ten-year-old adopted daughter. He appealed from the judgment of conviction and sentence, contending that the district court abused its discretion in admitting damaging testimony from his former wife. He also contends the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation when it allowed into evidence a videotaped interview of the daughter and a transcript of that interview. We transferred the case to the court of appeals, which affirmed. On further review of the court of appeals decision, we vacate that decision, reverse the judgment of conviction and sentence, and remand for a new trial.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In the early 1990s, Castaneda and his former wife, Patricia Johnson, moved to Sioux City, Iowa, from California. In Sioux City, Castaneda worked as a substitute teacher and later became a full-time teacher at a Sioux City elementary school.

In 1992 Castaneda and Johnson became foster parents to S.C. and her brother, M.C. Johnson worked at night, leaving Castaneda alone with the children. On occasions when Johnson returned from work, she found S.C. sleeping in Castaneda's room, sometimes while Castaneda was sleeping there too.

On several occasions, Johnson saw Castaneda and S.C. together in bed. This angered Johnson, and she talked to Castaneda about it. The practice, however, continued.

In 1994 Castaneda and Johnson were in the process of adopting S.C. and M.C. During this time, Johnson moved out of the home, and eventually she divorced Castaneda. Castaneda, however, went forward with the adoption, which the district court finalized in 1995.

Before the adoption became final, S.C. told a grade-school friend that Castaneda had raped her. As a foster care parent, Castaneda was a mandatory reporter. As such, he felt legally bound to report the allegation to the Iowa Department of Human Services, which he did. The department determined the accusation was unfounded.

Later, the department received a complaint that Castaneda had physically abused S.C. It was during this investigation that the allegations of sexual abuse in question surfaced. The department reported the complaint to the police, after which S.C. and M.C. were removed from Castaneda's home.

On May 8, 1996, the police had the Marion Health Center Child Protection Center interview S.C. Janet Kircher, a social worker employed at the center, conducted the interview, which was videotaped. During the interview, S.C. related that over the past two years, beginning when she was eight years old, Castaneda had on five to seven occasions committed various sex acts upon her or looked at her while she was naked.

Dr. Patrick James Duey conducted a medical examination of S.C. and determined the examination was consistent with a Class 3 examination. A Class 3 examination is classified as one that is suspicious for abuse.

Based on the interview and the medical examination, the State charged Castaneda on June 3 with three counts of sexual abuse in the second degree, see Iowa Code §§ 702.17, 709.1, 709.3(2) (1995), a class B felony, and one count of indecent contact with a child, see Iowa Code § 709.12, an aggravated misdemeanor.

On December 3 Castaneda's attorney attempted to depose S.C. During the deposition, S.C. was uncooperative and frequently tried to evade answering the attorney's questions. She said she did not want to talk about the alleged sexual abuse. S.C. referred the attorney to her videotaped interview. Although she often said that she did not remember, S.C. did answer some of the attorney's questions about the alleged sex acts that Castaneda supposedly had committed.

On February 17, 1997, the State filed a "Notice of Intent to Use Videotape" pursuant to Iowa Rules of Evidence 803(24) and/or 804(b)(5), and Iowa Code section 910A.14(3) (providing that recorded statements of a child describing sexual contact with or on the child may be admitted if the statements substantially comport with the requirements for admission under Iowa Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5), the residual hearsay exception). In its motion, the State noted that a probability existed that S.C. would be deemed "unavailable" pursuant to Iowa Rule of Evidence 804(a).

Castaneda argued that the State had not shown that S.C. was "unavailable" to testify. For that reason, Castaneda insisted that, if the court allowed the State to use the videotaped interview, such use would violate his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.

Following a hearing, district judge Dewie J. Gaul found the videotaped interview met the requirements of the rule regarding the residual hearsay exception. The judge also found that the videotaped interview was more probative than the deposition testimony that was filled with the child's reluctance to talk and unwillingness to give answers. However, the judge declined to rule on the admissibility of the videotaped interview at this time, pending a determination at the time of trial as to whether S.C. was unavailable to give live testimony.

On April 3 district judge Michael S. Walsh presided over a second hearing on the admissibility of the videotaped interview. The judge reviewed the videotape, a report from Dr. Richard C. Brown—a doctor who had interviewed S.C.—and the deposition. The judge, over Castaneda's objections, concurred with judge Gaul's ruling. Judge Walsh also found that S.C. was "unavailable" to testify at trial and ruled that the State would be allowed to admit the videotaped interview to the extent it was otherwise admissible.

On April 27 the parties tried the case to the jury. Because the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict, the court granted Castaneda's motion for mistrial.

On January 13, 1998, before the start of the second trial, Castaneda filed a motion asking the district court to reconsider whether S.C. was unavailable to testify. Castaneda also asked the court to rule that the proposed testimony of Patricia Johnson concerning sex acts she allegedly performed on him while he was observing children was irrelevant, as well as unfairly prejudicial, and therefore inadmissible.

District judge Phillip S. Dandos presided over the hearing on Castaneda's motion and the second trial. The hearing on the motion was held immediately prior to the beginning of the second trial on March 16, 1998. In addition to the previous rulings by judges Gaul and Walsh, judge Dandos considered a letter from S.C.'s therapist, social worker Doreen M. Loeffelholz. Based upon this letter and the previous findings of judges Gaul and Walsh, judge Dandos held that S.C. was "currently unavailable to testify at trial; that were she brought in to testify that this would be damaging to her and that it would add little, if anything, to the evidence in this case." Judge Dandos ruled the videotaped interview and transcript of that interview were admissible.

At the hearing, Castaneda's attorney did not object to the therapist's letter and, in fact, waived any objection to the admission of the videotaped interview and transcript.

Over Castaneda's objections, judge Dandos also ruled that Patricia Johnson's testimony was admissible. Judge Dandos concluded that Johnson's testimony was admissible only to the extent that it "goes to intent."

On March 24 the jury returned verdicts of not guilty on all charges except as to one count of sexual abuse in the second degree. The court sentenced Castaneda to an indeterminate twenty-five-year term.

This appeal presents two issues. First, did the district court abuse its discretion in allowing Johnson's testimony about the sex acts she allegedly performed upon Castaneda? Second, did the district court violate Castaneda's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation when it admitted into evidence S.C.'s videotaped interview and a transcript of that interview?

II. Evidence of Prior Sexual Acts With One Other Than the Victim.

A. The parties' contentions. In a hearing on a pretrial motion, Castaneda objected to Johnson's testimony about the alleged oral sex acts she performed upon Castaneda on two different occasions while he was allegedly observing children playing. He contended that the testimony was irrelevant under Iowa Rules of Evidence 401 and 402. He contended further that, even if relevant, the probative value of this evidence was outweighed by its unfairly prejudicial nature under Iowa Rule of Evidence 403. Finally, he contended such testimony constituted character evidence governed by Iowa Rule of Evidence 404 and not admissible.

The State contended that the testimony was admissible under rule 404(b) to show intent. Over Castaneda's objections, the district court allowed the testimony.

Specifically, the court ruled that the testimony would be "strictly limited to the purpose of showing any intent on the part of the defendant to commit the crimes alleged."

On appeal, Castaneda reasserts the objections to Johnson's testimony that he made in the district court. The State asserts that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting her testimony because the activity Johnson described indicated that Castaneda was fantasizing about having sexual activity with children. The State therefore asserts that Johnson's testimony was relevant as to intent to have indecent contact with S.C. Additionally, the State asserts that, even if prejudicial, Johnson's testimony was not unfairly prejudicial.

B. Applicable law. Iowa Rule...

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