State v. Chadeayne
| Decision Date | 13 April 1959 |
| Docket Number | No. 47150,47150 |
| Citation | 323 S.W.2d 680 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. George L. CHADEAYNE, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Rosenblum & Goldenhersh, Robert S. Goldenhersh, St. Louis, for appellant.
William J. Geekie, Pros. Atty., Sidney Faber, Asst. Pros. Atty., St. Louis, John M. Dalton, Atty. Gen., Fred L. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
Orville Richardson, St. Louis, for Motor Carriers Council of St. Louis, Inc., as amicus curiae.
George A. Spencer, Columbia, for Missouri-Illinois Food Distributors, Inc., Moeller Drayage Co., and Ben R. Schilli, as amici curiae.
Upon trial in the St. Louis Court of Criminal Correction, George L. Chadeayne, appellant herein, was adjudged guilty of operating a tractor-trailer in the City of St. Louis in violation of the gross weight limitations of Laws 1957, p. 624, Sec. 304.180 RSMo 1949, 1957 Supp., V.A.M.S., and sentenced to a fine of $100. On appeal to the St. Louis Court of Appeals, the judgment was affirmed. State v. Chadeayne, 313 S.W.2d 757. Thereafter, on application of appellant, the cause was transferred to this court.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in not sustaining his motion for a judgment of acquittal because the weight limitations imposed by Sec. 304.180 have no application to motor vehicles operated in a city of more than 75,000 inhabitants; and that the only weight limitation imposed upon motor vehicles operated exclusively within the limits of such cities, and within two miles of the corporate limits thereof, is governed exclusively by Sec. 304.190, which was not violated by appellant. All statutory references herein are to RSMo 1949 and 1957 Supp., V.A.M.S., except when otherwise indicated. The term 'highway'. as used in the statutes here involved, is defined: 'Any public thoroughfare for vehicles, including state roads, county roads and public streets, avenues, boulevards, parkways or alleys in any municipality.' Section 301.010(6).
Section 304.170, as amended in 1957, fixes the maximum width, height and length of motor vehicles 'operated upon the highways of this state.'
Section 304.180, as amended in 1957, provides:
'1. No vehicle or combination of vehicles shall be moved or operated on any highway in this state having a greater weight than sixteen thousand pounds on one axle when the wheels attached to said axle are equipped with high pressure pneumatic, solid rubber or cushioned tires, and no vehicle or combination of vehicles shall be moved or operated on the highways of this state having a greater weight than eighteen thousand pounds on one axle when the wheels attached to said axle are equipped with low pressure tires, and no vehicle shall be moved or operated on the highways of this state having a load of over six hundred pounds per inch width of tire upon any wheel concentrated on the surface of the highway, the width in the case of rubber tires, both solid and pneumatic, to be measured between the flanges of the rim.
'2. An 'axle load' is defined as the total load transmitted to the road by all wheels whose centers are included between two parallel transverse vertical planes forty inches apart, extending across the full width of the vehicle.
'3. Subject to the limit upon the weight imposed upon the highway through any one axle, the total gross weight with load imposed upon the highway by any one group of two or more consecutive axles of a vehicle or combination of vehicles shall not exceed the gross weight given for the respective distance between the first and last axle of the total group of axles measured longitudinally to the nearest foot as set forth in the following table:' (Here follows a table of maximum weights predicated upon the 'axle load' of such vehicles.)
Section 304.190, as amended in 1957, provides:
'1. No motor vehicle operating exclusively within the corporate limits of cities containing seventy-five thousand inhabitants or more or within two miles of the corporate limits of the city shall exceed one hundred eight inches in width, fifteen feet in height, thirty-five feet in length, or fifty feet in length when in combination of such vehicles coupled together including coupling; except that motor vehicles transporting passengers for hire within the corporate limits of cities containing three hundred thousand inhabitants or more may be forty feet in length.
The facts are admitted. On September 23, 1957, appellant in the course of his employment as a truck driver for a coal distributor domiciled in the City of St. Louis, a city having more than 75,000 inhabitants, operated the tractor-trailer in question in said city. Its dimensions were 96 inches in width, 5 feet in height, and 31 feet 7 inches in length, and the distance between its axles was 26 feet 6 inches. Its gross weight load was 50,600 pounds, the load distributed over each of the axles being:
Load in Pounds
Axle on Axles
----------------------------- --------------
Steering Axle 5,600
Drive Axle 17,520
Front Axle on rear of trailer 13,740
Last Axle on rear of trailer 13,740
Concededly, appellant, on the date in question, operated a combination of motor vehicles in the City of St. Louis the gross weight of which was in violation of the gross weight limitations imposed by Sec. 304.180 to the extent of 1,380 pounds, but which was within all of the size and weight limitations fixed by Sec. 304.190.
Respondent contends (and the St. Louis Court of Appeals upheld the contention) that even though Sec. 304.190 makes no reference, directly or indirectly, to the gross weight limitations provided in Sec. 304.180, nevertheless said sections are to be read and considered in pari materia; and that, when so read and construed, it must be held that the legislature intended the gross weight limitations set forth in Sec. 304.180 should be applicable to motor vehicles operating in cities of 75,000 or more inhabitants. The legislative history of these sections is meticulously reviewed in the opinion of the St. Louis Court of Appeals. It would be a work of supererogation to herein repeat it. Suffice that reference be made to the opinion. 313 S.W.2d 757.
Our understanding of the conclusions reached by the Court of Appeals is that the provisions of Sec. 304.170 limiting the size of motor vehicles and of Sec. 304.180 limiting the gross weight of such vehicles operated upon the public highways of the state must be classified as a 'general law' applicable to all motor vehicles and that the provisions of Sec. 304.190, relating to the size and weight of vehicles operated exclusively within cities of 75,000 or more inhabitants (or within two miles of the corporate limits thereof), is to be classified as an 'exception' to the 'general law' as set forth in Secs. 304.170 and 304.180; that the 'general law', carried forward (with certain changes from time to time not herein material) since its original enactment in 1921, remains in effect and is applicable to the size and gross weight limitations of motor vehicles operated exclusively within such city areas to the extent that the express limitations prescribed by the 'general law' (Secs. 304.170 and 304.180) have not been specifically changed by the 'exception' provisions of Sec. 304.190 (); and that, inasmuch as Sec. 304.190 is silent on the subject of gross weight limitations, as fixed by Sec. 304.180, such limitations fixed by the latter section remained in effect and were applicable to vehicles operated exclusively within the city areas.
We are unable to agree with the conclusions reached by the Court of Appeals. From 1921 to 1925, the size and weight limitations of all motor vehicles operating on the highways of this state were fixed by the Laws of 1921, 1st Ex.Sess., p. 76. Let it be conceded that the provisions of that act were 'general'. In 1925, Laws 1925, p. 295, the legislature effected the repeal of the 'general' statute of 1921 insofar as it prescribed maximum size and weight limitations of motor vehicles operated on 'the highways of this state.' This was accomplished in the following manner: (a) Secs. 1 and 2 of the 1925 act substituted new and greater size and weight regulations upon motor vehicles operated on the 'highways of the state' than those set forth in the 1921 act; (b) Sec. 3 thereof provided:
'The provisions of this act shall not apply to motor vehicles operating exclusively within the corporate limits of cities now or hereafter containing 75,000 inhabitants or more; provided, however, the maximum size, width, length and weight, including load, limits of such motor vehicles operating exclusively within the corporate limits of such cities shall in no case exceed the limits prescribed in paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 20 of the act of the first extraordinary session of the 51st general assembly approved July 30, 1921, known as the 'Motor vehicle law of 1921' and found at pages 76 to 107 both inclusive of the session laws of Missouri, 1921, 1st extra session.'
and (c) Sec. 5 expressly repealed all laws or parts of laws in conflict or inconsistent with the act.
It is true, as noted in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, that Sec. 3 contains the opening phrase: 'The provisions of this act shall not apply to motor vehicles operating exclusively within the corporate limits of cities now or hereafter containing 75,000 inhabitants or more; * * *.' It is important to note, however, that Sec. 3 goes further and specifically creates by reference to and incorporation of the size and weight limitations set up in the 1921 act a...
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