State v. Chaffee, 22182
| Decision Date | 10 September 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 22182,22182 |
| Citation | 285 S.C. 21,328 S.E.2d 464 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Jonathan CHAFFEE and Dallas Ferrell, Appellants. . Heard |
William Isaac Diggs, Deputy Appellate Defender, Columbia, E. Delance Poston and Benjamin D. Moore, Johnsonville, for appellant Chaffee.
David I. Bruck, Columbia, Charles E. Godwin, and Michael L. Morgan, Lake City, for appellant Ferrell.
T. Travis Medlock, Atty. Gen., Harold M. Coombs, Jr., Charles H. Richardson, Asst. Attys. Gen., Columbia, and Dudley Saleeby, Jr., Sol., Twelfth Judicial Circuit, Florence, for respondent.
The Defendant-Appellant, Jonathan Chaffee, and the Defendant-Appellant, Dallas Ferrell, were indicted for the offenses of criminal conspiracy, murder, criminal sexual conduct in the first degree (four counts), armed robbery, larceny, housebreaking, and arson. At the first phase of a bifurcated trial, both were found guilty on all counts except armed robbery. At the second phase of the bifurcated trial, the jury found that both should die by electrocution on the murder count. Sentences were imposed accordingly. Sentences for terms of years were imposed on the other counts. From these convictions and sentences, both have appealed. We affirm.
Ferrell has filed sixteen exceptions which he argues in the form of eight questions in his brief. Chaffee has filed twenty-five exceptions which he argues in the form of twelve questions in his brief. Some of the exceptions are identical or nearly so and will be treated together. Others will of necessity be treated separately. All exceptions have been considered.
At about 4 o'clock in the afternoon on May 10, 1982, Chaffee, age 23, and Ferrell, age 24, went to the home in Florence of Mrs. Adele Baroody, an eighty-one year old widow, for the ostensible purpose of getting a drink of water. She allowed them to enter her home and supplied their needs; upon the arrival of her daughter-in-law, Mrs. Elizabeth Baroody, at the home the two men left. The daughter-in-law left shortly after their departure. Soon thereafter, the two men returned to the home and with the use of force entered through a door. Ferrell held a gun on Mrs. Baroody while Chaffee proceeded to disrobe and assault her. Through force, they carried her upstairs and onto a bed where both committed rape upon her body, both regularly and by way of the anus. They then strangled her by wrapping her own panty hose around her neck creating pressure with the "tourniquet." A mop handle was also rammed into her chest, and she was cut about the breasts with a broken light bulb. Her feet were tied to the bed posts.
Thereafter, they stole property from the house and in order to destroy the evidence of their crimes set fire to the building and left. When neighbors saw smoke coming from the building, the fire department was called and arrived about 6 o'clock p.m. to extinguish the blaze.
The daughter-in-law of Mrs. Baroody gave to the police officers descriptions of the men she had seen in the home of Mrs. Baroody. Using these descriptions, they located both defendants in the vicinity and detained them.
Each of the defendants, on separate days and acting independently of each other, gave a video taped confession demonstrating in the home of Mrs. Baroody how they committed the crimes. The testimony of each, as included in the respective confessions, is consistent with the evidence supplied by other witnesses. The confession of each is also consistent with the other although each has some details not included by the other. The convictions are based in large measure on these two confessions. Neither testified at either stage of the trial.
We consider the entire record to determine whether the defendants did or did not receive a fair trial.
Both Chaffee and Ferrell submit that the trial judge erred in excusing Mattie L. Clea from jury service after voir dire because of her views as related to capital punishment citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). Ms. Clea was questioned at length. In the last analysis, it became the duty of the judge to determine whether she was qualified under Witherspoon. In making the determination, he was not required to, and should not, single out any one question and answer. The questioning process must always be viewed in its entirety. State v. Linder, 276 S.C. 304, 278 S.E.2d 335 (1981); State v. Elmore, 279 S.C. 417, 308 S.E.2d 781, (1983). There was a reasonable basis for him to conclude that this prospective juror was unable to faithfully discharge her responsibility as a juror under the law. The ruling was consistent with the mandate of Section 16-3-20(E) of the Cum.Supp. of the 1976 Code which addresses the circumstances under which a person may be disqualified in a death penalty case from service on a jury panel. We find no error.
It is next the contention of both Chaffee and Ferrell that they were illegally detained and arrested and that the confessions and other evidence procured was "the fruit of the poisonous tree" and should have been excluded by the trial judge. A hearing was held out of the presence of the jury in response to motions to suppress. As a basis for the judge's ruling that the confession and the evidence was admissible, he had before him the following information: After the fire department had arrived about 6 o'clock to extinguish the fire at the Baroody home, police officers also came and were supplied with information by the daughter-in-law of Mrs. Baroody. She described the two men who had gained entrance to the home of the deceased person shortly before. Detective Raines told the judge that he knew Chaffee inasmuch as he had arrested him previously and that he was familiar with the fact that he had previously been suspected of arson. He suspected that arson was the cause of the fire at the Baroody home. Chaffee was located down the street in the park. Upon being accosted, Chaffee stated that he had been to the house earlier and upon request, accompanied the police officers to the victim's house and pointed out that this was the house he had previously visited. It was the Baroody residence. Chaffee told the officers that Dallas Ferrell had accompanied him. Ferrell was found in front of the burned house. Both Chaffee and Ferrell were given Miranda warnings. It is not contested but that the officers had probable cause to believe that a felony or felonies had been committed. It is argued that they had no probable cause to believe that Chaffee and Ferrell were the perpetrators.
Approximately five hours after police officers had accosted Chaffee and Ferrell, a confession was given and a watch taken from the Baroody home was found on the person of Chaffee. During this period of time, the two suspects were not under formal arrest but were inescapably restrained from leaving. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), recognizes the rights of officers to temporarily detain suspects for investigative purposes even though no information is available at the time as a basis for procuring an arrest warrant. The time and the circumstances of the detention depends upon the nature and the extent of the governmental interest involved. We quote from that case:
One general interest is of course that of effective crime prevention and detection; it is this interest which underlies the recognition that a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for the purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.
The reasonableness of the law appreciates the fact that on occasion one may be wrongfully stopped, frisked and detained. The reasonableness of an officer's conduct and detention is related to all of the circumstances including the nature of the crime. Here, it was evident that the worst of crimes had been committed; the suspicion, even if short of probable cause, was great. Counsel for the appellants cite and rely upon the recent case of Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). Therein, the Court said:
... The scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.
The predicate permitting seizures on suspicion short of probable cause is that law enforcement interests warrant a limited intrusion on the personal security of the suspect. The scope of the intrusion permitted will vary to some extent with the particular facts and circumstances of each case. This much, however, is clear: an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly, the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881-882, 95 S.Ct. [2574] at 2580-2581 [45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975) ], Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. at 146, 92 S.Ct. [1921] at 1923 [32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) ]. It is the State's burden to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify on the basis of a reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure.
We agree with the trial judge who said: "And I do not believe that their Fourth Amendment rights have been violated, considering the totality of the circumstances, that is, the whole picture which I have taken into account, and based upon this I am of the opinion that the officers had a particularized and effective faces [sic] [apparently basis] for suspecting the persons stopped of criminal activity." We find no error.
Both Chaffee and Ferrell submit that the trial judge erred in admitting into evidence video taped confessions and reenactment of the crimes. Each had, on the night of the crimes and after being given...
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