State v. Causey

• Decision Date: 22 July 1977
• Docket Number: No. 46491,46491
• Citation: 257 N.W.2d 288
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Michael CAUSEY, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 288

257 N.W.2d 288

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Michael CAUSEY, Appellant.

No. 46491.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 22, 1977.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Corroborating information contained in the search warrant affidavit provided a substantial basis for crediting an unidentified informant's tip. The affidavit thus was facially sufficient to establish probable cause.

2. Misrepresentation by a government agent in a search warrant affidavit will invalidate the warrant if (1) the misstatement of fact is material to the determination of probable cause, and (2) the government agent deliberately or recklessly misrepresented the material fact.

Bruce Hartigan, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Richard G. Mark, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frederick S. Suhler, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Dennis P. Moriarty, County Atty., Shakopee, for respondent.

Heard before ROGOSHESKE, KELLY, and SCOTT, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc.

KELLY, Justice.

Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction in district court for possession of heroin, morphine, and hashish and possession of heroin with intent to sell. We remand for a hearing.

This appeal concerns the sufficiency and accuracy of an affidavit supporting a warrant which authorized search of defendant and his residence. That search yielded the evidence that resulted in defendant's conviction. The affidavit stated in pertinent part:

"Affiant, Donald Hamilton, states that he is a Sgt. for the Scott County Sheriff's Office, a resident of Scott County Minnesota and a member of the Metropolitan Area Narcotics Squad and that affiant has been working in the area of drug control for the past 8 years. That during the past 8 years, the affiant has worked with several different informants and has had extensive experience in judging the reliability of the informant.

"The affiant was informed by an informant who he considers reliable that Michael Causey during the last week of January, 1974 was in possession of heroin and was using heroin. Affiant's informant further states that the use of heroin and the possession of the heroin occurred at Route 2, Prior Lake, Spring Lake Township, Scott County, Minnesota. This is a residence owned by Earl McQuestion of Savage, Minnesota. The residence, occupied by Michael Causey, is on the Thornton Point Road.

"Affiant's informant further states that he/she had been in the residence occupied by Michael Causey within the last week of January, 1974 and personally observed Michael Causey using the heroin for himself by injecting it into his arm and also observed other heroin at the residence. Affiant then requested that the informant accompany him to the vicinity of the Causey residence. The informant then accompanied the affiant and directed him to the location of the Causey residence. Affiant observed two cars parked in front of the Causey residence. One vehicle registered to Michael Causey and the other vehicle registered to Carroll J. Ahlstrand. A check with the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension for the state of Minnesota revealed that Mr Ahlstrand had been convicted for possession of heroin within the past 6 months. Affiant was informed by Agent O'Connor of the Drug Enforcement Administration that Patrick Ryan of Minneapolis informed Agent O'Connor that Michael Causey was dealing in heroin and had heroin in his possession in October and November of 1973. Patrick Ryan then informed Agent O'Connor that Michael Causey had a large quantity of heroin and a large amount of cash close by. Patrick Ryan informed Agent O'Connor that he had purchased narcotics from Michael Causey in the past. Affiant was informed by Agent O'Connor that Patrick Ryan had been in the Causey home."

The district court permitted defendant to challenge the accuracy of the contents of the affidavit at a Rasmussen hearing. The court then denied defendant's motion to suppress. Defendant was convicted in a bench trial and sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment not to exceed 7 years, to be served concurrently with a Federal prison sentence.

This appeal presents two issues:

(1) Is the affidavit facially sufficient to establish probable cause for the search?

(2) Do inaccuracies in the affidavit invalidate the search warrant?

1. Defendant first contends that the affidavit taken at face value fails to establish probable cause for the search. An affidavit based on hearsay information must satisfy the two-pronged test advanced in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and restated in State v. LaBarre, 292 Minn. 228, 235, 195 N.W.2d 435, 440 (1972): "(T)he affidavit (must contain) the underlying facts and circumstances to enable the magistrate to independently judge (1) that the informant obtained his knowledge of the reported criminal activity in a reliable manner; and (2) that the officer-affiant had a sufficient basis to believe that the informant was 'credible' or his information 'reliable.' " The first prong of the test was met by the unidentified informant's first-hand observation of defendant using heroin and keeping it at his residence. E. g., United States v. Cutts, 535 F.2d 1083 (8 Cir. 1976); United States v. Watts, 176 U.S.App.D.C. 314, 540 F.2d 1093 (1976).

Whether the second prong of the test has been met is a matter of controversy. The affidavit notes that the affiant has 8 years of experience in drug control, that he has "extensive experience in judging the reliability of the informant," and that he considers the informant reliable. These conclusory statements do not enable a magistrate to independently judge the informant's credibility and do not alone satisfy the second prong of the test. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969); State v. LaBarre, 292 Minn. 228, 236, and note 6, 195 N.W.2d 435, 441 (1972). However, if other information in the affidavit corroborates the tip so that it then meets the second Aguilar requirement, the tip may be considered probative of probable cause. Spinelli v. United States, supra; United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971); United States v. Watts, supra.

The prosecution cites several possible corroborating factors: (1) The informant accompanied and directed the affiant to defendant's rural residence; (2) an automobile parked there revealed that defendant apparently associated with a convicted heroin user; and (3) defendant had a reputation for dealing in heroin 3 months earlier. ¹ The corroborating factors appearing in this affidavit make it similar to the affidavit deemed sufficient in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960), a case which the plurality opinion in United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 580, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 2080, 29 L.Ed.2d 723, 732 (1971), characterized as a "suitable benchmark." Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the court in Jones, stated:

" * * * The (magistrate) need not have been convinced of the presence of narcotics in the apartment. He might have found the affidavit insufficient and withheld his warrant. But there was substantial basis for him to conclude that narcotics were probably present in the apartment, and that is sufficient. It is not suggested that the (magistrate) doubted (affiant's) word. Thus we may assume that (affiant) had the day before been told, by one who claimed to have bought narcotics there, that petitioner was selling narcotics in the apartment. Had that been all, it might not have been enough; but (affiant) swore to a basis for accepting the informant's story. The informant had previously given accurate information. His story was corroborated by other sources of information. And petitioner was known by the police to be a user of narcotics. Corroboration through other sources of information reduced the chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale; that petitioner was a known user of narcotics made the charge against him much less subject to scepticism than would be such a charge against one without such a history." 362 U.S. 271, 80 S.Ct. 736, 4 L.Ed.2d 708. (Italics supplied.)

Because the corroborating factors here taken together provide a substantial basis for crediting the informant's tip, the affidavit is facially sufficient to establish probable cause.

2. Defendant next contends that inaccuracies in the affidavit vitiate the warrant. Defendant had the opportunity to explore the factual basis of the affidavit's contents at a Rasmussen hearing, granted by the court below prior to our decision in State v. Luciow, Minn., 240 N.W.2d 833, 245 N.W.2d 235 (1976). In Luciow, we held that a defendant has the right, upon a proper showing, to challenge the basis of a facially sufficient affidavit, but we did not establish a standard delineating the circumstances in which inaccuracies in the supporting affidavit would invalidate a search warrant. Recently, however, in State v. Nolting, Minn., 254 N.W.2d 340 (1977), we held that an innocent misrepresentation, even though material to the determination of probable cause, was insufficient to invalidate a warrant. In the instant case, we attempt to flesh out the standard in its entirety.

The United States Supreme Court has not dealt specifically with misrepresentations in search warrant affidavits, ² but state and lower Federal courts have formulated several standards on nonconstitutional bases. We think it unnecessary to discuss in detail the various tests that have been adopted or proposed. ³ Suffice it to say that the tests are based on either one or both of the following factors: (1) the materiality of the misrepresentation to the establishment of probable cause; and (2) the state of mind of the agent who makes the misrepresentation.

Only misrepresentations of material facts should invalidate a warrant. If a misrepresentation is not material, then other information in the affidavit is sufficient to establish probable cause. In this...