State v. Cenac

• Decision Date: 17 November 1961
• Docket Number: No. 45856,45856
• Citation: 241 La. 1055,132 So.2d 928
• Parties: . Supreme Court of Louisiana
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 928

132 So.2d 928

241 La. 1055

STATE of Louisiana v. Dennis CENAC et al. In re State of Louisiana applying for certiorari or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit Parish of Terrebonne.

No. 45856.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Nov. 17, 1961.

Opinion of Court of Appeals, see page 897, ante.

Writ refused.

We find no error of law in the ruling complained of.

HAMITER, J.

FOURNET, C.J., concurs with written reasons.

McCALEB, J.

SUMMERS, J., concurs with reasons.

HAWTHORNE, J., is of the view that the State's application for a writ should be granted and assigns written reasons.

HAMLIN, J., is of the opinion that the State's application for a writ should be granted and assigns written reasons.

SANDERS, J., is of the opinion that the writ should be granted and assigns written reasons.

FOURNET, Chief Justice (concurring in the refusal to grant the writ).

Ordinarily, when an application for a writ to review a decision of an inferior court is denied by a majority of the members of this court, the minority views are not reduced to writing, and inasmuch as under our rules an application for rehearing of our action on a writ is never considered, such views have little, if any, value. This is particularly true in the instant case since a review of the previous decisions of this court upon which the Court of Appeal for the First Circuit based its decree here will readily disclose that the issues posed in the above entitled case are identical in every respect with those disposed of in the first decision of this court in the case of California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 74 So.2d 1.

Of the three justices who have not subscribed to the court's action in refusing the instant writ, only Mr. Justice HAWTHORNE was a member of this court at the time the first Price case and its sequel, the second Price case (234 La. 338, 99 So.2d 743), were handed down. From a perusal of his lengthy written views for not concurring with the majority action in the instant case, I cannot conceive what purpose can be served by its rendition, for I find nothing therein that was not argued and reargued either in brief or orally in the two Price cases, and most of which can be found by reading the dissenting opinions in those cases.

Much is now being made of the fact that the legislature of 1954 sought to nullify this court's decision in the first Price case by its adoption of Act No. 727 (R.S. 9:5661) eleven days after the finality of that decision by declaring its conception of the public policy of the state at the time the legislature of 1912 adopted its Act No. 62, which was the basis for the decision in the first Price case. Yet no mention is made of the fact that at the time of the decision in the second Price case the provisions of Act No. 727 of 1954 had been in full force and effect for some three years, and the court in its majority view completely ignored the then Attorney General's Urgent plea that he be permitted to test the Beckwith title in an appropriate petitory action--already instituted--in the light of the state's public as declared in Act No. 727 of 1954, and also in the light of additional information he had acquired disclosing the Beckwith patent had not been secured from the legally constituted officials of Louisiana, but, instead, through fraud, deceit, and collusion by one John Beckwith (an ex-general of the Union army, who, with other northern politicians, had swarmed over the Southland following the Civil War from a 'carpetbag' governor maintained in office through the force of Federal troops, and on which no tax was ever paid. The court was at that time also aware of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. People of the State of Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 13 S.Ct. 110, 36 L.Ed. 1018, quoted from at length in my learned colleague's written statement, as can be readily ascertained by a reference to my dissenting opinion in the second Price case.

Yet in the second Price case the court, by a majority opinion, in which Mr. Justice Hawthorne concurred, concluded the decision in the first Price case had adjudged the Beckwith group to be the owners in full ownership of all of the land included in the Beckwith patent, thus not only approving the rationale of the decision in the first Price case, that is, that 'The manifest purpose of Act No. 62 of 1912 was to stabilize titles issued by the State over the signature of the Governor and Register of the State Land Office in cases wherein the State and other interested parties failed to contest the patents within a stated time,' (225 La. 706, 84 So.2d 14) but reinforced the holding in the majority opinion that 'when the stated time elapsed (the six year period provided by Act 62 of 1912) without action, the curative provisions of the law became operative and rendered ALL SUCH PATENTS UNASSAILABLE.' (The emphasis and matter within brackets has been supplied.)

While it may be considered regrettable that I was unable to convince my learned colleagues of the far reaching effect of that decision at the time, I do not feel that this court can now in good conscience afford to deal differently with respect to the rights of all other such patents, particularly when it is noted that the property included in and covered by the patent held by the Cenacs was acquired in good faith for the purpose of operating a fish and oyster industry that was actually established on the premises and operated there these many years, during all of which time the taxes thereon were regularly paid each year.

Indeed, there would be no stability of titles in this state if every time there is a change of the membership of this court, previously adjudicated property rights are to be changed to accord with the views of the individual members as newly composed.

SUMMERS, Justice (concerning).

I concur in the ruling denying the application for a writ of certiorari in this case for I am convinced of the correctness of the decision of the Court of Appeal (132 So.2d 897).

The only issue presented by the application which this Court has not heretofore adjudicated is the effect of Act 727 of 1954 ¹ upon the prior jurisprudence of this State construing Act 62 of 1912.

The Act of 1954 is an effort on the part of the Legislature to render nugatory the settled judicial construction of the 1912 act, by declaring that what an entirely different Legislature had in mind over two generations before was a purpose and intent which is the very antithesis of what has been judicially declared to be the 1912 Legislature's 'manifest purpose'.

Article II, Sections 1 and 2, of the LSA-Louisiana Constitution provides for the distribution of the powers of government into three distinct departments-- legislative, executive and judicial--and that no one of these departments, nor any person or collection of persons holding office in one of them, shall exercise power properly belonging to either of the other. This constitutional expression of the traditional American principle of separation of powers in government has been steadfastly upheld by this Court, and the Constitution charges obedience to this mandate by all state officials.

It is also a fundamental rule of constitutional law that the interpretation and construction of legislative acts in litigation are matters exclusively within the province of the courts. It does not lie within the domain of the lawmakers to interpret their own laws. ²

For these reasons I do not consider the Act of 1954 can change the meaning of the Act of 1912.

The other issues presented by the application have been answered by this Court by decisions in Atchafalaya Land Co. v. F. B. Williams Cypress Co., 146 La. 1047, 84 So. 351 (1920), Atchafalaya Land Co. v. Dibert, Stark & Brown Cypress Co., 157 La. 689, 102 So. 871 (1925); State v. Sweet Lake Land & Oil Co., 164 La. 240, 113 So. 833 (1927); Realty Operators, Inc. v. State Mineral Board, 202 La. 398, 12 So.2d 198 (1942); O'Brien v. State Mineral Board, 209 La. 266, 24 So.2d 470 (1946); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. State Mineral Board, 223 La. 47, 64 So.2d 839 (1953); and California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 74 So.2d 1 (1954).

In addition to the correctness of the decisions in the Humble Oil & Refining Co. and California Co. cases, supra, I am convinced that constancy in our jurisprudence, especially when a rule of property has been established, is not only expected but vitally necessary to the stability of our system of law.

HAWTHORNE, Justice (dissenting).

Justice HAMLIN, Justice SANDERS, and I are of the view that the application of the State of Louisiana for a writ of certiorari in this case should be granted.

The other members of the court, constituting a majority, have denied the state's application to review a Court of Appeal judgment which, in effect, holds that navigable bodies of water, such as bays which are arms of the sea, rivers, and lakes, may be owned by private individuals or corporations. ¹ 132 So.2d 897. From such a holding it follows that these private owners are entitled to the proceeds from oil and gas leases executed by them covering these navigable water bottoms. ² That the proceeds from such oil and gas leases run into millions of dollars no one can deny. Our law as I understand it is clear that this huge sum belongs to the people of this state because the state in its sovereign capacity is vested with title to the navigable waters and their beds. Being of this view, I cannot subscribe to a holding which to me is contrary to law and which permits private persons to enrich themselves at the expense of the people of this state. ³

In this state ownership of the soil carries with it the ownership of all that is directly above and under it, carries with it the right to all that the thing produces and all that becomes united to it either naturally or artificially, and gives the right to use, enjoy, and dispose in the most unlimited manner....