State v. Caston
| Decision Date | 13 May 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 56963,No. 1,56963,1 |
| Citation | 509 S.W.2d 39 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Oscar Lee CASTON, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Charles B. Blackmar, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Louis, for respondent.
Walter L. Metcalf, Jr., Armstrong, Teasdale, Kramer & Vaughn, St. Louis, for (defendant) appellant.
Oscar Lee Caston appeals from a conviction of robbery in the first degree by means of a dangerous and deadly weapon, a felony. He was sentenced by the court to ten years in the department of corrections under the second offender act, section 556.280, RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S. The appeal was filed prior to January 1, 1972. This court has jurisdiction, Mo.Const., Art. V, Section 31, V.A.M.S.
Appellant's point on this appeal is: 'The trial court committed prejudicial error in denying appellant the right to inquire of his witnesses as to the drinking done by the victim and his condition just prior to the time the robbery occurred, because such testimony was relevant on the issue of the credibility of the victim's identification testimony and the victim's capacity for observation, recollection and the like.'
The victim identified appellant as one of two men who robbed him. There was no other evidence connecting appellant to the crime. The victim had been to two taverns over a period of six hours during the day and evening of October 21, 1970, and testified he had two or three drinks before going to the third tavern--Le Jazz Hot. As he left Le Jazz Hot and approached his car, he testified that appellant and another man asked for a ride. He was apprehensive and thought the best thing to do was let them get into the car. The men said they wanted to go to Sarah and Manchester. The victim asked if they would like to stop for a drink and they agreed. The three went into the Knot Hole bar at Sarah and West Pine. The victim testified he bought them one drink each and he drank half of one highball. The bill for the drinks was between one and two dollars. He didn't remember how long they were in the Knot Hole but guessed that they were there from two to four minutes--long enough to converse with the two men. The victim left the Knot Hole but the two men followed him and again asked for a ride. He agreed. Appellant rode in the front and the other man in the back seat.
When they got to Sarah and Newstead the men told him to pull over and let them out. When he stopped, the man in the back seat put a pistol to the victim's neck and the two men proceeded to rob the victim and then escaped. The victim returned to the Knot Hole where he borrowed a dime from the bartender, whom he knew, and called the police. About one week later he identified appellant's photograph out of numerous ones given him by the police.
The defense called one witness, the bartender from the Knot Hole, to testify. He knew the victim and remembered him being in the Knot Hole with two colored men on the night of the robbery and that the victim purchased drinks for them. Appellant's attorney asked the bartender if the victim had any drinks himself. The state objected on the grounds that it was improper to attempt to impeach a witness (the victim) on a collateral matter--whether the victim had any drinks. Appellant's attorney stated, 'The important issue here is identification.' The court said: 'All right, you can go into the identification, but your question as to the number of drinks is a collateral issue and I will sustain the objection.'
The witness was then asked, 'Were they drinking the entire time,' and he answered, 'Yes, they had several--two or--'. The court sustained the state's objection and struck the answer, stating to the jury that 'the Court sustained the objection to the number of drinks and so forth because it is a collateral issue to the charge in this case.'
Defense counsel requested and obtained a short recess. Thereafter, when the witness resumed the stand, defense counsel asked him if there was anything unusual about the victim's conduct that night. The state's objection was overruled and the witness responded, 'Not especially, no.'
Appellant contends it was...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Matthews v. State
...course of drinking prior to alleged theft of car by defendant to show extent of intoxication and defense of consent); State v. Caston, 509 S.W.2d 39 (Mo.1974) (court erred in refusing to permit cross-examination of witness as to number of drinks consumed immediately prior to or during time ......
-
Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp.
...the witness's ability to see, hear, perceive and observe." Johnston v. Conger, 854 S.W.2d 480, 483 (Mo.App.1993), citing State v. Caston, 509 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Mo.1974). This evidence is admissible by cross-examination or by independent testimony. Caston, 509 S.W.2d at 41. Any possible impairm......
-
Mitchell v. Kardesch
...State v. Johnson, 700 S.W.2d 815, 817-18 (Mo. banc 1985) (bias); State v. Pigques, 310 S.W.2d 942, 947 (Mo.1958) (bias); State v. Caston, 509 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Mo. 1974) (ability to By contrast, parties traditionally have been limited in introducing extrinsic evidence when the form of impeachm......
-
Lagud v. Kan. City Bd. of Police Comm`rs,
...is not a collateral issue but bears directly upon the ability of the witness to accurately describe those events. State v. Caston, 509 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Mo. 1974) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 936 S.W.2d 104, 106 (Mo. banc 1996) (stating, in a civil......